Skip to main content

Grayscale Zcash Trust ZEC

For the period ended Dec 31, 2024. Filed Mar 7, 2025.

View on SEC.gov

About this filing

A company's yearly report to the SEC, with audited financial statements. It is the fullest account a company gives of its business, its finances and the risks it sees.

FY2024 · Filed Mar 7, 2025

ZCSH$35.59+7.3%Stored close · as of Nov 6, 2026

What changed in Risk Factors?

Read the current filing

Previous report: 10-K

Period ended 2023-12-31; filed 2024-02-23.

0000950170-24-019126

Item 1A. Risk Factors

Current report: 10-K

Period ended 2024-12-31; filed 2025-03-07.

0000950170-25-035469

Item 1A. Risk Factors

The baseline is this issuer’s latest earlier reporting period of the same form that was filed before the current report. A previous 10-Q is a different quarter, not a year-over-year comparison. Amendments are excluded.

Compared 196 previous paragraphs and 187 current paragraphs.

100 unchanged; 73 reworded; 12 added; 17 removed; 6 previous and 2 current paragraphs rearranged.

Tables are not compared: 0 previous and 0 current tables excluded. Dates, whitespace, punctuation and numbering changes are ignored; changes to financial figures remain significant.

A changed paragraph is not evidence that risk increased or decreased. An unchanged paragraph does not establish that risk stayed the same.

Added paragraphs (12)

Current report

The limited history of the Index;

Current report

Digital asset mining operations can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for mining operations. Additionally, miners may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage, or when the cost of electricity as compared to mining, validating, or transaction fees make conducting operations uneconomical.

Current report

Furthermore, a hard fork can lead to new security concerns. For example, when the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum trading platforms through at least October 2016. An Ethereum trading platform announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of mining power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual miner or mining pool’s hashing power to exceed 50% of the processing power of a digital asset network that retained or attracted less mining power, thereby making digital asset networks that rely on proof-of-work more susceptible to attack.

Current report

In accordance with its regulatory obligations, the Authorized Participant, or Liquidity Provider, conducts customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence on its counterparties, which enables it to determine each counterparty’s AML and other risks and assign an appropriate risk rating.

Current report

These events have led to a substantial increase in regulatory and enforcement scrutiny of the industry as a whole and of Digital Asset Trading Platforms in particular, including from the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress. For example, in June 2023, the SEC brought charges against Binance (the “Binance Complaint”) and Coinbase (the “Coinbase Complaint”), two of the largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, alleging that they solicited U.S. investors to buy, sell, and trade “crypto asset securities” through their unregistered trading platforms and operated unregistered securities exchanges, brokerages and clearing agencies. Binance subsequently announced that it would be suspending USD deposits and withdrawals on Binance.US and that it plans to delist its USD trading pairs. In addition, in November 2023, the SEC brought similar charges against Kraken (the “Kraken Complaint”), alleging that it operated as an unregistered securities exchange, brokerage and clearing agency. Binance and Kraken continue to litigate these charges against the SEC; in February 2025, the SEC announced it had filed a joint stipulation with Coinbase to dismiss the enforcement action against it. The Binance Complaint and the Kraken Complaint have led, and may in the future lead, to further volatility in digital asset prices.

Current report

Even in the United States, there have been allegations of wash-trading even on regulated venues. Any actual or perceived false trading on Digital Asset Trading Platforms, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of ZEC and/or negatively affect the market perception of ZEC.

Current report

The SEC may approve applications under Rule 19b-4 of the Exchange Act to list competing digital assets as exchange-traded products, which could reduce demand for, and the price of, ZEC and adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Current report

To date, the SEC has only approved applications under Rule 19b-4 of the Exchange Act to list spot digital asset exchange-traded products which hold Bitcoin and Ether. However, applications for competing digital assets have been filed and are currently pending, and there can be no guarantee the SEC will not one day approve any such application. If applications to list spot digital asset exchange-traded products are approved, to the extent such competing digital asset exchange-traded products come to represent a significant proportion of the demand for digital assets generally, demand for, and the price of, ZEC could be reduced. Such reduced demand could in turn negatively affect the Index Price, the NAV, the NAV per Share, the value of the Shares, the Principal Market NAV and the Principal Market NAV per Share. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that the Trust will be able to maintain its scale and achieve its intended competitive positioning relative to competitors, which could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares.

Current report

Whether a digital asset is a security, or offers and sales of a digital asset are securities transactions, under the federal securities laws depends on whether it is included in the lists of instruments making up the definition of “security” in the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act. Digital assets as such do not appear in any of these lists, although each list includes the terms “investment contract” and “note,” and the SEC has typically analyzed whether a particular digital asset is a security or the offer and sale of a digital asset is a securities transaction by reference to whether it meets the tests developed by the federal courts interpreting these terms, known as the Howeyand Reves tests, respectively. For many digital assets, whether or not the Howeyor Reves tests are met is difficult to resolve definitively, and substantial legal arguments can often be made both in favor of and against a particular digital asset qualifying as a security, or a particular offer and sale of a digital asset qualifying as a securities transaction under one or both of the Howeyand Reves tests. Adding to the complexity, the SEC staff has indicated that the security status of a particular digital asset can change over time as the relevant facts evolve, though recent arguments advanced in ongoing litigation may suggest that the SEC no longer believes the status of a digital asset can change over time.

Current report

As is the case with ZEC, analyses from counsel typically review the often-complex facts surrounding a particular digital asset’s underlying technology, creation, use case and usage development, distribution and secondary-market trading characteristics as well as contributions of and marketing or promotional efforts by the individuals or organizations who appear to be involved in these activities, among other relevant facts, usually drawing on publicly available information. This information, usually found on the internet, often includes both information that originated with or is attributed to such individuals or organizations, as well as information from third-party sources and databases that may or may not have a connection to such individuals or organizations, and the availability and nature of such information can change over time. The Sponsor and counsel often have no independent means of verifying the accuracy or completeness of such information, and therefore of necessity usually must assume that such information is materially accurate and complete for purposes of the Howeyand Reves analyses. After having gathered this information, counsel typically analyzes it in light of the Howey and Reves tests, in order to inform a judgment as to whether or not a federal court would conclude that the digital asset, or transactions in the digital asset, in question is or is not a security, or are or are not securities transactions, respectively, for purposes of the federal securities laws. Often, certain factors appear to support a conclusion that the digital asset in question, or transactions in the digital asset, is a security, or are or are not securities transactions, respectively, while other factors appear to support the opposite conclusion, and in such a case counsel endeavors to weigh the importance and relevance of the competing factors. This analytical process is further complicated by the fact that, at present, federal judicial case law applying the relevant tests to digital assets is limited and in some situations inconsistent, with no federal appellate court having considered the question on the merits, as well as the fact that because each digital asset presents its own unique set of relevant facts, it is not always possible to directly analogize the analysis of one digital asset to another. Because of this factual complexity and the current lack of a well-developed body of federal case law applying the relevant tests to a variety of different fact patterns, the Sponsor has not in the past received, and currently does not expect that it would be able to receive, “opinions” of counsel stating that a particular digital asset, or transactions in the digital asset, is or is not a security, or are or are not securities transactions, respectively, for federal securities law purposes. The Sponsor understands that as a matter of practice, counsel is generally able to render a legal “opinion” only when the relevant facts are substantially ascertai…

Excerpt shortened here; the source contains the full paragraph.

Current report

In addition, if ZEC, or transactions in ZEC, are in fact a security, the Trust could be considered an unregistered “investment company” under the Investment Company Act, which could necessitate the Trust’s liquidation. In this case, the Trust and the Sponsor may be deemed to have participated in an illegal offering of investment company securities and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will be able to register the Trust under the Investment Company Act at such time or take such other actions as may be necessary to ensure the Trust’s activities comply with applicable law, which could force the Sponsor to liquidate the Trust.

