Q - iShares Ethereum Trust ETF
For the period ended Jun 30, 2025. Filed Aug 5, 2025.
View on SEC.govAbout this filing
A company's report for each of its first three quarters. The financial statements are not audited. It shows how the business has moved since the last annual report, and what management says changed.
Jun 30, 2025 · Filed Aug 5, 2025
What changed in Risk Factors?
Read the current filingPrevious report: 10-Q
Period ended 2025-03-31; filed 2025-05-07.
0001437749-25-015164
Item 1A. Risk FactorsUnregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of ProceedsDefaults Upon Senior SecuritiesCurrent report: 10-Q
Period ended 2025-06-30; filed 2025-08-05.
0001437749-25-024883
Item 1A. Risk FactorsUnregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of ProceedsDefaults Upon Senior SecuritiesThe baseline is this issuer’s latest earlier reporting period of the same form that was filed before the current report. A previous 10-Q is a different quarter, not a year-over-year comparison. Amendments are excluded.
Compared 64 previous paragraphs and 72 current paragraphs.
54 unchanged; 10 reworded; 8 added; 0 removed; 0 previous and 0 current paragraphs rearranged.
Tables are not compared: 1 previous and 1 current tables excluded. Dates, whitespace, punctuation and numbering changes are ignored; changes to financial figures remain significant.
A changed paragraph is not evidence that risk increased or decreased. An unchanged paragraph does not establish that risk stayed the same.
Added paragraphs (8)
Current report
The limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions of Shares could have adverse consequences for the Trust.
Current report
Authorized Participants must be registered broker-dealers. Registered broker-dealers are subject to various requirements of the federal securities laws and rules, including financial responsibility rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements. On May 15, 2025, the Division of Trading and Markets of the SEC and the Office of General Counsel of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) stated that broker-dealers are permitted to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions in connection with spot crypto exchange-traded products; however, there has yet to be definitive regulatory guidance on and the specific details of how registered broker-dealers can comply with SEC rules with regard to transacting in or holding spot ether. Until further regulatory clarity emerges regarding whether registered broker-dealers can hold and deal in ether under such rules, there is a risk that registered broker-dealers participating in the in-kind creation or redemption of Shares for ether may be unable to demonstrate compliance with such requirements. While compliance with rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements would be the broker-dealer’s responsibility, a national securities exchange is required to enforce compliance by its member broker-dealers with applicable federal securities law and rules. As of the date of this filing, the Sponsor and the Trustee have not executed agreements that give them the ability to conduct creations and redemptions in-kind for ether, in addition to conducting creations and redemptions for cash.
Current report
Even with the recent approval of in-kind creations and redemptions, the Trust’s limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions could result in the exchange-traded product arbitrage mechanism failing to function as efficiently as it otherwise would, leading to the potential for the Shares to trade at premiums or discounts to the NAV, and such premiums or discounts could be substantial. See “—The use of cash creations and redemptions, as opposed to in-kind creations and redemptions, may adversely affect the arbitrage transactions by Authorized Participants intended to keep the price of the Shares closely linked to the price of ether and, as a result, the price of the Shares may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV.” Furthermore, if cash creations or redemptions are unavailable, either due to the Sponsor’s decision to reject or suspend such orders, the unavailability of Ether Trading Counterparties or the Prime Execution Agent’s services, or otherwise, Authorized Participants will be limited in their ability to redeem or create Shares, in which case the arbitrage mechanism may not function as efficiently. This could result in impaired liquidity for the Shares, wider bid/ask spreads in secondary trading of the Shares and greater costs to investors and other market participants. In addition, the Trust’s limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions, and resulting relative reliance on cash creations and redemptions, could cause the Sponsor to halt or suspend the creation or redemption of Shares during times of market volatility or turmoil, among other consequences.
Current report
Further, there can be no assurance that broker-dealers would be willing to serve as Authorized Participants with respect to the in-kind creation and redemption of Shares. Any of these factors could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares.
