Invesco Galaxy Bitcoin ETF

Previous wording

Market and Volatility Risk. Bitcoin has historically exhibited high price volatility relative to more traditional asset classes. For example, there were steep increases in the value of certain digital assets, including bitcoin, over the course of 2021. These increases were followed by steep drawdowns throughout 2022. These episodes of rapid price appreciation followed by steep drawdowns have occurred multiple times throughout bitcoin’s history, including, for example, in 2011, 2013-2014, and 2017-2018, before repeating again in 2021-2022. Over the course of 2023, bitcoin prices have continued to exhibit extreme volatility.

Current wording

Bitcoin has historically exhibited high price volatility relative to more traditional asset classes. For example, there were steep increases in the value of certain digital assets, including bitcoin, over the course of 2021. These increases were followed by steep drawdowns throughout 2022. These episodes of rapid price appreciation followed by steep drawdowns have occurred multiple times throughout bitcoin’s history, including, for example, in 2011, 2013-2014, and 2017-2018, before repeating again in 2021-2022. Over the course of 2023 and 2024, bitcoin prices continued to exhibit extreme volatility.

Previous wording

Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset trading platforms by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis”). In response to these events, the digital asset markets have experienced extreme price volatility and other entities in the digital asset industry have been, and may continue to be, negatively affected, further undermining confidence in the digital asset markets. These events have also negatively impacted the liquidity of the digital asset markets as certain entities affiliated with FTX engaged in significant trading activity. If the liquidity of the digital asset markets continues to be negatively impacted by these or similar events, digital asset prices, including bitcoin, may continue to experience significant volatility or price declines and confidence in the digital asset markets may be further undermined.

Current wording

Extreme volatility may persist and the value of the Shares may significantly decline in the future without recovery. The digital asset markets may still be experiencing a bubble or may experience a bubble again in the future. For example, in the first half of 2022, each of Celsius Network, Voyager Digital Ltd., and Three Arrows Capital declared bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem and negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset trading platforms by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis”). In response to these events, the digital asset markets have experienced extreme price volatility and other entities in the digital asset industry have been, and may continue to be, negatively affected, further undermining confidence in the digital asset markets. These events have also negatively impacted the liquidity of the digital asset markets as certain entities affiliated with FTX engaged in significant trading activity. If the liquidity of the digital asset markets continues to be negatively impacted by these or similar events, digital asset prices, including bitcoin, may continue to experience significant volatility or price declines and confidence in the digital asset markets may be further undermined.

Previous wording

Bitcoin has only recently become selectively accepted as a means of payment for goods and services by some retail and commercial outlets, and the use of bitcoin by consumers to pay such retail and commercial outlets remains limited. Banks and other established financial institutions may refuse to process funds for bitcoin transactions; process wire transfers to or from bitcoin trading venues, bitcoin-related companies or service providers; or maintain accounts for persons or entities transacting in bitcoin or providing bitcoin-related services. In addition, some taxing jurisdictions, including the U.S., treat the use of bitcoin as a medium of exchange for goods and services to be a taxable sale of bitcoin, which could discourage the use of bitcoin as a medium of exchange, especially for a holder of bitcoin that has appreciated in value.

Current wording

Bitcoin has only recently become selectively accepted as a means of payment for goods and services by some retail and commercial outlets, and the use of bitcoin by consumers to pay such retail and commercial outlets remains limited. Banks and other established financial institutions may refuse to process funds for bitcoin transactions; process wire transfers to or from bitcoin trading venues, bitcoin-related companies or service providers; or maintain accounts for persons or entities transacting in bitcoin or providing bitcoin-related services. In addition, some taxing jurisdictions, including the U.S., treat the use of bitcoin as a medium of exchange for goods and services to be a taxable sale of bitcoin, which could discourage the use of bitcoin as a medium of exchange, especially for a holder of bitcoin that has appreciated in value. See “—Regulatory Risk—The tax treatment of bitcoin and transactions involving bitcoin for U.S. federal income tax purposes is uncertain and may be adverse, which could adversely affect the value of an investment in the Shares.”

Previous wording

As the use of digital asset networks increases without a corresponding increase in throughput of the networks, average fees and settlement times have shown significant volatility and can increase significantly at times. Bitcoin’s network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. For example, since January 1, 2019, bitcoin transaction fees have increased from $0.18 per bitcoin transaction, on average, to a high of $60.95 per transaction, on average, on April 20, 2021. As of December 31, 2022, bitcoin transaction fees were $1.17 per transaction, on average. Increased fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for bitcoin (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, bitcoin, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares. In May 2023, events related to the adoption of ordinals, which are a means of inscribing digital content on the bitcoin blockchain, caused transaction fees to temporarily spike above $30 per transaction. As of October 1, 2023, bitcoin transaction fees were averaging $2.22 per transaction.