Current report

The Custodian is a fiduciary under § 100 of the New York Banking Law and a qualified custodian for purposes of Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) under the Investment Advisers Act, and is licensed to custody the Trust’s ZEC in trust on the Trust’s behalf. However, the SEC has released proposed amendments to Rule 206(4)-2 that, if enacted as proposed, would amend the definition of a “qualified custodian” under Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6). Executive officers of the Custodian’s parent company have made public statements indicating that the Custodian will remain a qualified custodian under the proposed SEC rule, if enacted as currently proposed. However, there can be no assurance that the Custodian would continue to qualify as a “qualified custodian” under a final rule.
Removed paragraphs (17)

Previous report

The Trust may be required to disclose information, including information relating to investors, to regulators;

Previous report

ZEC’s primary advantage over other digital assets, its use in private on-chain transactions, has not been widely adopted, even in the context of Zcash transactions. If ZEC’s privacy capabilities are not more widely utilized, it may struggle to compete with other digital assets.

Previous report

Many digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges due to the fact that public blockchains generally face a tradeoff between security and scalability. One means through which public blockchains achieve security is decentralization, meaning that no intermediary is responsible for securing and maintaining these systems. For example, a greater degree of decentralization generally means a given digital asset network is less susceptible to manipulation or capture. In practice, this typically means that every single node on a given digital asset network is responsible for securing the system by processing every transaction and maintaining a copy of the entire state of the network. As a result, a digital asset network may be limited in the number of transactions it can process by the capabilities of each single fully participating node. Many developers are actively researching and testing scalability solutions for public blockchains that do not necessarily result in lower levels of security or decentralization, such as off-chain payment channels and Layer 2 networks. Off-chain payment channels would allow parties to transact without requiring the full processing power of a blockchain. Layer 2 networks can increase the scalability of a blockchain by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on top of a “Layer 1” network.

Previous report

As part of its counterparty onboarding process, each of the Authorized Participant and the Liquidity Provider uses third-party services to screen prospective counterparties against various watch lists, including the Specially Designated Nationals List of the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and countries and territories identified as non-cooperative by the Financial Action Task Force. If the Sponsor, the Trust, the Authorized Participant or the Liquidity Provider were nevertheless to transact with such a sanctioned entity, the Sponsor, the Trust, the Authorized Participant and the Liquidity Provider would be at increased risk of potential criminal or civil lawsuits.

Previous report

industry as a whole.

Previous report

Digital Asset Trading Platforms are relatively new and, in many ways, unregulated. While many prominent Digital Asset Trading Platforms provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management teams, corporate practices and regulatory compliance, many other Digital Asset Trading Platforms do not provide this information. Furthermore, while Digital Asset Trading Platforms are and may continue to be subject to federal and state licensing requirements in the United States, Digital Asset Trading Platforms do not appear to be subject to regulation in a similar manner as other regulated trading platforms, such as national securities exchanges or designated contract markets. As a result, the marketplace may lose confidence in Digital Asset Trading Platforms, including prominent trading platforms that handle a significant volume of ZEC trading.

Previous report

The SEC has also identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the Digital Asset Markets generally, including, among others (1) “wash-trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in ZEC manipulating ZEC pricing; (3) hacking of the Zcash Network and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the Zcash Network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in ZEC, new sources of demand for ZEC) or based on the dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins,” including Tether; and (7) fraud and manipulation at Digital Asset Markets. The use or presence of such acts and practices in the Digital Asset Markets could, for example, falsely inflate the volume of ZEC present in the Digital Asset Markets or cause distortions in the price of ZEC, among other things that could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to shareholders. Moreover, tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities, such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-trading, may not be available to or employed by Digital Asset Markets, or may not exist at all. Many Digital Asset Markets also lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers. As a result, the prices of ZEC on Digital Asset Markets may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges.

Previous report

There have been a growing number of attempts to list on national securities exchanges the shares of funds that hold digital assets or that have exposures to digital assets through derivatives. These investment vehicles attempt to provide institutional and retail investors exposure to markets for digital assets and related products. With the exception of funds that hold Bitcoin and certain Ethereum-based derivatives, the SEC has repeatedly denied such requests. In January 2018, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management outlined several questions that sponsors would be expected to address before the SEC will consider granting approval for funds holding “substantial amounts” of cryptocurrencies or “cryptocurrency-related products.” The questions, which focus on specific requirements of the Investment Company Act, generally fall into one of five key areas: valuation, liquidity, custody, arbitrage and potential manipulation. The SEC has not explicitly stated whether each of the questions set forth would also need to be addressed by entities with similar products and investment strategies that instead pursue registered offerings under the Securities Act, although such entities would need to comply with the registration and prospectus disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. After several years of the SEC denying requests to list shares of various digital asset funds holding Bitcoin on national securities exchanges, including the request to list the shares of Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) on NYSE Arca in June 2022, the Sponsor petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the SEC’s final order denying approval to list shares of Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) on NYSE Arca as an exchange-traded product. In August 2023, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Sponsor’s petition and vacated the SEC’s order as arbitrary and capricious. The SEC did not seek panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. In October 2023, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the SEC. Ultimately, on January 10, 2024, the SEC approved NYSE Arca’s 19b-4 application to list the shares of the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) on NYSE Arca as an exchange-traded product, as well as requests to list shares of various other digital asset funds holding Bitcoin on national securities exchanges.

Previous report

For example, in 2020 the SEC filed a complaint against the issuer of XRP, Ripple Labs, Inc., and two of its executives, alleging that they raised more than $1.3 billion through XRP sales that should have been registered under the federal securities laws, but were not. In the years prior to the SEC’s action, XRP’s market capitalization at times reached over $140 billion. However, in the weeks following the SEC’s complaint, XRP’s market capitalization fell to less than $10 billion, which was less than half of its market capitalization in the days prior to the complaint.

Previous report

In August 2021, the chair of the SEC stated that he believed investors using digital asset trading platforms are not adequately protected, and that activities on the platforms can implicate the securities laws, commodities laws and banking laws, raising a number of issues related to protecting investors and consumers, guarding against illicit activity, and ensuring financial stability. The chair expressed a need for the SEC to have additional authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms from “falling between regulatory cracks,” as well as for more resources to protect investors in “this growing and volatile sector.” The chair called for federal legislation centering on digital asset trading, lending, and decentralized finance platforms, seeking “additional plenary authority” to write rules for digital asset trading and lending. Moreover, President Biden’s March 9, 2022 Executive Order, asserting that technological advances and the rapid growth of the digital asset markets “necessitate an evaluation and alignment of the United States Government approach to digital assets,” signals an ongoing focus on digital asset policy and regulation in the United States. A number of reports issued pursuant to the Executive Order have focused on various risks related to the digital asset ecosystem, and have recommended additional legislation and regulatory oversight. There have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets. In connection with these developments, the SEC has taken a number of actions. For example, in February 2023, the SEC proposed amendments to the custody rules under Rule 406(4)-2 of the Investment Advisers Act. The proposed rule changes would amend the definition of a “qualified custodian” under Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) and expand the current custody rule in 406(4)-2 to cover digital assets and related advisory activities. If enacted as proposed, these rules would likely impose additional regulatory requirements with respect to the custody and storage of digital assets and could lead to additional regulatory oversight of the digital asset ecosystem more broadly. Moreover, the failure of FTX in November 2022 and the resulting market turmoil substantially increased regulatory scrutiny in the United States and globally and led to SEC and criminal investigations, enforcement actions and other regulatory activity across the digital asset ecosystem. For example, in June 2023, the SEC brought enforcement actions against Binance and Coinbase, two of the largest digital asset trading platforms, alleging that Binance and Coinbase operated unregistered securities exchanges, brokerages and clearing agencies. In addition, in November 2023, the SEC brought similar charges against Kraken, alleging that it operated as an unregistered securities exchange, brokerage and clearing agency.

Previous report

Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, the Zcash Network contains certain privacy features, which may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction level data. Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In August 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. citizens from using Tornado Cash, a digital asset protocol designed to obfuscate blockchain transactions, by adding certain Ethereum wallet addresses associated with the protocol to its Specially Designated Nationals list. A large portion of Ethereum validators globally, as well as notable industry participants such as Centre, the issuer of the USDC stablecoin, have reportedly complied with the sanctions and blacklisted the sanctioned addresses from interacting with their networks. Although no regulatory action has been taken to treat privacy-enhancing digital assets differently, this may change in the future.

Previous report

Additionally, to the extent an Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor is found to have operated without appropriate state or federal licenses, it may be subject to investigation, administrative or court proceedings, and civil or criminal monetary fines and penalties, all of which would harm the reputation of the Trust or the Sponsor, decrease the liquidity, and have a material adverse effect on the price of, the Shares.

