WisdomTree Bitcoin Fund

Previous wording

The entire cryptocurrency industry experienced a significant drawdown in 2022, particularly throughout the latter half of the year. The decline was due to numerous factors, including a slowing macroeconomic environment, rising interest rates, expiring pandemic financial assistance, and the public collapse of several major industry participants, including Three Arrows Capital, Voyager, Celsius, and most recently, FTX and Genesis. The cryptocurrency industry’s turbulent drawdown in 2022 is expected to draw increased regulatory and enforcement scrutiny from, among others, the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress, as well as state regulators and authorities. Developments in the regulation of digital assets are ongoing. For example, in July 2023, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled on the SEC’s action against Ripple Labs, Inc. The court found that offers and sales of XRP, a digital token, to institutions and sophisticated individuals constituted securities transactions, but that offers and sales of XRP on crypto trading platforms, distributions to employees, and other third-party developers were not securities transactions. More recently, the D.C. Circuit Court found that the SEC’s denial of the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust’s listing was “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedures Act in light of the SEC’s approval of two similar bitcoin futures-based exchange-traded products (“ETPs”). In the immediate aftermath of this court decision, the price of bitcoin increased from nearly $26,000 to over $28,100. After the results of the U.S. presidential election in November 2024, the price of bitcoin rallied to an all-time high of over $100,000 in December 2024 based, in part, on the market’s perception that the new presidential administration would be pro-cryptocurrency. It is not possible to predict at this time all of the risks that regulatory developments may pose to the Trust, its service providers or to the digital asset industry as a whole.

Current wording

While, regulatory and enforcement scrutiny increased through the end of 2024, including from, among others, the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress, as well as state regulators and authorities, the current U.S. presidential administration has signaled its desire to strengthen U.S. leadership in the digital assets space through the issuance of executive orders and the establishment of an interagency working group that is tasked with proposing a regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets in the United States in early 2025. Meanwhile, the SEC officially rescinded Staff Accounting Bulletin 121 and established a new “Crypto Task Force” focused on providing clarity on the application of the federal securities laws to digital assets and collaborating with the digital assets industry and the public towards establishing an appropriate regulatory framework. Certain members of Congress have also outlined a proposed bicameral roadmap for digital asset legislation to address inconsistencies in digital asset classifications. In 2023, the D.C. Circuit Court found that the SEC’s denial of the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust’s listing was “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedures Act in light of the SEC’s approval of two similar bitcoin futures-based exchange-traded products (“ETPs”). In the immediate aftermath of this court decision, the price of bitcoin increased from nearly $26,000 to over $28,100 and reached record highs during 2025 before retreating. The exact timeline and impact of these recent regulatory developments on the Trust’s business is uncertain and it is not possible to predict at this time what risks, if any, that regulatory developments may pose to the Trust, its service providers or to the digital asset industry as a whole.

Previous wording

Forks have occurred already to the Bitcoin network. For example, in August 2017, Bitcoin “forked” into Bitcoin and a new digital asset, Bitcoin Cash, as a result of a several-year dispute over how to increase the rate of transactions that the Bitcoin network can process. At the time of the fork, bitcoin was valued at approximately $2,700. Within approximately two weeks following the fork, bitcoin reached a value of approximately $4,000, while nearly four months later in mid-December 2017, bitcoin reached an all-time high at the time of approximately $19,500, before dropping to approximately $14,000 prior to year-end 2017. Forks may also occur as a network community’s response to a significant security breach. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum “forked” into Ethereum and a new digital asset, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach in which an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to syphon approximately $60 million of ETH held by the DAO, a distributed autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the hack, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a “fork” that effectively reversed the hack. However, a minority of users continued to develop the original blockchain, now referred to as “Ethereum Classic” with the digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as Ethereum Classic, or ETC. ETC now trades on several digital asset platforms. A fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of otherwise compatible software that users run. Such a fork could lead to users and miners abandoning the digital asset with the flawed software. It is possible, however, that a substantial number of users and miners could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains. This could result in a permanent fork, as in the case of Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. In addition, many developers have previously initiated hard forks in the Blockchain to launch new digital assets, such as Bitcoin Gold and Bitcoin Diamond. To the extent such digital assets compete with bitcoin, such competition could impact demand for bitcoin and could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Forks may also occur as a network community’s response to a significant security breach. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum “forked” into Ethereum and a new digital asset, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach in which an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to syphon approximately $60 million of ETH held by The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the hack, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a “fork” that effectively reversed the hack. However, a minority of users continued to develop the original blockchain, now referred to as “Ethereum Classic” with the digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as Ethereum Classic, or ETC. ETC now trades on several digital asset platforms. A fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of otherwise compatible software that users run. Such a fork could lead to users and miners abandoning the digital asset with the flawed software. It is possible, however, that a substantial number of users and miners could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains. This could result in a permanent fork, as in the case of Ethereum and Ethereum Classic.