Current report
Additional risks such as operational failures (e.g., technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns regarding the adequacy or transparency of reserve assets backing stablecoins, the use of unbacked or undercollateralized stablecoins in potentially manipulative trading practices and regulatory scrutiny of stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, including exchanges that facilitate stablecoin transactions, may also adversely affect market confidence and liquidity. Further, these risks are underscored by recent legislative developments. On July 18, 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (“GENIUS Act”) was enacted, establishing a federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins. The GENIUS Act prohibits the issuance or use of payment stablecoins unless the issuer obtains a qualifying license and complies with a range of regulatory requirements, including reserve backing with liquid assets, redemption rights, governance standards, and operational transparency. The GENIUS Act also restricts the payment of interest on stablecoins and imposes oversight on both bank and nonbank issuers. The enactment of the GENIUS Act, or the removal or migration of prominent stablecoins from the Ethereum network, could reduce the willingness of market participants to engage in digital asset transactions that rely on stablecoins, diminish liquidity in the ether market, and adversely affect the price of ether. Any such developments could, in turn, materially and adversely impact the value of the Shares.
Current report
In recent times, a number of companies engaged in businesses outside the digital assets industry have begun to hold their corporate treasuries in digital assets instead of in fiat currency (“digital asset treasury companies”). In some cases these companies have raised funds through financing or securities offerings and applied the proceeds to purchase digital assets, including ether.
Current report
Digital asset treasury companies are a relatively new phenomenon and it is difficult to predict their long-term sustainability, and therefore their impact to digital asset markets, and to the Trust. Digital asset treasury companies may increase procyclical dynamics in the market because they may purchase digital assets, such as ether, when prices are rising and they may in certain circumstances be forced to sell such assets when prices are decreasing, potentially causing downward pressure on ether prices in a falling market (causing prices to fall faster than they otherwise would). Digital asset treasury companies could cause greater volatility in digital asset markets, including markets for ether. Negative events or sentiment surrounding digital asset treasury companies could affect the market for ether. The foregoing or similar events involving digital asset treasury companies could adversely affect holders of Shares in the Trust.
Reworded paragraphs (10)
Previous wording
The price of some digital assets, including ether, has risen following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Many expect the new administration to facilitate a supportive regulatory approach toward the digital asset industry. Through his executive orders, President Trump has indicated that the administration will work toward providing greater regulatory clarity for blockchain technology and digital assets, thereby fostering their development in the U.S. Similarly, the digital asset industry expects favorable legislation from the new U.S. Congress as certain members have expressed interest in advancing digital asset specific legislation. There can be no assurance that market expectations around future activity by the administration or Congress will be fulfilled, or that digital asset prices will rise or maintain their current levels. Some commentators have referred to the digital asset market post‑President Trump’s election as a bubble. There can be no assurance that such a bubble does not exist. The failure of the administration and Congress to provide the expected level of regulatory clarity and support for blockchain technology and digital assets, could lead to a decline in digital assets prices, including ether. Such a decline could cause a decline in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. Moreover, there can be no assurance that political dynamics and sentiments toward the digital asset industry, or market perceptions of those sentiments, will not shift over time.
Current wording
The price of some digital assets, including ether, have fluctuated significantly following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Many expect the new administration to facilitate a supportive regulatory approach toward the digital asset industry. Through his executive orders, President Trump has indicated that the administration will work toward providing greater regulatory clarity for blockchain technology and digital assets, thereby fostering their development in the U.S. Similarly, the digital asset industry expects favorable legislation from the new U.S. Congress as certain members have expressed interest in advancing digital asset specific legislation. There can be no assurance that market expectations around future activity by the administration or Congress will be fulfilled, or that digital asset prices will rise or maintain their current levels. Some commentators have referred to the digital asset market post‑President Trump’s election as a bubble. There can be no assurance that such a bubble does not exist. The failure of the administration and Congress to provide the expected level of regulatory clarity and support for blockchain technology and digital assets, could lead to a decline in digital asset prices, including ether. Such a decline could cause a decline in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. Moreover, there can be no assurance that political dynamics and sentiments toward the digital asset industry, or market perceptions of those sentiments, will not shift over time.