Current wording

As the use of digital asset networks increases without a corresponding increase in throughput of the networks, average fees and settlement times have shown significant volatility and can increase significantly at times. Bitcoin’s network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. For example, since January 1, 2019, bitcoin transaction fees have increased from $0.18 per bitcoin transaction, on average, to a high of $60.95 per transaction, on average, on April 20, 2021. As of December 31, 2022, bitcoin transaction fees were $1.17 per transaction, on average. Increased fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for bitcoin (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, bitcoin, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares. In May 2023, events related to the adoption of ordinals, which are a means of inscribing digital content on the bitcoin blockchain, caused transaction fees to temporarily spike above $30 per transaction. As of December 31, 2024, bitcoin transaction fees were averaging $1.78 per transaction .

Previous wording

Miners generate revenue from both newly created bitcoin, known as the “block reward” and from fees taken upon verification of transactions. If the aggregate revenue from transaction fees and the block reward is below a miner’s cost, the miner may cease operations. If the award of new units of bitcoin for solving blocks declines and/or the difficulty of solving blocks increases, and transaction fees voluntarily paid by participants are not sufficiently high, miners may not have an adequate incentive to continue mining and may cease their mining operations. The current fixed reward for solving a new block on the Bitcoin network is 6.25 bitcoin per block, which decreased from 12.5 bitcoin in May 2020. It is estimated that it will halve again in or around April 2024. This reduction may result in a reduction in the aggregate hash rate of the Bitcoin network as the incentive for miners decreases. Miners ceasing operations would reduce the collective processing power on the Bitcoin network, which would adversely affect the confirmation process for transactions (i.e., temporarily decreasing the speed at which blocks are added to the blockchain until the next scheduled adjustment in difficulty for block solutions) and make the Bitcoin network more vulnerable to a malicious actor or botnet obtaining sufficient control to alter the blockchain and hinder transactions. Any reduction in confidence in the confirmation process or processing power of the Bitcoin network may adversely affect an investment in the Shares.

Current wording

Miners generate revenue from both newly created bitcoin, known as the “block reward” and from fees taken upon verification of transactions. If the aggregate revenue from transaction fees and the block reward is below a miner’s cost, the miner may cease operations. If the award of new units of bitcoin for solving blocks declines and/or the difficulty of solving blocks increases, and transaction fees voluntarily paid by participants are not sufficiently high, miners may not have an adequate incentive to continue mining and may cease their mining operations. The current fixed reward for solving a new block on the Bitcoin network is 3.125 bitcoin per block, which decreased from 6.25 bitcoin in April 2024. It is estimated that it will halve again sometime in 2028. Reductions may result in a reduction in the aggregate hash rate of the Bitcoin network as the incentive for miners decreases. Miners ceasing operations would reduce the collective processing power on the Bitcoin network, which would adversely affect the confirmation process for transactions (i.e., temporarily decreasing the speed at which blocks are added to the blockchain until the next scheduled adjustment in difficulty for block solutions) and make the Bitcoin network more vulnerable to a malicious actor or botnet obtaining sufficient control to alter the blockchain and hinder transactions. Any reduction in confidence in the confirmation process or processing power of the Bitcoin network may adversely affect an investment in the Shares.

Previous wording

Furthermore, a hard fork can introduce new security risks. For example, when Ethereum and Ethereum Classic split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued trading venues through at least October 2016. An trading platform announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 ether tokens from the Ethereum Classic network, which was worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual miner or mining pool’s hashing power to exceed 50% of the processing power of the Bitcoin network, thereby making the network more susceptible to attack.

Current wording

Furthermore, a hard fork can introduce new security risks. For example, when Ethereum and Ethereum Classic split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued trading venues through at least October 2016. A trading platform announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 ether tokens from the Ethereum Classic network, which was worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual miner or mining pool’s hashing power to exceed 50% of the processing power of the Bitcoin network, thereby making the network more susceptible to attack.

Previous wording

As another example of the effects of hard forks on digital assets, on September 15th, 2022, the Ethereum Network successfully completed its Merge, moving from a Proof-of-Work (“PoW”) model to a Proof-of-Stake (“PoS”) model. Ethereum PoW miners who disagreed with the new consensus mechanism forked the network, which resulted in the EthereumPoW network (“ETHW”). ETHW was driven by a small but vocal group of miners who wished to hold onto revenue as Ethereum switched to PoS. The vast majority of token holder votes preferred the new PoS consensus method. There was no material impact on the Ethereum network as a result of the fork. All ether holders were airdropped ETHW tokens as a result of the hard fork. However, not all liquidity providers were able to trade the new token and the ETHW token almost immediately lost most of its value.