Previous wording

Furthermore, a hard fork can lead to new security concerns. For example, when the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks, two other digital asset networks, split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum exchanges through at least October 2016. An Ethereum exchange announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of mining power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual miner or mining pool’s hashing power to exceed 50% of the processing power of a digital asset network that retained or attracted less mining power, thereby making digital asset networks that rely on proof-of-work more susceptible to attack. A hard fork may adversely affect the price of bitcoin at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Furthermore, while the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which network is generally accepted as the Bitcoin network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the network and the associated digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Either of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Furthermore, a hard fork can lead to new security concerns. For example, when the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum platforms through at least October 2016. An Ethereum platform announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of mining power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual miner or mining pool’s hashing power to exceed 50% of the processing power of a digital asset network that retained or attracted less mining power, thereby making digital asset networks that rely on proof-of-work more susceptible to attack.

Previous wording

As another example of the effects of hard forks on digital assets, on September 15, 2022, the Ethereum Network completed a move from a proof-of-work model to a proof-of-stake model. Ethereum proof-of-work miners who disagreed with the new consensus mechanism forked the network which resulted in the Ethereum proof-of-work network. Ethereum proof-of-work network was driven by a small but vocal group of miners who wished to hold onto revenue as Ethereum switched to proof-of-stake. The vast majority of token holder votes preferred the new proof-of stake consensus method. There was no material impact on the Ethereum network as a result of the fork. All ether holders were airdropped Ethereum proof-of-work network tokens as a result of the hard fork. However, not all liquidity providers were able to trade the new token and the Ethereum proof-of-work network token almost immediately lost most of its value.

Current wording

As another example of the effects of hard forks on digital assets, on September 15, 2022, the Ethereum Network completed its Merge, moving from a proof-of-work model to a proof-of-stake model. Ethereum proof-of-work miners who disagreed with the new consensus mechanism forked the network which resulted in the Ethereum proof-of-work network. Ethereum proof-of-work network was driven by a small but vocal group of miners who wished to hold onto revenue as Ethereum switched to proof-of-stake. The vast majority of token holder votes preferred the new proof-of-stake consensus method. There was no material impact on the Ethereum network as a result of the fork. All ether holders were airdropped Ethereum proof-of-work network tokens as a result of the hard fork. However, not all liquidity providers were able to trade the new token and the Ethereum proof-of-work network token almost immediately lost most of its value.

Previous wording

Spot markets on which bitcoin trades may be susceptible to wash trading. Wash trading occurs when offsetting trades are entered into for other than bona fide reasons, such as the desire to inflate reported trading volumes. Wash trading may be motivated by non-economic reasons, such as a desire for increased visibility on popular websites that monitor markets for digital assets so as to improve their attractiveness to investors who look for maximum liquidity, or it may be motivated by the ability to attract listing fees from token issuers who seek the most liquid and high-volume exchanges on which to list their coins. Results of wash trading may include unexpected obstacles to trade and erroneous investment decisions based on false information. Any actual or perceived false trading in the digital asset markets, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of bitcoin and/or negatively affect the market perception of bitcoin. To the extent that wash trading either occurs or appears to occur in spot markets on which bitcoin trades, investors may develop negative perceptions about bitcoin and the digital assets industry more broadly, which could adversely impact the price bitcoin and, therefore, the price of Shares. Wash trading also may place more legitimate digital asset platforms at a relative competitive disadvantage.

Current wording

Spot markets on which bitcoin trades may be susceptible to wash trading. Wash trading occurs when offsetting trades are entered into for other than bona fide reasons, such as the desire to inflate reported trading volumes. Wash trading may be motivated by non-economic reasons, such as a desire for increased visibility on popular websites that monitor markets for digital assets so as to improve their attractiveness to investors who look for maximum liquidity, or it may be motivated by the ability to attract listing fees from token issuers who seek the most liquid and high-volume exchanges on which to list their coins. Results of wash trading may include unexpected obstacles to trade and erroneous investment decisions based on false information. Any actual or perceived false trading in the digital asset markets, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of bitcoin and/or negatively affect the market perception of bitcoin. To the extent that wash trading either occurs or appears to occur in spot markets on which bitcoin trades, investors may develop negative perceptions about bitcoin and the digital assets industry more broadly, which could adversely impact the price of bitcoin and, therefore, the price of Shares. Wash trading also may place more legitimate digital asset platforms at a relative competitive disadvantage.