Previous report

As discussed in the section entitled “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences—Uncertainty Regarding the U.S. Federal Income Tax Treatment of Digital Assets” below, assuming that the Trust is properly treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, each beneficial owner of Shares will be treated for U.S. federal income tax purposes as the owner of an undivided interest in the ZEC (and, if applicable, any Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency) held in the Trust. Due to the new and evolving nature of digital assets and the absence of comprehensive guidance with respect to digital assets, many significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets are uncertain.

Previous report

Under the guidance provided in the Ruling & FAQs, hard forks, airdrops and similar occurrences with respect to digital assets will under certain circumstances be treated as taxable events giving rise to ordinary income. In the absence of guidance to the contrary, it is possible that any such income recognized by a U.S. tax-exempt shareholder would constitute “unrelated business taxable income” (“UBTI”). A tax-exempt shareholder should consult its tax adviser regarding whether such shareholder may recognize UBTI as a consequence of an investment in Shares. See “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.”

Previous report

The Ruling & FAQs do not address whether income recognized by a non-U.S. person as a result of a fork, airdrop or similar occurrence could be subject to the 30% withholding tax imposed on U.S.-source “fixed or determinable annual or periodical” income. Non-U.S. Holders (as defined under “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences—Tax Consequences to Non-U.S. Holders” below) should assume that, in the absence of guidance, a withholding agent (including the Sponsor) is likely to withhold 30% of any such income recognized by a non-U.S. Holder in respect of its Shares, including by deducting such withheld amounts from proceeds that such non-U.S. Holder would otherwise be entitled to receive in connection with a distribution of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. See “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.”

Previous report

DCG is (i) the sole member and parent company of the Sponsor, and parent company of Genesis, a Liquidity Provider to the Authorized Participant from October 3, 2022 through September 12, 2023; (ii) the indirect parent company of

Previous report

DCG is a minority interest holder in both Coinbase, Inc. and Kraken, which operate two of the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index Price.
Reworded paragraphs (73)

Previous wording

Competition from the emergence or growth of other digital assets or methods of investing in ZEC could have a negative impact on the price of ZEC and adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Competition from the emergence or growth of other digital assets could have a negative impact on the price of ZEC and adversely affect the value of the Shares;

Previous wording

The Trust relies on third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to the affairs of the Trust and the replacement of such service providers could pose a challenge to the safekeeping of the Trust’s ZEC and to the operations of the Trust.

Current wording

The Trust relies on third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to the affairs of the Trust and the replacement of such service providers could pose challenges to the safekeeping of the Trust’s ZEC and to the operations of the Trust;

Previous wording

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ZEC, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ZEC, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.

Current wording

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ZEC, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including declines in the trading prices of ZEC, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.

Previous wording

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ZEC, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. For instance, following significant increases throughout the majority of 2020, digital asset prices, including ZEC, experienced significant volatility throughout 2021 and 2022. This volatility became extreme in November 2022 when FTX halted customer withdrawals. See “—Recent developments in the digital asset economy have led to extreme volatility and disruption in digital asset markets, a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem, significant negative publicity surrounding digital assets broadly and market-wide declines in liquidity.” Digital asset prices, including ZEC, have continued to fluctuate widely throughout 2023 and through the date of this Annual Report.

Current wording

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ZEC, have experienced extreme volatility throughout their existence, including in recent periods and may continue to do so. For instance, following significant increases throughout the majority of 2020, digital asset prices, including ZEC, experienced significant volatility throughout 2021 and 2022. This volatility became extreme in November 2022 when FTX, then a major Digital Asset Trading Platform, halted customer withdrawals. See “—Recent developments in the digital asset economy have led to extreme volatility and disruption in digital asset markets, a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem, significant negative publicity surrounding digital assets broadly and market-wide declines in liquidity.” Digital asset prices, including ZEC, have continued to fluctuate widely through the date of this Annual Report.

Previous wording

Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ZEC, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. Furthermore, negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset economy may reduce confidence in the digital asset economy and may result in greater volatility in the price of ZEC and other digital assets, including a depreciation in value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actions to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of ZEC. For additional information that quantifies the volatility of ZEC prices and the value of the Shares, see “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Historical NAV and ZEC Prices.”

Current wording

Extreme volatility in the future, including declines in the trading prices of ZEC, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. Furthermore, negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset economy may reduce confidence in the digital asset economy and may result in greater volatility in the price of ZEC and other digital assets, including a depreciation in value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actions to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of ZEC. For additional information that quantifies the volatility of ZEC prices and the value of the Shares, see “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Historical NAV and ZEC Prices.”

Previous wording

Digital asset networks are dependent upon the internet. A disruption of the internet or a digital asset network, such as the Zcash Network, would affect the ability to transfer digital assets, including ZEC, and, consequently, their value.

Current wording

Digital asset networks and related protocols are dependent upon the internet. A disruption of the internet or a digital asset network or related protocol, such as the Zcash Network, would affect the ability to transfer digital assets, including ZEC, and, consequently, their value.

Previous wording

The acceptance of software patches or upgrades by a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the users and miners in a digital asset network, such as the Zcash Network, could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate networks.

Current wording

The acceptance of software patches or upgrades to a digital asset network by a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the users and miners in a digital asset network, such as the Zcash Network, could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate blockchain networks.

Previous wording

Moreover, in the past, flaws in the source code for digital assets have been exposed and exploited, including flaws that disabled some functionality for users, exposed users’ personal information and/or resulted in the theft of users’ digital assets. The cryptography underlying ZEC could prove to be flawed or ineffective, or developments in mathematics and/or technology, including advances in digital computing, algebraic geometry and quantum computing, could result in such cryptography becoming ineffective. In any of these circumstances, a malicious actor may be able to take the Trust’s ZEC, which would adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, functionality of the Zcash Network may be negatively affected such that it is no longer attractive to users, thereby dampening demand for ZEC. Even if another digital asset other than ZEC were affected by similar circumstances, any reduction in confidence in the source code or cryptography underlying digital assets generally could negatively affect the demand for digital assets and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Moreover, in the past, flaws in the source code for digital asset networks and related protocols have been exposed and exploited, including flaws that disabled some functionality for users, exposed users’ personal information and/or resulted in the theft of users’ digital assets. The cryptography underlying ZEC could prove to be flawed or ineffective, or developments in mathematics and/or technology, including advances in digital computing, algebraic geometry and quantum computing, could result in such cryptography becoming ineffective. In any of these circumstances, a malicious actor may be able to take the Trust’s ZEC, which would adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, functionality of the Zcash Network may be negatively affected by such an exploit such that it is no longer attractive to users, thereby dampening demand for ZEC. Even if another digital asset other than ZEC were affected by similar circumstances, any reduction in confidence in the source code or cryptography underlying digital asset networks and related protocols generally could negatively affect the demand for digital assets and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

Moreover, because digital assets, including ZEC, have been in existence for a short period of time and are continuing to develop, there may be additional risks in the future that are impossible to predict as of the date of this Annual Report.

Current wording

Moreover, because digital assets, including ZEC, have existed for a short period of time and are continuing to be developed, there may be additional risks to the digital asset networks and related protocols that are impossible to predict as of the date of this Annual Report.

Previous wording

The first digital asset, Bitcoin, was launched in 2009. ZEC launched in 2016. In general, digital asset networks, including the Zcash Network and other cryptographic and algorithmic protocols governing the issuance of digital assets represent a new and rapidly evolving industry that is subject to a variety of factors that are difficult to evaluate. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:

Current wording

The first digital asset, Bitcoin, was launched in 2009. ZEC launched in 2016. In general, digital asset networks, including the Zcash Network and related protocols represent a new and rapidly evolving industry that is subject to a variety of factors that are difficult to evaluate. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:

Previous wording

ZEC is only selectively accepted by retail and commercial outlets, and use of ZEC by consumers remains limited. Banks and other established financial institutions may refuse to process funds for ZEC transactions; process wire transfers to or from Digital Asset Trading Platforms, ZEC-related companies or service providers; or maintain accounts for persons or entities transacting in ZEC. As a result, the prices of ZEC are largely determined by speculators and miners, thus contributing to price volatility that makes retailers less likely to accept ZEC in the future. While the use of other digital assets, such as Bitcoin, to purchase goods and services from commercial or service businesses is developing, ZEC has not yet been accepted in the same manner due to its infancy and because ZEC has a slightly different purpose than Bitcoin.