Current wording

As another example of the effects of hard forks on digital assets, on September 15, 2022, the Ethereum Network successfully completed its Merge, moving from a Proof-of-Work (“PoW”) model to a Proof-of-Stake (“PoS”) model. Ethereum PoW miners who disagreed with the new consensus mechanism forked the network, which resulted in the EthereumPoW network (“ETHW”). ETHW was driven by a small but vocal group of miners who wished to hold onto revenue as Ethereum switched to PoS. The vast majority of token holder votes preferred the new PoS consensus method. There was no material impact on the Ethereum network as a result of the fork. All ether holders were airdropped ETHW tokens as a result of the hard fork. However, not all liquidity providers were able to trade the new token and the ETHW token almost immediately lost most of its value.

Previous wording

Some digital asset networks have been subject to malicious activity achieved through control over 50% of the processing power on the network. For example, on May 24, 2018, it was reported that attackers compromised the Bitcoin Gold network in this manner and were successfully able to double-spend units of bitcoin gold in a series of transactions over the course of at least one week and in a total amount of at least $18 million. In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network experienced a 51% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may negatively impact perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Furthermore, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic Network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic network. The attacks resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of $5.0 million and $1.0 million. Other digital assets such as Verge, Monacoin and Electroneum have also suffered similar attacks. Although there have been no reports of such activity on the Bitcoin network, certain mining pools may have exceeded the 50% threshold on the Bitcoin network in the past. The possible crossing of the 50% threshold indicates a greater risk that a single mining pool could exert authority over the validation of digital asset transactions, and this risk is heightened if over 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority. For example, it is believed that more than 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin network is now or at one time was located in China. Because the Chinese government has subjected digital assets to heightened levels of scrutiny recently, forcing several digital asset trading venues to shut down, and has reportedly begun to place restrictions on mining activities, there is a risk that the Chinese government could also achieve control over more than 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin network. To the extent that the Bitcoin ecosystem, including the core developers and the administrators of mining pools, does not act to ensure greater decentralization of mining processing power, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the processing power on the Bitcoin network will increase, which may adversely affect an investment in the Shares.

Current wording

Some digital asset networks have been subject to malicious activity achieved through control over 50% of the processing power on the network. For example, on May 24, 2018, it was reported that attackers compromised the Bitcoin Gold network in this manner and were successfully able to double-spend units of bitcoin gold in a series of transactions over the course of at least one week and in a total amount of at least $18 million. In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network experienced a 51% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may negatively impact perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Furthermore, in August 2020, the Ethereum Classic Network was the target of two double-spend attacks by an unknown actor or actors that gained more than 50% of the processing power of the Ethereum Classic network. The attacks resulted in reorganizations of the Ethereum Classic blockchain that allowed the attacker or attackers to reverse previously recorded transactions in excess of $5.0 million and $1.0 million. Other digital assets such as Verge, Monacoin and Electroneum have also suffered similar attacks. Although there have been no reports of such activity on the Bitcoin network, certain mining pools may have exceeded the 50% threshold on the Bitcoin network in the past. The possible crossing of the 50% threshold indicates a greater risk that a single mining pool could exert authority over the validation of digital asset transactions, and this risk is heightened if over 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority. For example, it is believed that more than 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin network is now or at one time was located in China. Because the Chinese government has subjected digital assets to heightened levels of scrutiny recently, forcing several digital asset trading venues to shut down, and has reportedly begun to place restrictions on mining activities, there is a risk that the Chinese government could also achieve control over more than 50% of the processing power on the Bitcoin network. To the extent that the Bitcoin ecosystem, including the core developers and the administrators of mining pools, does not act to ensure greater decentralization of mining processing power, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the processing power on the Bitcoin network will increase, which may adversely affect an investment in the Shares. See “—Regulatory Risk.”

Previous wording

Trust’s bitcoin holdings, and the Trust’s private key(s) is (are) lost, destroyed or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key(s) is (are) accessible, the Trust will be unable to access its bitcoin, which could adversely affect an investment in the Shares of the Trust. In addition, if the Trust’s private key(s) is (are) misappropriated and the Trust’s bitcoin holdings are stolen, including from or by the Bitcoin Custodian, the Trust could lose some or all of its bitcoin holdings, which could adversely impact an investment in the Shares of the Trust.

Current wording

The custody of the Trust’s bitcoin is handled by the Bitcoin Custodian, and the transfer of bitcoin to and from Authorized Participants or their agents is directed by the Sponsor. If the Bitcoin Custodian’s internal procedures and controls are inadequate to safeguard the Trust’s bitcoin holdings, and the Trust’s private key(s) is (are) lost, destroyed or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key(s) is (are) accessible, the Trust will be unable to access its bitcoin, which could adversely affect an investment in the Shares of the Trust. In addition, if the Trust’s private key(s) is (are) misappropriated and the Trust’s bitcoin holdings are stolen, including from or by the Bitcoin Custodian, the Trust could lose some or all of its bitcoin holdings, which could adversely impact an investment in the Shares of the Trust.