Previous wording

The Trust and the Sponsor face competition with respect to the creation of competing exchange-traded bitcoin products. If the SEC were to approve many or all of the currently pending applications for such exchange-traded bitcoin products, many or all of such products, including the Trust, could fail to acquire substantial assets, initially or at all. The Trust’s competitors may also charge a substantially lower fee than the Sponsor’s Fee in order to achieve initial market acceptance and scale. Accordingly, the Sponsor’s competitors may commercialize a competing product more rapidly or effectively than the Sponsor is able to, which could adversely affect the Sponsor’s competitive position and the likelihood that the Trust will achieve initial market acceptance and could have a detrimental effect on the scale and sustainability of the Trust. If the Trust fails to achieve sufficient scale, approximately $450 million in assets or more, due to competition, limited interest or otherwise, the Sponsor may have difficulty in covering the costs associated with launching and maintaining the Trust and such shortfalls could impact the Sponsor’s ability to properly invest in robust ongoing operations and controls of the Trust to minimize the risk of operating events, errors, or other forms of losses to the Shareholders. In addition, the Trust may also fail to attract adequate liquidity in the secondary market due to such competition, resulting in a sub-standard number of Authorized Participants willing to make a market in the Shares, which in turn could result in a significant premium or discount in the Shares for extended periods and the Trust’s failure to reflect the performance of the price of bitcoin.

Current wording

The Trust and the Sponsor face competition with respect to the creation of competing exchange-traded bitcoin products. The Trust, could fail to acquire substantial assets, initially or at all. The Trust’s competitors may also charge a substantially lower fee than the Sponsor’s Fee in order to achieve initial market acceptance and scale. Accordingly, the Sponsor’s competitors may commercialize a competing product more rapidly or effectively than the Sponsor is able to, which could adversely affect the Sponsor’s competitive position and the likelihood that the Trust will achieve initial market acceptance and could have a detrimental effect on the scale and sustainability of the Trust. If the Trust fails to achieve sufficient scale, approximately $450 million in assets or more, due to competition, limited interest or otherwise, the Sponsor may have difficulty in covering the costs associated with launching and maintaining the Trust and such shortfalls could impact the Sponsor’s ability to properly invest in robust ongoing operations and controls of the Trust to minimize the risk of operating events, errors, or other forms of losses to the Shareholders. In addition, the Trust may also fail to attract adequate liquidity in the secondary market due to such competition, resulting in a sub-standard number of Authorized Participants willing to make a market in the Shares, which in turn could result in a significant premium or discount in the Shares for extended periods and the Trust’s failure to reflect the performance of the price of bitcoin.

Previous wording

Central banks in certain countries have introduced digital forms of legal tender (CBDCs). Research suggests over 100 countries are exploring CBDCs. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could have an advantage in competing with, or replace, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange or store of value. Central banks and other governmental entities have also announced cooperative initiatives and consortia with private sector entities, with the goal of leveraging blockchain and other technology to reduce friction in cross-border and interbank payments and settlement, and commercial banks and other financial institutions have also recently announced a number of initiatives of their own to incorporate new technologies, including blockchain and similar technologies, into their payments and settlement activities, which could compete with, or reduce the demand for, bitcoin. As a result, the value of bitcoin could decrease, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust.The scheduled mining of additional bitcoin and their subsequent sale may cause the price of bitcoin to decline, which could negatively affect an investment in the Trust.

Current wording

Central banks in certain countries have introduced digital forms of legal tender (CBDCs). Research suggests over 100 countries are exploring CBDCs. Whether or not they incorporate blockchain or similar technology, CBDCs, as legal tender in the issuing jurisdiction, could have an advantage in competing with, or replace, bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a medium of exchange or store of value. Central banks and other governmental entities have also announced cooperative initiatives and consortia with private sector entities, with the goal of leveraging blockchain and other technology to reduce friction in cross-border and interbank payments and settlement, and commercial banks and other financial institutions have also recently announced a number of initiatives of their own to incorporate new technologies, including blockchain and similar technologies, into their payments and settlement activities, which could compete with, or reduce the demand for, bitcoin. As a result, the value of bitcoin could decrease, which could adversely affect an investment in the Trust.