Current wording

ZEC is only selectively accepted as a means of payment by retail and commercial outlets, and use of ZEC by consumers remains limited. Banks and other established financial institutions, whether voluntarily or in response to regulatory feedback, may refuse to process funds for ZEC transactions; process wire transfers to or from Digital Asset Trading Platforms, ZEC-related companies or service providers; or maintain accounts for persons or entities transacting in ZEC. As a result, the prices of ZEC are largely determined by speculators and miners, thus contributing to price volatility that makes retailers less likely to accept ZEC in the future. While the use of other digital assets, such as Bitcoin, to purchase goods and services from commercial or service businesses is developing, ZEC has not yet been accepted in the same manner because it has a slightly different purpose than Bitcoin.

Previous wording

Certain privacy-preserving features have been or are expected to be introduced to digital asset networks, such as the Zcash Network, and trading platforms or businesses that facilitate transactions in ZEC may be at an increased risk of having banking services cut off if there is a concern that these features interfere with the performance of anti-money laundering duties and economic sanctions checks.

Current wording

Certain privacy-preserving features have been or are expected to be introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If any such features are introduced to the Zcash Network, any trading platforms or businesses that facilitate transactions in ZEC may be at an increased risk of criminal or civil lawsuits or of having banking services cut off if there is a concern that these features interfere with the performance of anti-money laundering duties and economic sanctions checks. As of the date of this Annual Report, the Sponsor is not aware of any ongoing efforts to introduce further privacy-preserving features to the Zcash Network.

Previous wording

The governance of decentralized networks, such as the Zcash Network, is by voluntary consensus and open competition. As a result, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on the governance of any particular decentralized digital asset network, which may stymie such network’s utility and ability to grow and face challenges. The foregoing notwithstanding, the protocols for some decentralized networks, such as the Zcash Network, are informally managed by a group of core developers that propose amendments to the relevant network’s source code. Core developers’ roles evolve over time, largely based on self-determined participation. If a significant majority of users and miners were to adopt amendments to the Zcash Network based on the proposals of such core developers, the Zcash Network would be subject to new protocols that may adversely affect the value of ZEC.

Current wording

The foregoing notwithstanding, the underlying software for some digital asset networks and protocols, such as the Zcash Network, is informally or formally managed or developed by a group of core developers that propose amendments to the relevant network’s or protocol’s source code. Core developers’ roles may evolve over time, generally based on self-determined participation. If a significant majority of users and miners were to adopt amendments to a decentralized network based on the proposals of such core developers, such network would be subject to new source code that may adversely affect the value of the relevant digital asset.

Previous wording

that potentially doubles the transactions per second that can be handled on-chain. More importantly, Segregated Witness also enables so-called second layer solutions, such as the Lightning Network, or payment channels that greatly increase transaction throughput (i.e., millions of transactions per second). Wallets and “intermediaries,” or connecting nodes that facilitate payment channels, that support Segregated Witness or Lightning Network-like technologies have not seen wide-scale use as of December 31, 2023. Additionally, questions remain regarding Lightning Network services, such as its cost and who will serve as intermediaries.

Current wording

As of December 31, 2024, the Zcash Network was capable of handling approximately 5 transactions per second, or approximately 40% of the daily transaction volume of the Bitcoin network. In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital assets are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. For example, in August 2017, the Bitcoin Network was upgraded with a technical feature known as “Segregated Witness” that potentially doubles the transactions per second that can be handled on-chain. More importantly, Segregated Witness also enables so-called second layer solutions, such as the Lightning Network, or payment channels that greatly increase transaction throughput (i.e., millions of transactions per second). Wallets and “intermediaries,” or connecting nodes that facilitate payment channels, that support Segregated Witness or Lightning Network-like technologies have not seen wide-scale use as of December 31, 2024. Additionally, questions remain regarding Lightning Network services, such as its cost and who will serve as intermediaries.

Previous wording

As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average fees and settlement times may increase considerably. For example, the Bitcoin network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. Since January 1, 2021, Bitcoin average daily transaction fees have ranged from $0.50 per transaction on January 8, 2023, to as high as $60.95 per transaction, on average, on April 20, 2021. As of December 31, 2023, Bitcoin average daily transaction fees stood at $21.00 per Bitcoin transaction. Since January 1, 2021, Zcash Network average daily transaction fees have ranged from $0.0011 per transaction on February 26, 2023, to as high as $0.2186 per transaction, on average, on August 26, 2022. As of December 31, 2023, Zcash Network average daily transaction fees stood at $0.0215 per Zcash transaction. Notwithstanding the increase in throughput on the Zcash Network as compared to the Bitcoin network, settlement speeds on the Zcash Network have remained relatively constant since December 2019, when a network upgrade halved the target block interval to 1.26 minutes, although they can vary depending on the size of the number of pending transactions waiting to be included in a block. Increased fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for ZEC (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ZEC, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Current wording

As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average transaction fees and settlement times may increase considerably. For example, the Bitcoin network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. Since January 1, 2022, Bitcoin average daily transaction fees have ranged from $0.38 per transaction on September 8, 2024, to as high as $124.17 per transaction, on April 20, 2024. As of December 31, 2024, Bitcoin average daily transaction fees stood at $1.79 per transaction. Since January 1, 2021, Zcash Network average daily transaction fees have ranged from $0.001 per transaction on February 26, 2023, to as high as $0.29 per transaction, on March 6, 2024. As of December 31, 2024, Zcash Network average daily transaction fees stood at $0.05 per transaction. Notwithstanding the increase in throughput on the Zcash Network as compared to the Bitcoin network, settlement speeds on the Zcash Network have remained relatively constant since December 2019, when a network upgrade halved the target block interval to 1.3 minutes, although they can vary depending on the size of the number of pending transactions waiting to be included in a block. Increased transaction fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for ZEC (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ZEC, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the scale of settlement of Zcash Network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Current wording

There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the scale of settlement or throughput of Zcash Network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

Digital asset networks are often developed by a diverse set of contributors and the perception that high-profile contributors may no longer contribute to the network may have an adverse effect on the market price of any related digital assets. For example, in June 2017, an unfounded rumor circulated that Ethereum protocol developer Vitalik Buterin had died. Following the rumor, the price of ETH decreased approximately 20% before recovering after Buterin himself dispelled the rumor. Some have speculated that the rumor led to the decrease in the price of ETH. In the event a high-profile contributor to the Zcash Network is perceived as no longer contributing to the Zcash Network due to death, retirement, withdrawal, incapacity, or otherwise, whether or not such perception is valid, it could negatively affect the price of ZEC, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Digital asset networks and related protocols are often developed by a diverse set of contributors, but are also often developed by identifiable and high-profile contributors. The perception that certain high-profile contributors may no longer contribute to the applicable digital asset network or protocol may have an adverse effect on the market price of any related digital assets. For example, in June 2017, an unfounded rumor circulated that Ethereum protocol developer Vitalik Buterin had died. Following the rumor, the price of Ether decreased approximately 20% before recovering after Buterin himself dispelled the rumor. Some have speculated that the rumor led to the decrease in the price of Ether. In the event a high-profile contributor to the Zcash Network is perceived as no longer contributing to the Zcash Network due to death, retirement, withdrawal, incapacity, or otherwise, whether or not such perception is valid, it could negatively affect the price of ZEC, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

As of December 31, 2023, the largest unshielded 100 ZEC wallets held approximately 58% of the ZEC in circulation. Moreover, it is possible that other persons or entities control multiple wallets that collectively hold a significant number of ZEC, even if they individually only hold a small amount, and it is possible that some of these wallets are controlled by the same person or entity. Furthermore, because of Zcash’s privacy-preserving features, it is possible that some persons or entities have accumulated large positions of ZEC using shielded transactions, which would not be reflected in available token concentration data, and therefore ownership of ZEC may be more concentrated than is currently known. As a result of this concentration of ownership, large sales or distributions by such holders could have an adverse effect on the market price of ZEC.