Previous wording
On March 13, 2024, the Ethereum network underwent a planned fork called “Dencunˮ implementing a series of EIPs. EIP 4844, which some commentators perceive to be the most significant EIP within the Dencun series, is intended to improve the economics of Layer 2s by reducing transaction fees for Layer 2s who batch transactions executed on the Layer 2s and upload them as a batch (or as a single proof) onto the main Layer 1 Ethereum network. Among other objectives, the Dencun software upgrade was designed to provide Layer 2 scaling solutions a designated storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, called Binary Large Objects (“blobsˮ), which attach large data chunks to transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network and are recorded on its blockchain. The data in blobs become inaccessible on the Layer 1 Ethereum network after a temporary period of time (three weeks), unlike the previous method of storing batched data from Layer 2s on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, which was stored permanently. The cost of accessing the temporary storage in blobs is expected by proponents of the Dencun upgrade to be substantially lower than the cost of storing the data on the Ethereum Layer 1 network permanently, making Layer 2s more cost-efficient to operate and, some commentators hope, making them more attractive as a scaling solution. Immediately following the upgrade, some Layer 2s reportedly experienced reduced transaction fees when batching transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network, which in turn lowered the transaction costs for executing transactions on such Layer 2s, but this also is believed to have resulted in ether prices (ether being the native asset of the Layer 1 Ethereum network) dropping as well due, in part, to the reduced demand for ether to pay the transaction costs of recording data on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Decreased ether prices could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Additionally, some Layer 2s, such as Blast, reportedly experienced outages and other disruptions in the aftermath of the Dencun upgrade, which in the case of Blast halted block production on the Blast Layer 2 blockchain for a period of time, though it was reportedly restored afterward. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Dencun could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares.
Current wording
On March 13, 2024, the Ethereum network underwent a planned fork called “Dencun” implementing a series of EIPs. EIP 4844, which some commentators perceive to be the most significant EIP within the Dencun series, is intended to improve the economics of Layer 2s by reducing transaction fees for Layer 2s who batch transactions executed on the Layer 2s and upload them as a batch (or as a single proof) onto the main Layer 1 Ethereum network. Among other objectives, the Dencun software upgrade was designed to provide Layer 2 scaling solutions a designated storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, called Binary Large Objects (“blobs”), which attach large data chunks to transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network and are recorded on its blockchain. The data in blobs become inaccessible on the Layer 1 Ethereum network after a temporary period of time (three weeks), unlike the previous method of storing batched data from Layer 2s on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, which was stored permanently. The cost of accessing the temporary storage in blobs is expected by proponents of the Dencun upgrade to be substantially lower than the cost of storing the data on the Ethereum Layer 1 network permanently, making Layer 2s more cost-efficient to operate and, some commentators hope, making them more attractive as a scaling solution. Immediately following the upgrade, some Layer 2s reportedly experienced reduced transaction fees when batching transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network, which in turn lowered the transaction costs for executing transactions on such Layer 2s, but this also is believed to have resulted in ether prices (ether being the native asset of the Layer 1 Ethereum network) dropping as well due, in part, to the reduced demand for ether to pay the transaction costs of recording data on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Decreased ether prices could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Additionally, some Layer 2s, such as Blast, reportedly experienced outages and other disruptions in the aftermath of the Dencun upgrade, which in the case of Blast halted block production on the Blast Layer 2 blockchain for a period of time, though it was reportedly restored afterward. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Dencun could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares.
Previous wording
As illustrated by Dencun and the Merge, the Ethereum network regularly implements planned forks in an effort to achieve its development roadmap, advance the scalability process, and to improve the network generally. For example, in connection with the Ethereum development roadmap, the Ethereum network executed planned forks to transition from the initial Frontier development stage into the Homestead development stage in 2016; to transition from the Homestead development stage to the first sub-stage, Byzantium, of the Metropolis development stage in 2017; to transition from the Byzantium sub-stage to the St. Petersburg sub-stage in early 2019; and to transition from the St. Petersburg sub-stage to the Istanbul sub-phase, in late 2019. In April 2021, the Ethereum network underwent the Berlin and Altair planned forks, among others. In 2022, Ethereum underwent the Bellatrix and Paris planned forks in connection with the Merge. In 2023, Ethereum underwent the Capella and Shanghai planned forks (collectively, “Shapella”), which enabled withdrawals of staked assets to the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain mainnet for the first time (they had previously been locked on the Beacon Chain testnet following the Merge). Forthcoming Ethereum upgrades include, “Pectra” which is a combination of the Prague execution layer hard fork and the Electra consensus layer upgrade, scheduled to go live on May 7, 2025. Pectra intends to, among other changes, increase the maximum amount of ether that a validator can stake from 32 to 2,048, allowing validators to manage higher balances with the goal of potentially reducing costs; introduce account abstraction, allowing externally owned accounts (EOAs) to temporarily function like smart contracts; and reduce security risks and shorten the wait time for new validators. Any of these or future planned forks could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s nodes, users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. Alternatively, such hard forks could be contentious, leading to a split and fracture in the Ethereum community to its collective detriment, as discussed above. Any such outcomes could adversely affect the value of the Shares.