Previous wording

If the Bitcoin Custody Agreement is terminated, the Sponsor may not be able to find a party willing to serve as the custodian of the Trust’s bitcoin or as the Trust’s prime broker under the same terms as the current Bitcoin Custody Agreement or at all. To the extent that Sponsor is not able to find a suitable party willing to serve as the custodian or prime broker, the Sponsor may be required to terminate the Trust and liquidate the Trust’s bitcoin. In addition, to the extent that the Sponsor finds a suitable party but must enter into a modified Bitcoin Custody Agreement that is less favorable for the Trust or Sponsor, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected.

Current wording

Custody Agreement or at all. To the extent that Sponsor is not able to find a suitable party willing to serve as the custodian or prime broker, the Sponsor may be required to terminate the Trust and liquidate the Trust’s bitcoin. In addition, to the extent that the Sponsor finds a suitable party but must enter into a modified Bitcoin Custody Agreement that is less favorable for the Trust or Sponsor, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected.

Previous wording

The Trust could also suffer losses in the event that a bank in which the Execution Agent holds customer cash fails, becomes insolvent, enters receivership, is taken over by regulators, enters financial distress, or otherwise suffers adverse effects to its financial condition or operational status. For example, Silvergate Bank, Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank recently experienced financial distress, including voluntary liquidation and receiverships.

Current wording

The Trust could also suffer losses in the event that a bank in which the Execution Agent holds customer cash fails, becomes insolvent, enters receivership, is taken over by regulators, enters financial distress, or otherwise suffers adverse effects to its financial condition or operational status. For example, in 2023 Silvergate Bank, Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank experienced financial distress, including voluntary liquidation and receiverships.

Previous wording

In August 2021, the chair of the SEC stated that he believed investors using digital asset trading platforms are not adequately protected, and that activities on the platforms can implicate the securities laws, commodities laws and banking laws, raising a number of issues related to protecting investors and consumers, guarding against illicit activity, and ensuring financial stability. The chair expressed a need for the SEC to have additional authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms from “falling between regulatory cracks,” as well as for more resources to protect investors in “this growing and volatile sector.” The chair called for federal legislation centering on digital asset trading, lending, and decentralized finance platforms, seeking “additional plenary authority” to write rules for digital asset trading and lending. Moreover, President Biden’s March 9, 2022 Executive Order, asserting that technological advances and the rapid growth of the digital asset markets “necessitate an evaluation and alignment of the United States Government approach to digital assets,” signals an ongoing focus on digital asset policy and regulation in the United States. A number of reports issued pursuant to the Executive Order have focused on various risks related to the digital asset ecosystem, and have recommended additional legislation and regulatory oversight. There have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets.

Current wording

In August 2021, the chair of the SEC stated that he believed investors using digital asset trading platforms are not adequately protected, and that activities on the platforms can implicate the securities laws, commodities laws and banking laws, raising a number of issues related to protecting investors and consumers, guarding against illicit activity, and ensuring financial stability. The chair expressed a need for the SEC to have additional authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms from “falling between regulatory cracks,” as well as for more resources to protect investors in “this growing and volatile sector.” The chair called for federal legislation centering on digital asset trading, lending, and decentralized finance platforms, seeking “additional plenary authority” to write rules for digital asset trading and lending. Moreover, Former President Biden’s March 9, 2022 Executive Order, asserting that technological advances and the rapid growth of the digital asset markets “necessitate an evaluation and alignment of the United States Government approach to digital assets,” signals an ongoing focus on digital asset policy and regulation in the United States. A number of reports issued pursuant to the Executive Order have focused on various risks related to the digital asset ecosystem, and have recommended additional legislation and regulatory oversight. There have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets. In May 2024, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4763, the Financial Innovation and Technology for the 21 st Century Act (“FIT21”), which would amend existing securities and commodity regulatory statutes to facilitate the use of digital assets. While FIT21 receive strong bipartisan support, its future in is uncertain, however, a Republican-controlled Congress may result in the enactment of legislation governing cryptocurrencies, such FIT21. During his campaign, President Trump indicated that his administration will be pro-cryptocurrency and has reportedly discussed the creation of a national bitcoin reserve, and other potential policies related to cryptocurrencies including bitcoin. On January 23, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order that outlined the administration’s commitment to strengthening U.S. leadership in the digital asset space and established an inter-agency working group for artificial intelligence and crypto that is tasked with proposing a regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets, including stablecoins, in the United States.

Previous wording

It is not possible to predict whether, or when, any of these developments will lead to Congress granting additional authorities to the SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how they might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function or how any new regulations or changes to existing regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and bitcoin held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares.