Current wording

As of the date of this Annual Report, the largest unshielded 100 ZEC wallets held approximately 53% of the ZEC in circulation. Moreover, it is possible that other persons or entities control multiple wallets that collectively hold a significant amount of ZEC, even if they individually only hold a small amount, and it is possible that some of these wallets are controlled by the same person or entity. Furthermore, because of Zcash’s privacy-preserving features, it is possible that some persons or entities have accumulated large positions of ZEC using shielded transactions, which would not be reflected in available token concentration data, and therefore ownership of ZEC may be more concentrated than is currently known. As a result of this concentration of ownership, large sales or distributions by such holders could have an adverse effect on the market price of ZEC.

Previous wording

A reduction in the processing power expended by miners on the Zcash Network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet obtaining control. See “—If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the processing power on the Zcash Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Zcash Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.”

Current wording

A reduction in the processing power expended by miners on the Zcash Network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet obtaining control on the Zcash Network. See “—If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the processing power on the Zcash Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Zcash Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.”

Previous wording

If a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains a majority of the processing power on the Zcash Network, it may be able to alter the Blockchain on which transactions in ZEC rely by constructing fraudulent blocks or preventing certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all. The malicious actor or botnet could also control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions. Although the malicious actor or botnet would not be able to generate new tokens or transactions using such control, it could “double-spend” its own tokens (i.e., spend the same tokens in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the processing power on the Zcash Network or the ZEC community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the Blockchain may not be possible. Further, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Zcash Network.

Current wording

If a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains a majority of the processing power on the Zcash Network, it may be able to alter the Blockchain on which transactions in ZEC rely by constructing fraudulent blocks or preventing certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all. The malicious actor or botnet could also control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions. Although the malicious actor or botnet may not be able to generate new digital assets or transactions using such control, it may be able to “double-spend” its own digital assets (i.e., spend the same tokens in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the processing power on the Zcash Network or the ZEC community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the Blockchain may not be possible. Further, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Zcash Network.

Previous wording

Moreover, because of the Zcash Network’s privacy-preserving features, it is possible that certain pools have exceeded in the past, or may exceed now or in Zcash’s future, the 50% threshold on the Zcash Network. As of the date of this Annual Report, there are no known reports of malicious activity on, or control of, the Zcash Network, and no mining pools on the Zcash Network are believed to have exceeded the 50% hashrate threshold. However, because of Zcash’s privacy-preserving features, it is possible that certain mining pools have exceeded in the past, or may exceed now or in the future, the 50% threshold on the Zcash Network. The crossing of the 50% threshold indicates a greater risk that a single mining pool could exert authority over the validation of ZEC transactions, and this risk is heightened if over 50% of the processing power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators of mining pools, do not act to ensure similar degrees of decentralization of ZEC mining processing power, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the processing power on the Zcash Network may increase, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Moreover, because of the Zcash Network’s privacy-preserving features, it is possible that certain pools have exceeded in the past, or may exceed now or in Zcash’s future, the 50% threshold on the Zcash Network. As of the date of this Annual Report, there are no known reports of malicious activity on, or control of, the Zcash Network, and no mining pools on the Zcash Network are believed to have exceeded the 50% hashrate threshold. However, because of Zcash’s privacy-preserving features, it is possible that certain mining pools have exceeded in the past, or may exceed now or in the future, the 50% threshold on the Zcash Network. The crossing of the 50% threshold indicates a greater risk that a single mining pool could exert authority over the validation of ZEC transactions, and this risk is heightened if over 50% of the processing power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators of mining pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of ZEC mining processing power, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the processing power on the Zcash Network will increase, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

For example, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic Network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic Network. The attack resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic Blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of over $5.0 million and $1.0 million. Furthermore, on June 2, 2018, the Horizen Network, another zk-SNARKs-based protocol, was the target of a double-spend attack by an unknown actor that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Horizen Network. The attack was the result of delayed submission of blocks to the Horizen Network. Any similar attacks on the Zcash Network could negatively impact the value of ZEC and the value of the Shares.

Current wording

For example, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic Network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic Network. The attacks resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic Blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of $5.0 million and $1.0 million. Furthermore, on June 2, 2018, the Horizen Network, another zk-SNARKs-based protocol, was the target of a double-spend attack by an unknown actor that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Horizen Network. The attack was the result of delayed submission of blocks to the Horizen Network. Any similar attacks on the Zcash Network could negatively impact the value of ZEC and the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Zcash Network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. To the extent that the ZEC ecosystem does not grow, the possibility that a malicious actor may be able to maliciously influence the Zcash Network in this manner will remain heightened.

Current wording

A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Zcash Network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. The less that the ZEC ecosystem grows, the greater the possibility that a malicious actor may be able to maliciously influence the Zcash Network in this manner will remain heightened.

Previous wording

The Zcash Network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can download the software, modify it and then propose that the users and miners of ZEC adopt the modification. When a modification is introduced and a substantial majority of users and miners’ consent to the modification, the change is implemented and the network remains uninterrupted. However, if less than a substantial majority of users and miners’ consent to the proposed modification, and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Zcash Network, with one group running the pre-modified software and the other running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two versions of Bitcoin running in parallel, yet lacking interchangeability. For example, in August 2017, Bitcoin “forked” into Bitcoin and a new digital asset, Bitcoin Cash, as a result of a several-year dispute over how to increase the rate of transactions that the Bitcoin Network can process.

Current wording

The Zcash Network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can download the software, modify it and then propose that the users and miners of ZEC adopt the modification. When a modification is introduced and a substantial majority of users and miners’ consent to the modification, the change is implemented and the network remains uninterrupted. However, if less than a substantial majority of users and miners’ consent to the proposed modification, and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Zcash Network, with one group running the pre-modified software and the other running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two versions of Bitcoin running in parallel, yet lacking interchangeability. For example, in August 2017, Bitcoin “forked” into Bitcoin and a new digital asset, Bitcoin Cash, as a result of a several-year dispute over how to increase the rate of transactions that the Bitcoin network can process. Some users of the original network may harbor ill will toward the Bitcoin Cash network, and vice versa. These users may attempt to negatively impact the use or adoption of the Bitcoin Cash network. A fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of otherwise compatible software that users run. Such a fork could lead to users and miners abandoning the digital asset with the flawed software. It is possible, however, that a substantial number of users and miners could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains. This could result in a permanent fork.

Previous wording

A hard fork may adversely affect the price of ZEC at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Furthermore, while the Trust would be entitled to both versions of the digital asset running in parallel, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which version of the digital asset is generally accepted as the Zcash Network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Either of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares. For example, following the DAO hack in July 2016, holders of Ethereum voted on-chain to reverse the hack, effectively causing a hard fork. For the days following the vote, the price of Ethereum rose from $11.65 on July 15, 2016 to $14.66 on July 21, 2016, the day after the first Ethereum Classic block was mined. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ZEC at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash Network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash Network that eliminated the Founders’

Current wording

A hard fork may adversely affect the price of ZEC at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Furthermore, while the Trust would be entitled to both versions of the digital asset running in parallel, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which version of the digital asset is generally accepted as the Zcash Network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Either of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares. As an illustrative example of a digital asset hard fork, on November 15, 2020, certain Bitcoin Cash developers enacted a proposed update to the Bitcoin Cash network requiring 8% of mined tokens to be redistributed to the developer pool, causing a hard fork, and created a network with a token labeled BCHA. For the days following the fork, the price of BCH fluctuated from $246.15 on November 15, 2020 to $256.55 on November 20, 2020. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ZEC at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash Network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash Network that eliminated the Founders’ Reward. For the days following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZEC fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash Network launch on October 28, 2016. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ZEC at the time of announcement or adoption.

Previous wording

In the event of a hard fork of the Zcash Network, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Zcash Network, is generally accepted as the Zcash Network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes. The Sponsor will base its determination on a variety of then relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the Sponsor’s beliefs regarding expectations of the core developers of ZEC, users, services, businesses, miners and other constituencies, as well as the actual continued acceptance of, mining power on, and community engagement with, the Zcash Network. There is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork, and the Sponsor’s decision may adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. The Sponsor may also disagree with shareholders, security vendors and the Index Provider on what is generally accepted as ZEC and should therefore be considered “ZEC” for the Trust’s purposes, which may also adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result.