Current wording
As illustrated by Dencun and the Merge, the Ethereum network regularly implements planned forks in an effort to achieve its development roadmap, advance the scalability process, and to improve the network generally. For example, in connection with the Ethereum development roadmap, the Ethereum network executed planned forks to transition from the initial Frontier development stage into the Homestead development stage in 2016; to transition from the Homestead development stage to the first sub-stage, Byzantium, of the Metropolis development stage in 2017; to transition from the Byzantium sub‑stage to the St. Petersburg sub-stage in early 2019; and to transition from the St. Petersburg sub-stage to the Istanbul sub-phase, in late 2019. In April 2021, the Ethereum network underwent the Berlin and Altair planned forks, among others. In 2022, Ethereum underwent the Bellatrix and Paris planned forks in connection with the Merge. In 2023, Ethereum underwent the Capella and Shanghai planned forks (collectively, “Shapella”), which enabled withdrawals of staked assets to the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain mainnet for the first time (they had previously been locked on the Beacon Chain testnet following the Merge). On May 7, 2025, “Pectra” which is a combination of the Prague execution layer hard fork and the Electra consensus layer upgrade, went live. Pectra, among other changes, increased the maximum amount of ether that a validator can stake from 32 to 2,048, allowing validators to manage higher balances with the goal of potentially reducing costs; introduce account abstraction, allowing externally owned accounts (EOAs) to temporarily function like smart contracts; and reduce security risks and shorten the wait time for new validators. Any of these or future planned forks could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s nodes, users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. Alternatively, such hard forks could be contentious, leading to a split and fracture in the Ethereum community to its collective detriment, as discussed above. Any such outcomes could adversely affect the value of the Shares.
Previous wording
In addition, over the past several years, some digital asset platforms have been closed due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such digital asset platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such digital asset platforms. While, generally speaking, smaller digital asset platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger digital asset platforms more stable, larger digital asset platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and their shortcomings or ultimate failures are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, and therefore may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in late February 2014, demonstrated that even the largest digital asset platforms could be subject to abrupt failure with consequences for both users of digital asset platforms and the digital asset industry as a whole. In particular, in the two weeks that followed the February 7, 2014 halt of bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one bitcoin fell on other platforms from around $795 on February 6, 2014 to $578 on February 20, 2014. Additionally, in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets. Further, in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex, a large digital asset platform. The value of bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. Regulatory enforcement actions have followed, such as in July 2017, when FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct digital asset platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based digital asset platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. Following the hack, Youbit users were allowed to withdraw approximately 75% of the digital assets in their platform accounts, with any potential further distributions to be made following Yapian’s pending bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in January 2018, the Japanese digital asset platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian digital asset platform Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest digital asset platforms, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset platforms by volume at the time, halted customer wit…
Excerpt shortened here; the source contains the full paragraph.
Current wording
In addition, over the past several years, some digital asset platforms have been closed due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such digital asset platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such digital asset platforms. While, generally speaking, smaller digital asset platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger digital asset platforms more stable, larger digital asset platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and their shortcomings or ultimate failures are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, and therefore may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in late February 2014, demonstrated that even the largest digital asset platforms could be subject to abrupt failure with consequences for both users of digital asset platforms and the digital asset industry as a whole. In particular, in the two weeks that followed the February 7, 2014 halt of bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one bitcoin fell on other platforms from around $795 on February 6, 2014 to $578 on February 20, 2014. Additionally, in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets. Further, in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex, a large digital asset platform. The value of bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. Regulatory enforcement actions have followed, such as in July 2017, when FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct digital asset platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based digital asset platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. Following the hack, Youbit users were allowed to withdraw approximately 75% of the digital assets in their platform accounts, with any potential further distributions to be made following Yapian’s pending bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in January 2018, the Japanese digital asset platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian digital asset platform Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest digital asset platforms, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset platforms by volume at the time, halted customer wit…
Excerpt shortened here; the source contains the full paragraph.
Previous wording
Further, if the Trustee decides to operationalize the Additional Ether Custodian, the Additional Ether Custodian would perform essential functions in terms of safekeeping any of the Trust’s ether that is held with Anchorage. The Anchorage Custodian Agreement provides the Trust with an alternative ether custodian to safeguard the Trust’s ether; however, if the Trustee does not operationalize the Additional Ether Custodian, or if Anchorage fails to perform the functions of the Anchorage Custodian Agreement once operationalized, the Trust may be unable to operate or create or redeem Baskets or may suffer losses, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares. Anchorage could terminate services under the Anchorage Custodian Agreement upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately for Cause. A “Termination for Cause” is defined in the Anchorage Custodian Agreement as: (i) the Trust materially breaches any provision of the Additional Ether Custodian Agreement, and such breach remains uncured for a period of 30 calendar days after notice of such breach is provided by Anchorage to the Trust; or (ii) the Trust becomes bankrupt or insolvent. If Anchorage were to terminate services under the Anchorage Custodian Agreement, the Trustee may need to find and appoint a replacement ether custodian.