Current wording

It is not possible to predict whether, or when, any of these developments will lead to Congress granting additional authorities to the SEC, the CFTC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how they might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function or how any new regulations or changes to existing regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and bitcoin held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares.

Previous wording

In February 2020, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin stated digital assets were a “crucial area” on which the U.S. Treasury Department has spent significant time. Secretary Mnuchin announced that the U.S. Treasury Department is preparing significant new regulations governing digital asset activities to address concerns regarding the potential use for facilitating money laundering and other illicit activities. In December 2020, FinCEN, a bureau within the U.S. Treasury Department, proposed a rule that would require financial institutions to submit reports, keep records, and verify the identity of customers for certain transactions to or from so-called “unhosted” wallets, also commonly referred to as self-hosted wallets. In January 2021, U.S. Treasury Secretary nominee Janet Yellen stated her belief that regulators should “look closely at how to encourage the use of digital assets for legitimate activities while curtailing their use for malign and illegal activities.”

Current wording

Treasury Department is preparing significant new regulations governing digital asset activities to address concerns regarding the potential use for facilitating money laundering and other illicit activities. In December 2020, FinCEN, a bureau within the U.S. Treasury Department, proposed a rule that would require financial institutions to submit reports, keep records, and verify the identity of customers for certain transactions to or from so-called “unhosted” wallets, also commonly referred to as self-hosted wallets. In January 2021, U.S. Treasury Secretary nominee Janet Yellen stated her belief that regulators should “look closely at how to encourage the use of digital assets for legitimate activities while curtailing their use for malign and illegal activities.”

Previous wording

In addition, a determination that bitcoin is a security under U.S. or foreign law could adversely affect an investment in the Shares.

Current wording

In addition, a determination that bitcoin is a security under U.S. or foreign law could adversely affect an investment in the Shares. See “—Future regulations may require the Trust and the Sponsor to become registered, which may cause the Trust to liquidate.”

Previous wording

Shareholders do not have the protections associated with ownership of Shares in an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”) or the protections afforded by the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”).

Current wording

Shareholders do not have the protections associated with ownership of Shares in an investment company registered under the 1940 Act or the protections afforded by the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”).

Previous wording

If a Shareholder opposed a jury trial demand based on the waiver, the applicable court would determine whether the waiver was enforceable based on the facts and circumstances of that case in accordance with applicable federal laws. To our knowledge, the enforceability of a contractual pre-dispute jury trial waiver in connection with claims arising under the U.S. federal securities laws has not been finally adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, we believe that a contractual pre-dispute jury trial waiver provision is generally enforceable, including under the laws of the State of Delaware, which govern the Trust Agreement. By purchasing Shares in the Trust, Shareholders waive a right to a trial by jury which may limit a Shareholder’s ability to bring a claim in a judicial forum that it finds favorable for disputes with the Trust.

Current wording

If a Shareholder opposed a jury trial demand based on the waiver, the applicable court would determine whether the waiver was enforceable based on the facts and circumstances of that case in accordance with applicable federal laws. To the Trust’s knowledge, the enforceability of a contractual pre-dispute jury trial waiver in connection with claims arising under the U.S. federal securities laws has not been finally adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the Trust believes that a contractual pre-dispute jury trial waiver provision is generally enforceable, including under the laws of the State of Delaware, which govern the Trust Agreement. By purchasing Shares in the Trust, Shareholders waive a right to a trial by jury which may limit a Shareholder’s ability to bring a claim in a judicial forum that it finds favorable for disputes with the Trust.

Previous wording

Current and future legislation, SEC and CFTC rulemaking, and other regulatory developments may impact the manner in which bitcoin is treated for classification and clearing purposes. In particular, certain transactions in bitcoin may be deemed to be commodity interests under the CEA or bitcoin may be classified by the SEC as a “security” under U.S. federal securities laws. Public statements made in the past by senior officials at the SEC, including a June 2018 speech by the director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, indicate that such officials do not believe that bitcoin is a security. Such statements are not official policy statements by the SEC and reflect only the speaker’s views, which are not binding on the SEC or any other agency or court. If bitcoin is determined to be a “security” under federal or state securities laws by the SEC or any other agency, or in a proceeding in a court of law or otherwise, it may have material adverse consequences for bitcoin as a digital asset. In the face of such developments, the required registrations and compliance steps may result in extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. If the Sponsor decides to dissolve the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances, the Trust may be dissolved or liquidated at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders.