Current wording

In the event of a hard fork of the Zcash Network, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine, in good faith, which digital asset network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Zcash Network, is generally accepted as the Zcash Network and should therefore be considered the appropriate digital asset network for the Trust’s purposes. The Sponsor will base its determination on a variety of then relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the Sponsor’s beliefs regarding expectations of the core developers of ZEC, users, services, businesses, miners and other constituencies, as well as the actual continued acceptance of, mining power on, and community engagement with, the Zcash Network. There is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset network or digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork, and the Sponsor’s decision may adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. The Sponsor may also disagree with shareholders, security vendors and the Index Provider on what is generally accepted as ZEC and should therefore be considered “ZEC” for the Trust’s purposes, which may also adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result.

Previous wording

The Zcash Network uses zk-SNARKs, which provide additional layers of confidentiality to transactions on the Zcash Network by protecting the amount and the recipient in ZEC transactions. The ease of use of these features was improved in October 2018 with a Zcash Network upgrade called “Sapling.” This cryptography is new and could ultimately fail, resulting in less privacy than believed or no privacy at all, and could adversely affect one’s ability to complete transactions on any such digital asset network or otherwise adversely interfere with the integrity of the relevant blockchain. For example, on February 5, 2019, the team behind Zcash announced that it discovered a vulnerability in zk-SNARKs on March 1, 2018 that was subsequently patched in connection with the Sapling upgrade in October 2018. The vulnerability was a counterfeiting vulnerability that could have allowed an attacker to exploit a flaw in the original zero-knowledge proof cryptography to act differently than intended and create fake ZEC on the Zcash Network without being detected. Although the privacy features prevent one from being certain no Zcash were counterfeited, the team behind Zcash found no evidence that counterfeiting occurred prior to the patch and believes the vulnerability has been fully remediated with the deployment of the Sapling upgrade. More recently, on May 31, 2022, the Electric Coin Company announced the activation of the Network Update 5 (“NU5”) upgrade. This upgrade implements Halo, a type of cryptography technology invented by the Electric Coin Company, to remove the need for complex generation ceremonies and is intended to further the development of zero-knowledge proof cryptography.

Current wording

The Zcash Network uses zk-SNARKs, which provide additional layers of confidentiality to transactions on the Zcash Network by protecting the amount and the recipient in ZEC transactions. This cryptography is new and could ultimately fail, resulting in less privacy than believed or no privacy at all, and could adversely affect one’s ability to complete transactions on any such digital asset network or otherwise adversely interfere with the integrity of the relevant blockchain. Digital asset networks have in the past been, and may continue to be, used to facilitate illicit activities. Because ZEC is a privacy-preserving digital asset, it is also subject to certain types of attacks that may go undetected. For example, on February 5, 2019, the team behind Zcash announced that it discovered a vulnerability in its zk-SNARK implementation on March 1, 2018 that was subsequently patched in connection with a network upgrade called “Sapling” in October 2018.

Previous wording

Moreover, law enforcement agencies and other market participants have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations and comply with laws, such as anti-money laundering and economic sanctions laws. Because of the privacy-enhancing features of the Zcash Network, law enforcement agencies and other market participants may have less visibility into transaction-level data, which may encourage bad actors to misuse the Zcash Network for such illicit purposes. As a result, businesses that facilitate transactions in ZEC may be at increased risk of potential criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having banking services cut off if there is a concern that these features interfere with the performance of anti-money laundering duties and economic sanctions checks. Since 2019, ZEC, along with several other privacy tokens including Monero, Dash, and Horizen have been delisted from multiple exchanges, including Coinbase UK, Bittrex, and OKX. In another example, in June 2023 Binance announced it would delist Zcash as well as other privacy coins including Monero, Dash, and Horizen in France, Spain, Italy and Poland, though retracted that announcement later that month, and in January 2024 announced that it would extend the “monitoring tag” to multiple privacy coins including ZEC, indicating those tokens are “at risk” of being delisted from the exchange globally. Although these trading platform did not disclose the reasons for such delisting, and some trading platforms subsequently relisted ZEC, it is believed that they were the result of the privacy-enhancing features of the digital assets, and there is a risk that other digital asset trading platforms may remove ZEC from their platforms as well. Other service providers of such businesses may also cut off services if there is a concern that the Zcash Network is being used to facilitate crime. Any of the aforementioned occurrences could adversely affect the price of ZEC, the attractiveness of the Zcash Network and an investment in the Shares of the Trust.

Current wording

Moreover, law enforcement agencies and other market participants have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations and comply with laws, such as anti-money laundering and economic sanctions laws. Because of the privacy-enhancing features of the Zcash Network, law enforcement agencies and other market participants may have less visibility into transaction-level data, which may encourage bad actors to misuse the Zcash Network for such illicit purposes. As a result, businesses that facilitate transactions in ZEC may be at increased risk of potential criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having banking or other services cut off if there is a concern that these features interfere with the performance of anti-money laundering duties and economic sanctions checks. Since 2019, ZEC, along with several other privacy tokens including Monero, Dash, and Horizen have been delisted from multiple exchanges, including Coinbase UK, Bittrex, and OKX. In another example, in June 2023 Binance announced it would delist Zcash as well as other privacy coins including Monero, Dash, and Horizen in France, Spain, Italy and Poland, though retracted that announcement later that month, and in January 2024 announced that it would extend the “monitoring tag” to multiple privacy coins including ZEC, indicating those tokens are “at risk” of being delisted from the exchange globally. Although these digital asset trading platforms did not disclose the reasons for such delisting, and some digital asset trading platforms subsequently relisted ZEC, it is believed that they were the result of the privacy-enhancing features of the digital assets, and there is a risk that other digital asset trading platforms may remove ZEC from their platforms as a result of these concerns. Other service providers of such businesses may also cut off services if there is a concern that the Zcash Network is being used to facilitate crime. Any of the aforementioned occurrences could increase regulatory scrutiny of the Zcash Network and/or adversely affect the price of ZEC, the attractiveness of the Zcash Network and an investment in the Shares of the Trust.

Previous wording

Further, in March 2023, the FDIC accepted Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank into receivership. Also, in March 2023, Silvergate Bank announced plans to wind down and liquidate its operations. Following these events, a number of companies that provide digital asset-related services have been unable to find banks that are willing to provide them with bank accounts and banking services. Although these events did not have a material impact on the Trust or the Sponsor, it is possible that a future closing of a bank with which the Trust or the Sponsor has a financial relationship could subject the Trust or the Sponsor to adverse conditions and pose challenges in finding an alternative suitable bank to provide the Trust or the Sponsor with bank accounts and banking services.

Current wording

Digital asset markets have also been negatively impacted by the failure of entities perceived to be integral to the digital asset ecosystem. For example, in March 2023, state banking regulators placed Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank into Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) receiverships. Also, in March 2023, Silvergate Bank announced plans to wind down and liquidate its operations. Because these banks were perceived to be the banks most open to providing services for the digital asset ecosystem in the United States, their failures may impact the willingness of banks (based on regulatory pressure or otherwise) to provide banking services to digital asset market participants. In addition, because these banks were perceived to be the banks most open to providing services for the digital asset ecosystem, their failure has caused a number of companies that provide digital asset-related services to be unable to find banks that are willing to provide them with such banking services. The inability to access banking services could negatively impact digital asset market participants and therefore the value of digital assets, including ZEC, and thus the Shares. In addition, although these events did not have an impact directly on the Trust or the Sponsor when these bank failures occurred, it is possible that a future closing of a bank with which the Trust or the Sponsor has a financial relationship could subject the Trust or the Sponsor to adverse conditions and pose challenges in finding an alternative suitable bank to provide the Trust or the Sponsor with bank accounts and banking services.

Previous wording

Continued disruption and instability in the digital asset markets as these events develop, including further declines in the trading prices and liquidity of ZEC, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.

Current wording

Continued disruption and instability in the digital asset markets as these events develop, including declines in the trading prices and liquidity of ZEC, or the failure of service providers to the Trust, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.

Previous wording

The Trust’s own acquisitions or dispositions of ZEC, since there is no limit on the number of ZEC that the Trust may acquire.

Current wording

The Trust’s own acquisitions or dispositions of ZEC, since there is no limit on the amount of ZEC that the Trust may acquire.