Current wording
Further, if the Trustee decides to operationalize the Additional Ether Custodian, the Additional Ether Custodian would perform essential functions in terms of safekeeping any of the Trust’s ether that is held with Anchorage. The Anchorage Custodian Agreement provides the Trust with an available alternative ether custodian to safeguard the Trust’s ether; however, if the Trustee does not operationalize the Additional Ether Custodian, or if Anchorage fails to perform the functions of the Anchorage Custodian Agreement once operationalized, the Trust may be unable to operate or create or redeem Baskets, or may suffer losses, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares. Anchorage could terminate services under the Anchorage Custodian Agreement upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately for Cause. A “Termination for Cause” is defined in the Anchorage Custodian Agreement as: (i) the Trust materially breaches any provision of the Additional Ether Custodian Agreement, and such breach remains uncured for a period of 30 calendar days after notice of such breach is provided by Anchorage to the Trust; or (ii) the Trust becomes bankrupt or insolvent. If Anchorage were to terminate services under the Anchorage Custodian Agreement, the Trustee may need to find and appoint a replacement ether custodian.
Previous wording
The lack of full insurance and Shareholders’*** limited rights of legal recourse against the Trust, the Delaware Trustee, the Sponsor, the Trust Administrator, the Cash Custodian, the Prime Execution Agent, the Ether Custodian and, if operationalized, the Additional Ether Custodian, expose the Trust and its Shareholders to the risk of loss of the Trust***’s ether for which no person or entity is liable.
Current wording
The lack of full insurance and Shareholders’ limited rights of legal recourse against the Trust, the Delaware Trustee, the Sponsor, the Trust Administrator, the Cash Custodian, the Prime Execution Agent, the Ether Custodian and, if operationalized, the Additional Ether Custodian, expose the Trust and its Shareholders to the risk of loss of the Trust’s ether for which no person or entity is liable.
Previous wording
There is a lack of consensus regarding the regulation of digital assets, including ether, and their markets. As a result of the growth in the size of the digital asset market, as well as the 2022 Events, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies (including FinCEN, SEC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”), CFTC, FINRA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), state financial institution regulators, and others) have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the digital asset markets. Many of these state and federal agencies have brought enforcement actions or issued consumer advisories regarding the risks posed by digital assets to investors. Ongoing and future regulatory actions with respect to digital assets generally or ether in particular may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate. The 2022 Events, including among others the bankruptcy filings of FTX and its subsidiaries, Three Arrows Capital, Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, Genesis, BlockFi and others, and other developments in the digital asset markets, have resulted in calls for heightened scrutiny and regulation of the digital asset industry, with a specific focus on intermediaries such as digital asset platforms, platforms, and custodians. Federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies may introduce and enact new laws and regulations to regulate crypto asset intermediaries, such as digital asset platforms and custodians. The March 2023 collapses of Silicon Valley Bank, Silvergate Bank, and Signature Bank, which in some cases provided services to the digital assets industry, may amplify and/or accelerate these trends.
Current wording
There is a lack of consensus regarding the regulation of digital assets, including ether, and their markets. As a result of the growth in the size of the digital asset market, as well as the 2022 Events, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies (including FinCEN, SEC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”), CFTC, FINRA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), state financial institution regulators, and others) have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the digital asset markets. Many of these state and federal agencies have brought enforcement actions or issued consumer advisories regarding the risks posed by digital assets to investors. Ongoing and future regulatory actions with respect to digital assets generally or ether in particular may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate. The 2022 Events, including among others the bankruptcy filings of FTX and its subsidiaries, Three Arrows Capital, Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, Genesis, BlockFi and others, and other developments in the digital asset markets, have resulted in calls for heightened scrutiny and regulation of the digital asset industry, with a specific focus on intermediaries such as digital asset platforms, platforms, and custodians. Federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies may introduce and enact new laws and regulations to regulate crypto asset intermediaries, such as digital asset platforms and custodians. The March 2023 collapses of Silicon Valley Bank, Silvergate Bank, and Signature Bank, which in some cases provided services to the digital asset industry, may amplify and/or accelerate these trends.