Current wording

Current and future legislation, SEC and CFTC rulemaking, and other regulatory developments may impact the manner in which bitcoin is treated for classification and clearing purposes. In particular, certain transactions in bitcoin may be deemed to be commodity interests under the CEA or bitcoin may be classified by the SEC as a “security” under U.S. federal securities laws. Public statements made in the past by senior officials at the SEC, including a June 2018 speech by the then director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, indicate that such officials do not believe that bitcoin is a security. Such statements are not official policy statements by the SEC and reflect only the speaker’s views, which are not binding on the SEC or any other agency or court. If bitcoin is determined to be a “security” under federal or state securities laws by the SEC or any other agency, or in a proceeding in a court of law or otherwise, it may have material adverse consequences for bitcoin as a digital asset. In the face of such developments, the required registrations and compliance steps may result in extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. If the Sponsor decides to dissolve the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances, the Trust may be dissolved or liquidated at a time that is disadvantageous to Shareholders.

Previous wording

In addition to financial regulation, because of the high energy usage required for bitcoin mining, bitcoin may be subject to regulation stemming from energy usage and/or climate concerns. For example, as of December 31, 2022, approximately 245 million tera hashes are performed every second in connection with mining on the Bitcoin network. Although measuring the electricity consumed by this process is difficult because these operations are performed by various machines with varying levels of efficiency, the process consumes a significant amount of energy. The operations of the Bitcoin network and other digital asset networks may also consume significant amounts of energy. Further, in addition to the direct energy costs of performing calculations on any given digital asset network, there are indirect costs that impact a network’s total energy consumption, including the costs of cooling the machines that perform these calculations. A number of states and countries have adopted, or are considering the adoption of, regulatory frameworks to impede bitcoin mining and/or bitcoin use more broadly. For example, New York State recently failed to pass a bill that would place a moratorium on mining operations for proof-of-work blockchains such as bitcoin. Depending on how futures regulations are formulated and applied, such policies could have the potential to negatively affect the price of bitcoin, and, in turn, the value of the Shares. Increased regulation and the corresponding compliance cost of these regulations could additionally result in higher barriers to entry for bitcoin miners, which could increase the concentration of the hash rate, potentially having a negative impact on the price of bitcoin.

Current wording

In addition to financial regulation, because of the high energy usage required for bitcoin mining, bitcoin may be subject to regulation stemming from energy usage and/or climate concerns. For example, as of December 31, 2024, approximately 796 million tera hashes are performed every second in connection with mining on the Bitcoin network . Although measuring the electricity consumed by this process is difficult because these operations are performed by various machines with varying levels of efficiency, the process consumes a significant amount of energy. The operations of the Bitcoin network and other digital asset networks may also consume significant amounts of energy. Further, in addition to the direct energy costs of performing calculations on any given digital asset network, there are indirect costs that impact a network’s total energy consumption, including the costs of cooling the machines that perform these calculations. A number of states and countries have adopted, or are considering the adoption of, regulatory frameworks to impede bitcoin mining and/or bitcoin use more broadly. For example, New York State recently failed to pass a bill that would place a moratorium on mining operations for proof-of-work blockchains such as bitcoin. Depending on how futures regulations are formulated and applied, such policies could have the potential to negatively affect the price of bitcoin, and, in turn, the value of the Shares. Increased regulation and the corresponding compliance cost of these regulations could additionally result in higher barriers to entry for bitcoin miners, which could increase the concentration of the hash rate, potentially having a negative impact on the price of bitcoin.

Previous wording

Current U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) guidance indicates that bitcoin should be treated and taxed as property, not as currency, for U.S. federal income tax purposes, and that transactions involving the payment of bitcoin in return for goods and services should be treated as barter transactions. Such exchanges result in capital gain or loss measured by the difference between the price at which bitcoin is exchanged and the taxpayer’s basis in the bitcoin. However, because bitcoin is a new technological innovation, because IRS guidance has taken the form of administrative pronouncements that may be modified without prior notice and comment, and because there is as yet little case law on the subject, the U.S. federal income tax treatment of an investment in bitcoin or in transactions relating to investments in bitcoin may change from that described in the Prospectus, possibly with retroactive effect. Any such change in the U.S. federal income tax treatment of bitcoin may have a negative effect on prices of bitcoin and may adversely affect the value of the Shares. In this regard, the IRS has indicated that it has made it a priority to issue additional guidance related to the taxation of virtual currency transactions, such as transactions involving bitcoin. In addition, the IRS and U.S. Department of Treasury have proposed regulations regarding the tax information reporting rules for cryptocurrency transactions. While it has started to issue such additional guidance, whether any future guidance will adversely affect the U.S. federal income tax treatment of an investment in bitcoin or in transactions relating to investments in bitcoin is unknown. Moreover, future developments that may arise with respect to digital currencies may increase the uncertainty with respect to the treatment of digital currencies for U.S. federal income tax purposes.