Previous wording

Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of Digital Asset Trading Platforms, they may experience fraud, market manipulation, business failures, security failures or operational problems, which may adversely affect the value of ZEC and, consequently, the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Due to the largely unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of Digital Asset Trading Platforms, they may experience fraud, market manipulation, business failures, security failures or operational problems, which may adversely affect the value of ZEC and, consequently, the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

In addition, over the past several years, some Digital Asset Trading Platforms have been closed, been subject to criminal and civil litigation and have entered into bankruptcy proceedings due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure and/or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such Digital Asset Trading Platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such Digital Asset Trading Platforms. While smaller Digital Asset Trading Platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms more stable, larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and their shortcomings or ultimate failures are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, and therefore may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, in February 2014, Mt. Gox, the largest Digital Asset Trading Platform at the time, halted withdrawals of Bitcoin and subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan following a hack that resulted in the loss of several hundred thousand Bitcoin. In the two weeks following the halt of Bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one Bitcoin fell on other trading platforms from around $795 to $578. Failure and shortcomings of large Digital Asset Trading Platforms have since continued; in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 Bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets, and in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 Bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex. The value of Bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. Regulatory enforcement actions have followed, such as in July 2017, when FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct Digital Asset Trading Platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based digital asset trading platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. In January 2018, the Japanese digital asset trading platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian digital asset trading platform, Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. More recently, in November 2022, FTX, another of the world’s largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, filed for bankruptcy protection and subsequently halted customer withdrawals as well as trading on its FTX.US platform. While details and events surrounding the failure continue …

Excerpt shortened here; the source contains the full paragraph.

Current wording

While smaller Digital Asset Trading Platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms more stable, larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and their shortcomings or ultimate failures are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, including on the price of ZEC, and therefore may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, in November 2022, FTX, another of the world’s largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, filed for bankruptcy protection and subsequently halted customer withdrawals as well as trading on its FTX.US platform. Fraud, security failures and operational problems all played a role in FTX’s issues and downfall. Moreover, Digital Asset Trading Platforms have been a subject of enhanced regulatory and enforcement scrutiny, and Digital Asset Markets have experienced continued instability, following the failure of FTX. In particular, in June 2023, the SEC brought the Binance Complaint and Coinbase Complaint, alleging that Binance and Coinbase operated unregistered securities exchanges, brokerages and clearing agencies. In addition, in November 2023, the SEC brought the Kraken Complaint, alleging that Kraken operated as an unregistered securities exchange, brokerage and clearing agency.

Previous wording

The Index has a limited history and the Index Price is a composite reference rate calculated using trading price data from various Digital Asset Trading Platforms chosen by the Index Provider. The Digital Asset Trading Platforms chosen by the Index Provider have also changed over time. For example, on January 28, 2023, the Index Provider added Gemini as a Constituent Trading Platform due to the trading platform meeting the Index Provider’s minimum liquidity requirement. On April 29, 2023, the Index Provider removed Binance.US from the Index due to the trading platform failing the Index Provider’s minimum liquidity requirement, and did not add any Constituent Trading Platforms. The Index Provider may remove or add Digital Asset Trading Platforms to the Index in the future at its discretion. For more information on the inclusion criteria for Digital Asset Trading Platforms in the Index, see “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ZEC Industry and Market—ZEC Value—The Index and the Index Price.”

Current wording

The Index has a limited history and the Index Price is a composite reference rate calculated using trading price data from various Digital Asset Trading Platforms chosen by the Index Provider. The Digital Asset Trading Platforms chosen by the Index Provider have also changed over time. For example, on July 28, 2024, the Index Provider added Bitfinex to the Index due to the trading platform meeting the Index Provider’s minimum liquidity requirement as part of its scheduled quarterly review, and removed Gemini from the Index due to the trading platform failing to meet the Index Provider’s minimum liquidity requirement. On December 22, 2024, the Index Provider added back Gemini to the Index due to the trading platform meeting the Index Provider’s minimum liquidity requirement, and did not remove any Constituent Trading Platforms as part of its scheduled quarterly review. The Index Provider may remove or add Digital Asset Trading Platforms to the Index in the future at its discretion. For more information on the inclusion criteria for Digital Asset Trading Platforms in the Index, see “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ZEC Industry and Market—ZEC Value—The Index and the Index Price.”

Previous wording

Although the Index is designed to accurately capture the market price of ZEC, third parties may be able to purchase and sell ZEC on public or private markets not included among the constituent Digital Asset Trading Platforms of the Index, and such transactions may take place at prices materially higher or lower than the Index Price. Moreover, there may be variances in the prices of ZEC on the various Digital Asset Trading Platforms, including as a result of differences in fee structures or administrative procedures on different Digital Asset Trading Platforms. For example, based on data provided by the Index Provider, on any given day during the year ended December 31, 2023, the maximum differential between the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot price of any single Digital Asset Trading Platform included in the Index and the Index Price was 5.11% and the average of the maximum differentials of the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot price of each Digital Asset Trading Platform included in the Index and the Index Price was 2.75%. During this same period, the average differential between the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot prices of all the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index and the Index Price was 0.11%. All Digital Asset Trading Platforms that were included in the Index throughout the period were considered in this analysis. To the extent such prices differ materially from the Index Price, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ZEC, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Although the Index is designed to accurately capture the market price of ZEC, third parties may be able to purchase and sell ZEC on public or private markets not included among the Constituent Trading Platforms of the Index, and such transactions may take place at prices materially higher or lower than the Index Price. Moreover, there may be variances in the prices of ZEC on the various Digital Asset Trading Platforms, including as a result of differences in fee structures or administrative procedures on different Digital Asset Trading Platforms. For example, based on data provided by the Index Provider, on any given day during the year ended December 31, 2024, the maximum differential between the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot price of any single Digital Asset Trading Platform included in the Index and the Index Price was 7.93% and the average of the maximum differentials of the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot price of each Digital Asset Trading Platform included in the Index and the Index Price was 5.01%. During this same period, the average differential between the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot prices of all the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index and the Index Price was 0.06%. All Digital Asset Trading Platforms that were included in the Index throughout the period were considered in this analysis. To the extent such prices differ materially from the Index Price, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ZEC, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

The price of ZEC on public Digital Asset Trading Platforms has a very limited history, and during this history, ZEC prices on the Digital Asset Markets more generally, and on Digital Asset Trading Platforms individually, have been volatile and subject to influence by many factors, including operational interruptions. While the Index is designed to limit exposure to the interruption of individual Digital Asset Trading Platforms, the Index Price, and the price of ZEC generally, remains subject to volatility experienced by Digital Asset Trading Platforms, and such volatility could adversely affect the value of the Shares. For example, from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023, the Index Price ranged from $23.70 to $365.90, with the straight average being $76.93. In addition, during the year ended December 31, 2023, the Index Price ranged from $24.07 to $49.94. The Sponsor has not observed a material difference between the Index Price and average prices from the constituent Digital Asset Trading Platforms individually or as a group. The price of ZEC more generally has experienced volatility similar to the Index Price during these periods. For additional information on movement of the Index Price and the price of ZEC, see “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Historical NAV and ZEC Prices.”

Current wording

The price of ZEC on public Digital Asset Trading Platforms has a very limited history, and during this history, ZEC prices on the Digital Asset Markets more generally, and on Digital Asset Trading Platforms individually, have been volatile and subject to influence by many factors, including operational interruptions. While the Index is designed to limit exposure to the interruption of individual Digital Asset Trading Platforms, the Index Price, and the price of ZEC generally, remains subject to volatility experienced by Digital Asset Trading Platforms, and such volatility could adversely affect the value of the Shares. For example, from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2024, the Index Price ranged from $18.14 to $365.90, with the straight average being $72.09. In addition, during the year ended December 31, 2024, the Index Price ranged from $18.14 to $76.20. The Sponsor has not observed a material difference between the Index Price and average prices from the Constituent Trading Platforms individually or as a group. The price of ZEC more generally has experienced volatility similar to the Index Price during these periods. For additional information on movement of the Index Price and the price of ZEC, see “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Historical NAV and ZEC Prices.”

Previous wording

Furthermore, because the number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms is limited, the Index will necessarily be composed of a limited number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms. If a Digital Asset Trading Platform were subjected to regulatory, volatility or other pricing issues, the Index Provider would have limited ability to remove such Digital Asset Trading Platform from the Index, which could skew the price of ZEC as represented by the Index. Trading on a limited number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms may result in less favorable prices and decreased liquidity of ZEC and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares.