Previous wording
Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, certain privacy-enhancing features have been, or are expected to be, introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If the Ethereum network was to adopt any of these privacy-enhancing features, these features may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction-level data. For example, “privacy pools,” zero knowledge proofs, and other technologies that could enhance privacy have been discussed by participants in the Ethereum network. Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In August 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. citizens from using Tornado Cash, a digital asset protocol designed to obfuscate blockchain transactions, by adding certain Ethereum wallet addresses associated with the protocol to its Specially Designated Nationals list. On October 19, 2023, FinCEN published a proposed rulemaking to apply the authorities in Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to impose requirements on financial institutions that engage in in CVC transactions with CVC mixers. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require covered financial institutions to report to FinCEN any CVC transactions they process that involves CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. The term “CVC mixing” covers more than just transactions that involve CVC mixers like Tornado Cash, and seemingly could cover a broader range of conduct involving technologies, services, or methods that have the effect of obfuscating the source, destination, or amount of a CVC transaction, whether or not the obfuscation was intentional. If the rule were to be adopted as proposed and if the Ethereum network were to be deemed to or were to adopt features which come within the rule’s ambit, it could cause covered financial institutions – such as many digital asset platforms or the Trust’s service providers, such as the Prime Broker or Cash Custodian – to reduce support for or cease offering services for ether or to the Trust, which could impair the utility of ether, the value of the Shares and the Trust’s ability to operate in compliance with new laws and regulations.
Current wording
Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, certain privacy-enhancing features have been, or are expected to be, introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If the Ethereum network was to adopt any of these privacy-enhancing features, these features may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction-level data. For example, “privacy pools,” zero knowledge proofs, and other technologies that could enhance privacy have been discussed by participants in the Ethereum network. Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In August 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. citizens from using Tornado Cash, a digital asset protocol designed to obfuscate blockchain transactions, by adding certain Ethereum wallet addresses associated with the protocol to its Specially Designated Nationals list. On October 19, 2023, FinCEN published a proposed rulemaking to apply the authorities in Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to impose requirements on financial institutions that engage in CVC transactions with CVC mixers. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require covered financial institutions to report to FinCEN any CVC transactions they process that involves CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. The term “CVC mixing” covers more than just transactions that involve CVC mixers like Tornado Cash, and seemingly could cover a broader range of conduct involving technologies, services, or methods that have the effect of obfuscating the source, destination, or amount of a CVC transaction, whether or not the obfuscation was intentional. If the rule were to be adopted as proposed and if the Ethereum network were to be deemed to or were to adopt features which come within the rule’s ambit, it could cause covered financial institutions – such as many digital asset platforms or the Trust’s service providers, such as the Prime Execution Agent or Cash Custodian – to reduce support for or cease offering services for ether or to the Trust, which could impair the utility of ether, the value of the Shares and the Trust’s ability to operate in compliance with new laws and regulations.
Previous wording
Given the foundational role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their fundamental liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for ether. Because a large portion of the digital asset market still depends on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC, there is a risk that a disorderly de-pegging or a run-on Tether or USDC could lead to dramatic market volatility in digital assets more broadly. Volatility in stablecoins, operational issues with stablecoins (for example, technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns about the sufficiency of any reserves that support stablecoins or potential manipulative activity when unbacked stablecoins are used to pay for other digital assets (including ether), regulatory concerns about stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, such as exchanges, that support stablecoins, or proposed legislation, such as the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act which prohibits the use of payment stablecoins unless the issuers obtain certain licenses and comply with various regulatory and other requirements, or the removal or migration of prominent stablecoins away from the Ethereum network, could impact individuals’ willingness to trade on trading venues that rely on stablecoins, reduce liquidity in the ether market, and affect the value of ether, and in turn impact an investment in the Shares.
Current wording
Given the foundational role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their fundamental liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for ether. A significant portion of the digital asset market continues to depend on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC. As such, any disruption in the operation or perceived stability of these stablecoins such as a disorderly de-pegging event or a loss of market confidence resulting in a run on reserves could lead to substantial market volatility across digital assets more broadly.
Previous wording
c) 24,000,000 Shares (600 Baskets) were redeemed during the quarter ended March 31, 2025.
Current wording
c) 9,880,000 Shares (247 Baskets) were redeemed during the quarter ended June 30, 2025.