Current wording

Current U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) guidance indicates that bitcoin should be treated and taxed as property, not as currency, for U.S. federal income tax purposes, and that transactions involving the payment of bitcoin in return for goods and services should be treated as barter transactions. Such exchanges result in capital gain or loss measured by the difference between the price at which bitcoin is exchanged and the taxpayer’s basis in the bitcoin. However, because bitcoin is a new technological innovation, because IRS guidance has taken the form of administrative pronouncements that may be modified without prior notice and comment, and because there is as yet little case law on the subject, the U.S. federal income tax treatment of an investment in bitcoin or in transactions relating to investments in bitcoin may change from that described in this Report, possibly with retroactive effect. Any such change in the U.S. federal income tax treatment of bitcoin may have a negative effect on prices of bitcoin and may adversely affect the value of the Shares. In this regard, the IRS has indicated that it has made it a priority to issue additional guidance related to the taxation of virtual currency transactions, such as transactions involving bitcoin. In addition, the IRS and U.S. Department of Treasury have proposed regulations regarding the tax information reporting rules for cryptocurrency transactions. While it has started to issue such additional guidance, whether any future guidance will adversely affect the U.S. federal income tax treatment of an investment in bitcoin or in transactions relating to investments in bitcoin is unknown. Moreover, future developments that may arise with respect to digital currencies may increase the uncertainty with respect to the treatment of digital currencies for U.S. federal income tax purposes.

Previous wording

Current IRS guidance does not address whether income recognized by a non-U.S. person as a result of a hard fork, airdrop or similar occurrence could be subject to the 30% withholding tax imposed on U.S. source “fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits and income” (“FDAP”). A Non-U.S. Shareholder (as defined under “U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences” below) should assume that, in the absence of guidance, a withholding agent (including the Sponsor) is likely to withhold 30% of any such income recognized by a Non-U.S. Shareholder in respect of its Shares, including by deducting such withheld amounts from proceeds that such Non-U.S. Shareholder would otherwise be entitled to receive in connection with a distribution of the new digital asset.

Current wording

Current IRS guidance does not address whether income recognized by a non-U.S. person as a result of a hard fork, airdrop or similar occurrence could be subject to the 30% withholding tax imposed on U.S. source “fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits and income” (“FDAP”). A Non-U.S. Shareholder (which is a Shareholder that is, or is treated as, for U.S. federal income tax purposes, a nonresident alien individual, a foreign corporation, or an estate or trust whose income is not subject to U.S. federal income tax on a net income basis ) should assume that, in the absence of guidance, a withholding agent (including the Sponsor) is likely to withhold 30% of any such income recognized by a Non-U.S. Shareholder in respect of its Shares, including by deducting such withheld amounts from proceeds that such Non-U.S. Shareholder would otherwise be entitled to receive in connection with a distribution of the new digital asset.

Previous wording

Under current IRS guidance, hard forks, airdrops and similar events with respect to digital assets will under certain circumstances be treated as taxable events giving rise to ordinary income. In the absence of guidance to the contrary, it is possible that any such income recognized by a U.S. Tax-Exempt Shareholder (as defined under “U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences” below) would constitute “unrelated business taxable income” (“UBTI”). U.S. Tax-Exempt Shareholders should consult their tax advisers regarding whether such Shareholders may recognize UBTI as a consequence of an investment in the Shares.

Current wording

Under current IRS guidance, hard forks, airdrops and similar events with respect to digital assets will under certain circumstances be treated as taxable events giving rise to ordinary income. In the absence of guidance to the contrary, it is possible that any such income recognized by a U.S. Tax-Exempt Shareholder (which is a U.S. Shareholder that is exempt from tax under Section 501(a) of the Code)) would constitute “unrelated business taxable income” (“UBTI”). U.S. Tax-Exempt Shareholders should consult their tax advisers regarding whether such Shareholders may recognize UBTI as a consequence of an investment in the Shares.

Previous wording

Many bitcoin trading platforms lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers. As a result, the prices of bitcoin on trading platforms may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges. Tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-trading may not be available to or employed by digital asset trading platforms, or may not exist at all. The SEC has identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the bitcoin market generally, including, among others (1) “wash trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in bitcoin manipulating bitcoin pricing; (3) hacking of the Bitcoin network and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the Bitcoin network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in bitcoin, new sources of demand for bitcoin) or based on the dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins,” including Tether, the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment”); and (7) fraud and manipulation at bitcoin trading platforms. The effect of potential market manipulation, front-running, wash-trading, and other fraudulent or manipulative trading practices may inflate the volumes actually present in crypto market and/or cause distortions in price, which could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to Shareholders.