Current wording

Furthermore, because the number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms is limited, the Index will necessarily be comprised of a limited number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms. If a Digital Asset Trading Platform were subjected to regulatory, volatility or other pricing issues, the Index Provider would have limited ability to remove such Digital Asset Trading Platform from the Index, which could skew the price of ZEC as represented by the Index. Trading on a limited number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms may result in less favorable prices and decreased liquidity of ZEC and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

As of December 31, 2023, ZEC was the 122nd largest digital asset by market capitalization as tracked by CoinMarketCap.com. As of December 31, 2023, the alternative digital assets tracked by CoinMarketCap.com, had a total market capitalization of approximately $1,518.3 billion (including the approximately $439.3 million market cap of ZEC), as calculated using market prices and total available supply of each digital asset, excluding tokens pegged to other assets. In addition, many consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms rather than open platforms like the Zcash Network. ZEC faces competition from a wide range of digital assets. For example, Monero, Dash and Oasis Network are all focused on enhancing privacy. In addition, ZEC is currently supported by fewer trading platforms than more established digital assets, such as Bitcoin and Ether, which could impact its liquidity. Competition from the emergence or growth of alternative digital assets could have a negative impact on the demand for, and price of, ZEC and thereby adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Current wording

As of December 31, 2024, ZEC was the 104 largest digital asset by market capitalization as tracked by CoinMarketCap.com. As of December 31, 2024, the alternative digital assets tracked by CoinMarketCap.com, had a total market capitalization of approximately $3,291.9 billion (including the approximately $916.4 million market cap of ZEC), as calculated using market prices and total available supply of each digital asset, excluding tokens pegged to other assets. ZEC faces competition from a wide range of digital assets. For example, Monero, Dash and Oasis Network are all focused on enhancing privacy. Many consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned blockchain platforms rather than open platforms like the Zcash Network. In addition, ZEC is currently supported by fewer trading platforms than more established digital assets, such as Bitcoin and Ether, which could impact its liquidity. Competition from the emergence or growth of alternative digital assets could have a negative impact on the demand for, and price of, ZEC and thereby adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Previous wording

Investors may invest in ZEC through means other than the Shares, including through direct investments in ZEC and other potential financial vehicles, possibly including securities backed by or linked to ZEC and digital asset financial vehicles similar to the Trust. Market and financial conditions, and other conditions beyond the Sponsor’s control, may make it more attractive to invest in other financial vehicles or to invest in ZEC directly, which could limit the market for, and reduce the liquidity of, the Shares. In addition, to the extent digital asset financial vehicles other than the Trust tracking the price of ZEC are formed and represent a significant proportion of the demand for ZEC, large purchases or redemptions of the securities of these digital asset financial vehicles, or private funds holding

Current wording

Investors may also invest in ZEC through means other than the Shares, including through direct investments in ZEC and other potential financial vehicles, possibly including securities backed by or linked to ZEC and digital asset financial vehicles similar to the Trust. Market and financial conditions, and other conditions beyond the Sponsor’s control, may make it more attractive to invest in other financial vehicles or to invest in ZEC directly, which could limit the market for, and reduce the liquidity of, the Shares. In addition, to the extent digital asset financial vehicles other than the Trust tracking the price of ZEC are formed and represent a significant proportion of the demand for ZEC, large purchases or redemptions of the securities of these digital asset financial vehicles, or private funds holding ZEC, could negatively affect the Index Price, the NAV, the NAV per Share, the value of the Shares, the Principal Market NAV and the Principal Market NAV per Share. Moreover, any reduced demand for Shares of the Trust may cause the Shares of the Trust to trade at a discount to the NAV per Share.

Previous wording

Moreover even though NYSE Arca’s request with respect to Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) is approved, there is no guarantee that a similar application to list Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca, or another national securities exchange, will also be approved. In particular, Bitcoin is the only digital asset that the SEC has publicly indicated it does not currently view as a security and the SEC is unlikely to approve a request to list the shares of a spot exchange-traded product that holds a digital asset that the SEC believes is a security. Moreover, even if the SEC took the view that a digital asset was not a security, based on prior spot exchange-traded product disapprovals, the existence of a CFTC-regulated futures market for the relevant digital asset would be central to the SEC’s approval of any request to list the shares of a spot exchange-traded product holding such digital asset. As of the date hereof, there are only CFTC-regulated futures markets for Bitcoin and Ethereum. As such, significant barriers to regulatory approval for any request to list the shares of other digital asset investment vehicles, including the Shares of the Trust, remain, and investors should not assume that approval of a spot Bitcoin exchange-traded product would subsequently lead to approval of spot exchange-traded products holding other digital assets, such as the Trust. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will be successful in listing the Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca even if the Sponsor decides to do so.

Current wording

Moreover, even though NYSE Arca’s requests with respect to Grayscale Bitcoin Trust ETF, Grayscale Bitcoin Mini Trust ETF, Grayscale Ethereum Trust ETF and Grayscale Ethereum Mini Trust ETF were approved, there is no guarantee that a similar application to list Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca, or another national securities exchange, would be approved. In particular, Bitcoin is the only digital asset that the SEC has publicly indicated it does not currently view as a security, although the SEC, by action through delegated authority approving exchange rule filings to list shares of trusts holding Ether as commodity-based exchange-traded products, has implicitly taken the view that Ether is not a security. The Sponsor believes that the SEC is unlikely to approve a request to list the shares of a spot exchange-traded product that holds a digital asset that the SEC believes is a security. Moreover, even if the SEC took the view that a digital asset was not a security, based on prior spot exchange-traded product disapprovals, the existence of a CFTC-regulated futures market for the relevant digital asset would be central to the SEC’s approval of any request to list the shares of a spot exchange-traded product holding such digital asset. As of the date hereof, there are only CFTC-regulated futures markets for a limited number of digital assets, including Bitcoin, Ether, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. As such, there exist significant barriers to obtaining regulatory approval to list the shares of other digital asset investment vehicles, including the Shares of the Trust. Investors should not assume that recent approvals of spot Bitcoin and spot Ether exchange-traded products will subsequently lead to approval of spot exchange-traded products holding other digital assets, such as the Trust. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will be successful in listing the Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca even if the Sponsor decides to do so.

Showing the first 40 of 73 pairs. Open the source sections for the rest.

Rearranged current paragraphs (2)

Current report — wording carried from elsewhere

The governance of some digital asset networks and protocols, such as the Zcash Network, is generally by voluntary consensus and open competition. For such networks and protocols, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on that network’s or protocol’s governance, which may stymie such network’s or protocol’s utility, adaptability and ability to grow and face challenges.

Current report — wording carried from elsewhere

Competition from the emergence or growth of other digital assets could have a negative impact on the price of ZEC and adversely affect the value of the Shares.
Rearranged previous paragraphs (6)

Previous report — wording carried elsewhere

As of December 31, 2023, the Zcash Network could handle approximately eight times as many transactions as the Bitcoin network, or approximately 53 transactions per second. In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital assets are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. For example, in August 2017, the Bitcoin network was upgraded with a technical feature known as “Segregated Witness”

Previous report — wording carried elsewhere

Reward. For the days following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZEC fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash Network launch on October 28, 2016.

Previous report — wording carried elsewhere

ZEC, could negatively affect the Index Price, the NAV, the value of the Shares, the Principal Market NAV and the Principal Market NAV per Share. Moreover, any reduced demand for Shares of the Trust may cause the Shares of the Trust to trade at a discount to the NAV per Share.

Previous report — wording carried elsewhere

Expense Example.” As a result, the amount of Trust’s assets represented by each Share declines as the Trust pays the Sponsor’s Fee (or sells ZEC in order to raise cash to pay any Additional Trust Expenses), which may cause the Shares to decrease in value over time or dampen any increase in value.

Previous report — wording carried elsewhere

(or could be significantly impeded in attempting to) sell or otherwise liquidate investments in the Shares, which could have a material adverse impact on demand for the Shares and their value.

Previous report — wording carried elsewhere

The Sponsor and Genesis, which previously served as an Authorized Participant and distributor and marketer for the Shares, are affiliated parties that share a common parent company, DCG;