Previous wording

In addition, over the past several years, some bitcoin platforms have been closed due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such bitcoin platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such bitcoin platforms. While smaller bitcoin platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger bitcoin platforms more stable, larger bitcoin platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in late February 2014, demonstrated that even the largest bitcoin platforms could be subject to abrupt failure with consequences for both users of bitcoin platforms and the Bitcoin industry and market as a whole. In particular, in the two weeks that followed the February 7, 2014, halt of bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one bitcoin fell on other bitcoin platforms from around $795 on February 6, 2014 to $578 on February 20, 2014. Additionally, in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets. Further, in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex, a large bitcoin platform. The value of bitcoin immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex and the shares suffered a corresponding decrease in value. In July 2017, FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct bitcoin platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based cryptocurrency platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. Following the hack, Youbit users were allowed to withdraw approximately 75% of the digital assets in their platform accounts, with any potential further distributions to be made following Yapian’s pending bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in January 2018, the Japanese digital asset platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in June 2020 the platform suffered another data breach that resulted in the unauthorized access to its domain registration service, forcing the Japanese platform to halt its crypto remittance service. In February 2018, the Italian digital asset platform, Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest bitcoin platforms, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. The Spanish cryptocurrency platform, 2gether, disclosed in August 2020 that a cyberattack against its platform resulted in $1.45 million in crypto assets…

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Current wording

In addition, over the past several years, some bitcoin platforms have been closed due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such bitcoin platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such bitcoin platforms. While smaller bitcoin platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger bitcoin platforms more stable, larger bitcoin platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in late February 2014, demonstrated that even the largest bitcoin platforms could be subject to abrupt failure with consequences for both users of bitcoin platforms and the Bitcoin industry and market as a whole. In particular, in the two weeks that followed the February 7, 2014, halt of bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one bitcoin fell on other bitcoin platforms from around $795 on February 6, 2014 to $578 on February 20, 2014. Additionally, in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets. Further, in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex, a large bitcoin platform. The value of bitcoin immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex and the shares suffered a corresponding decrease in value. In July 2017, FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct bitcoin platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based cryptocurrency platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. Following the hack, Youbit users were allowed to withdraw approximately 75% of the digital assets in their platform accounts, with any potential further distributions to be made following Yapian’s pending bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in January 2018, the Japanese digital asset platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in June 2020 the platform suffered another data breach that resulted in the unauthorized access to its domain registration service, forcing the Japanese platform to halt its crypto remittance service. In February 2018, the Italian digital asset platform, Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest bitcoin platforms, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. The Spanish cryptocurrency platform, 2gether, disclosed in August 2020 that a cyberattack against its platform resulted in $1.45 million in crypto assets…

Excerpt shortened here; the source contains the full paragraph.

Previous wording

Bitcoin was the first digital asset to gain global adoption and critical mass, and as a result, it has a “first to market” advantage over other digital assets. As of December 31, 2024, bitcoin was the largest digital asset by market capitalization and had the largest user base and largest combined mining power. Despite this first to market advantage, as of December 31, 2024, there were over 10,000 alternative digital assets tracked by CoinMarketCap, having a total market-capitalization of approximately $3.25 trillion (including the approximately $1.834 trillion market cap of bitcoin), as calculated using market prices and total available supply of each digital asset. In addition, many consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms rather than open platforms like the Bitcoin network. Competition from the emergence or growth of alternative digital assets could have a negative impact on the demand for, and price of, bitcoin and thereby adversely affect an investment in the Shares.

Current wording

Bitcoin was the first digital asset to gain global adoption and critical mass, and as a result, it has a “first to market” advantage over other digital assets. As of December 31, 2025, bitcoin was the largest digital asset by market capitalization and had the largest user base and largest combined mining power. Despite this first to market advantage, as of December 31, 2025, there were over 29 million alternative digital assets tracked by CoinMarketCap, having a total market-capitalization of approximately $2.96 trillion (including the approximately $1.754 trillion market cap of bitcoin), as calculated using market prices and total available supply of each digital asset. In addition, many consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms rather than open platforms like the Bitcoin network. Competition from the emergence or growth of alternative digital assets could have a negative impact on the demand for, and price of, bitcoin and thereby adversely affect an investment in the Shares.