Current wording

Many bitcoin trading platforms lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers. As a result, the prices of bitcoin on trading platforms may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges. Tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-trading may not be available to or employed by digital asset trading platforms, or may not exist at all. The SEC has identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the bitcoin market generally, including, among others (1) “wash trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in bitcoin manipulating bitcoin pricing; (3) hacking of the Bitcoin network and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the Bitcoin network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in bitcoin, new sources of demand for bitcoin) or based on the dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins,” including Tether (for more information, see “Risk Factors—Risk Factors Related to Digital Assets—Prices of bitcoin may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and US Dollar Coin (“USDC”), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment”), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment”); and (7) fraud and manipulation at bitcoin trading platforms. The effect of potential market manipulation, front-running, wash-trading, and other fraudulent or manipulative trading practices may inflate the volumes actually present in crypto market and/or cause distortions in price, which could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to Shareholders.

Previous wording

The Trust as well as the Sponsor and its service providers are vulnerable to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and other public crises that may arise in the future, which may adversely affect the performance of the Trust’s investment in bitcoin and your investment in the Trust.

Current wording

The Trust as well as the Sponsor and its service providers are vulnerable to the effects of public health crises, which may adversely affect the performance of the Trust’s investment in bitcoin and your investment in the Trust.

Previous wording

The Trust and the Sponsor face competition with respect to the creation of competing products. The Sponsor’s competitors may have greater financial, technical and human resources than the Sponsor. These competitors may also compete with the Sponsor in recruiting and retaining qualified personnel. Smaller or early stage companies may also prove to be effective competitors, particularly through collaborative arrangements with large and established companies. Accordingly, the Sponsor’s competitors may commercialize a product involving bitcoin more rapidly, effectively or for a lower fee than the Sponsor is able to, which could adversely affect the Sponsor’s competitive position, the likelihood that the Trust will achieve initial market acceptance and the Sponsor’s ability to generate meaningful revenues from the Trust. For exchange-traded products similar to the Trust, there have been significant “first-mover” advantages in terms of asset gathering, trading volume and media coverage. In many cases, the first mover in an asset class has been able to maintain these advantages for extended periods.

Current wording

The Trust and the Sponsor face competition with respect to the creation of competing products. In January 2024, the SEC approved several exchange-traded bitcoin products and many of such products, including the Trust, could fail to acquire substantial assets, or fail to retain acquired assets due to competition and/or market conditions. The Sponsor’s competitors may have greater financial, technical and human resources than the Sponsor. These competitors may also compete with the Sponsor in recruiting and retaining qualified personnel. Smaller or early stage companies may also prove to be effective competitors, particularly through collaborative arrangements with large and established companies. Accordingly, the Sponsor’s competitors may commercialize a product involving bitcoin more rapidly, effectively or for a lower fee than the Sponsor is able to, which could adversely affect the Sponsor’s competitive position, the likelihood that the Trust will achieve initial acceptance and the Sponsor’s ability to generate meaningful revenues from the Trust. For exchange-traded products similar to the Trust, there have been significant “first-mover” advantages in terms of asset gathering, trading volume and media coverage. In many cases, the first mover in an asset class has been able to maintain these advantages for extended periods.

Previous wording

Although Shares of the Trust are expected to be publicly listed and traded on an exchange, there can be no guarantee that an active trading market for the Trust will develop or be maintained. If Shareholders need to sell their Shares at a time when no active market for them exists, the price Shareholders receive for their Shares, assuming that Shareholders are able to sell them, will likely be lower than the price that Shareholders would receive if an active market did exist and, accordingly, a Shareholder may suffer losses.

Current wording

Although Shares of the Trust are publicly listed and traded on an exchange, there can be no guarantee that an active trading market for the Trust will develop or be maintained. If Shareholders need to sell their Shares at a time when no active market for them exists, the price Shareholders receive for their Shares, assuming that Shareholders are able to sell them, will likely be lower than the price that Shareholders would receive if an active market did exist and, accordingly, a Shareholder may suffer losses.

Previous wording

The Trust’s portfolio will be priced, including for purposes of determining the NAV, based upon the estimated fair market value (“FMV”) for bitcoin determined by the Benchmark Provider. The price of bitcoin in U.S. Dollars or in other currencies available from other data sources may not be equal to the prices used to calculate the NAV. The Benchmark Provider has substantial discretion at any time to change the methodology used to determine the FMV of bitcoin, including the spot markets underlying its methodology. The Benchmark Provider does not have any obligation to take the needs of the Trust, the Trust’s Shareholders, or anyone else into consideration in connection with such changes.

Current wording

As set forth under “Calculation of NAV” below, the Trust’s portfolio will be priced, including for purposes of determining the NAV, based upon the estimated fair market value (“FMV”) for bitcoin determined by the Benchmark Provider. The price of bitcoin in U.S. Dollars or in other currencies available from other data sources may not be equal to the prices used to calculate the NAV. The Benchmark Provider has substantial discretion at any time to change the methodology used to determine the FMV of bitcoin, including the spot markets underlying its methodology. The Benchmark Provider does not have any obligation to take the needs of the Trust, the Trust’s Shareholders, or anyone else into consideration in connection with such changes.