Previous wording

The use of cash creations and redemptions, as opposed to in-kind creations and redemptions, could cause delays in trade execution due to potential operational issues arising from implementing a cash creation and redemption model, which involves greater operational steps (and therefore execution risk) than the originally contemplated in-kind creation and redemption model, or the potential unavailability or exhaustion of the Trust’s ability to borrow bitcoin or cash as trade credits (“Trade Credits”), which the Trust would not be able to use in connection with in-kind creations and redemptions. Such delays could cause the execution price associated with such trades to materially deviate from the Reference Rate used to determine the NAV, particularly when considering that the trading prices for bitcoin have exhibited high levels of volatility and may continue to do so. Even though the Authorized Participant is responsible for the dollar cost of such difference in prices, Authorized Participants could default on their obligations to the Trust, or such potential risks and costs could lead to Authorized Participants, who would otherwise be willing to purchase or redeem Baskets to take advantage of any arbitrage opportunity arising from discrepancies between the price of the Shares and the price of the underlying bitcoin, to elect to not participate in the Trust’s Share creation and redemption processes. This may adversely affect the arbitrage mechanism intended to keep the price of the Shares closely linked to the price of bitcoin, and as a result, the price of the Shares may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV. If the arbitrage mechanism is not effective, purchases or sales of Shares on the secondary market could occur at a premium or discount to NAV, which could harm Shareholders by causing them buy Shares at a price higher than the value of the underlying bitcoin held by the Trust or sell Shares at a price lower than the value of the underlying bitcoin held by the Trust, causing Shareholders to suffer losses.

Current wording

The use of cash creations and redemptions, as opposed to in-kind creations and redemptions, could cause delays in trade execution due to potential operational issues arising from implementing a cash creation and redemption model, which involves greater operational steps (and therefore execution risk), or the potential unavailability or exhaustion of the Trust’s ability to borrow bitcoin or cash as trade credits (“Trade Credits”), which the Trust would not be able to use in connection with in-kind creations and redemptions. Such delays could cause the execution price associated with such trades to materially deviate from the Reference Rate used to determine the NAV, particularly when considering that the trading prices for bitcoin have exhibited high levels of volatility and may continue to do so. Even though the Authorized Participant is responsible for the dollar cost of such difference in prices, Authorized Participants could default on their obligations to the Trust, or such potential risks and costs could lead to Authorized Participants, who would otherwise be willing to purchase or redeem Baskets to take advantage of any arbitrage opportunity arising from discrepancies between the price of the Shares and the price of the underlying bitcoin, to elect to not participate in the Trust’s Share creation and redemption processes. This may adversely affect the arbitrage mechanism intended to keep the price of the Shares closely linked to the price of bitcoin, and as a result, the price of the Shares may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV. If the arbitrage mechanism is not effective, purchases or sales of Shares on the secondary market could occur at a premium or discount to NAV, which could harm Shareholders by causing them buy Shares at a price higher than the value of the underlying bitcoin held by the Trust or sell Shares at a price lower than the value of the underlying bitcoin held by the Trust, causing Shareholders to suffer losses.

Previous wording

As bitcoin and digital assets have grown in both popularity and market size, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the digital asset spot market. Many of these state and federal agencies have brought enforcement actions and issued advisories and rules relating to digital asset markets. Under the prior administration, the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) charged certain large US digital asset trading platforms of supporting trading and settlement of securities in violation of the US federal securities laws. Specifically, the SEC alleged that these exchanges are operating as unregistered securities exchanges, brokers and clearing agencies. Beginning in early 2025, the current administration took steps to strengthen U.S. leadership in the digital assets space, including through the use of executive orders and the establishment of an interagency working group that is tasked with proposing a regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets in the United States. Meanwhile, the SEC established a new “Crypto Task Force” focused on providing clarity on the application of the federal securities laws to digital assets and collaborating with the digital asset industry and the public towards establishing an appropriate regulatory framework and dismissed or paused ongoing enforcement actions or investigations against certain digital asset platforms and companies, including Coinbase, Binance, Kraken and Uniswap, during the first quarter of 2025. The U.S. Congress is also actively preparing new legislation to address issues relating to digital assets and stablecoins. The outcome of federal legislation is highly uncertain and may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares and/or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate.

Current wording

As bitcoin and digital assets have grown in both popularity and market size, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies (including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), SEC, OCC, CFTC, FINRA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the IRS, state financial institution regulators, and others) have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the digital asset trading platform market. Many of these state and federal agencies have brought enforcement actions and issued advisories and rules relating to digital asset markets. Ongoing and future regulatory actions with respect to digital assets generally or any single digital asset in particular may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares and/or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate.

Previous wording

It is not possible to predict whether, or when, any of these developments will lead to Congress granting additional authorities to the SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how they might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function or how any new regulations or changes to existing regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and bitcoin held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares.

Current wording

At this time, it is not possible to predict with certainty whether, or when, any of these legislative and regulatory developments will lead to Congress granting additional authorities to the SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how they might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function or how any new regulations or changes to existing regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and bitcoin held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares.