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Encompass Health Corp

For the period ended Dec 31, 2025. Filed Feb 26, 2026.

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About this filing

A company's yearly report to the SEC, with audited financial statements. It is the fullest account a company gives of its business, its finances and the risks it sees.

FY2025 · Filed Feb 26, 2026

EHC$141.15+2.6%Stored close · as of Nov 9, 2026

What changed in Risk Factors?

Read the current filing

Previous report: 10-K

Period ended 2024-12-31; filed 2025-02-28.

0000785161-25-000009

Item 1A. Risk Factors

Current report: 10-K

Period ended 2025-12-31; filed 2026-02-26.

0000785161-26-000081

Item 1A. Risk Factors

The baseline is this issuer’s latest earlier reporting period of the same form that was filed before the current report. A previous 10-Q is a different quarter, not a year-over-year comparison. Amendments are excluded.

Compared 196 previous paragraphs and 195 current paragraphs.

139 unchanged; 52 reworded; 2 added; 4 removed; 1 previous and 2 current paragraphs rearranged.

Tables are not compared: 0 previous and 0 current tables excluded. Dates, whitespace, punctuation and numbering changes are ignored; changes to financial figures remain significant.

A changed paragraph is not evidence that risk increased or decreased. An unchanged paragraph does not establish that risk stayed the same.

Added paragraphs (2)

Current report

We receive state directed and supplemental payments in connection with several state Medicaid programs. In 2025, those payments totaled approximately $148 million. We also pay provider taxes to fund, in part, state Medicaid programs, and in 2025 those payments totaled approximately $127 million. In May 2024, CMS issued a final rule related to Medicaid managed care programs that addresses state directed payment programs and imposes new requirements for these programs. The various elements of the rule take effect between its issuance and early 2028. Ultimately, this rule could result in significant changes to state directed and supplemental payment programs from which we receive payments. However, a federal district court recently vacated portions of this rule following a legal challenge by the state of Texas. CMS appealed the decision, but the court enjoined enforcement of this rule while the appeal is pending. The OBBBA also contains provisions limiting states’ ability to assess provider taxes to increase federal matching Medicaid funds and make directed payments to providers. Most of these provisions take effect in 2027 or later and likely require additional federal and state regulatory action to implement.

Current report

It is possible that additional rulemaking could result in significant restructurings of existing state Medicaid programs, including provider tax and related directed and supplemental payment programs. State authorities design the structures and operations of these programs to promote access to acute-care hospitals for Medicaid patients by supplementing acute-care reimbursement. Historically, we are not aware of any IRFs playing a significant role in the design given the limited number of IRF Medicaid patients, so we are uncertain what attention state authorities will give to the effects of additional rulemaking on IRFs. We are unable to estimate the financial impact that structural modifications and other program changes, if any, may have on our Medicaid provider tax expenses or directed and supplemental payments. We cannot be certain that changes to state directed and supplemental payment programs will directly correspond to changes in the related provider taxes. CMS periodically assesses the compliance of these programs, and CMS’s determination that a state’s program fails to comply may result in a decrease in state directed and supplemental payments and recoupment of prior payments under that state’s noncompliant program.
Removed paragraphs (4)

Previous report

Examples of regulatory changes that can affect our business, beyond direct changes to Medicare reimbursement rates, can be found from time to time in CMS’s annual rulemaking. For example, the final rule for the fiscal year 2010 IRF-PPS implemented new coverage requirements which provided in part that a patient medical record must document a reasonable expectation that, at the time of admission to an IRF, the patient generally required and was able to participate in the intensive rehabilitation therapy services uniquely provided at IRFs. CMS has also taken the position that a patient’s medical file must appropriately document the rationale for the use of group therapies, as opposed to one-on-one therapy. Beginning in 2015, CMS instituted a new data collection requirement pursuant to which IRFs must capture the minutes and mode (individual, group, concurrent, or co-treatment) of therapy by specialty. Additionally, from time to time CMS has adopted changes in the medical conditions that will presumptively count toward the 60% compliance threshold to qualify for reimbursement as an inpatient rehabilitation hospital.

Previous report

President Trump has issued an unprecedented number of executive orders during his first 30 days in office. Many call for changes in policy or practice at federal agencies as well as additional rulemaking to further the policy ends. Given the amount of revenues we receive from Medicare and Medicaid, an extensive number of changes in federal policy affecting a broad spectrum of business operations, including by means of executive orders affecting parties doing business with the federal government, may increase our compliance costs and potential liability in the event of noncompliance.

Previous report

In December 2020, HHS-OCR proposed a new rule that would modify HIPAA regulations. According to HHS-OCR, the proposed rule is intended to promote care coordination and value-based care. The proposed changes to the HIPAA rules also provide for strengthening individuals’ rights to access their own health information, including electronic information; improving information sharing for care coordination and case management for individuals; facilitating greater family and caregiver involvement in the care of individuals experiencing emergencies or health crises; enhancing flexibilities for disclosures in emergency or threatening circumstances, such as the opioid and COVID-19 public health emergencies; and reducing administrative burdens on HIPAA covered healthcare providers and health plans, while continuing to protect individuals’ health information privacy interests. Although one of the stated purposes of the proposed rules is to reduce healthcare providers burdens, providers would have to engage in a number of activities to come into compliance if the changes are finalized, including changing policies and procedures, changing patient privacy notices and business associate agreements and training workforce members in the new requirements.

Previous report

•limitations in obtaining financing for acquisitions at a cost reasonable to us;
Reworded paragraphs (52)

Previous wording

In March 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the “ACA”) as a significant healthcare reform. Many provisions within the ACA have impacted or could in the future impact our business, including Medicare reimbursement reductions and promotion of alternative payment models, such as accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) and bundled payment initiatives. The nature and substance of state and federal healthcare laws are subject to change, by means of both broad-based healthcare reform legislation, like the ACA, and targeted legislative and regulatory action. Any future legislative and regulatory changes may impact the provisions of the ACA discussed below or other laws or regulations that either currently affect, or may in the future affect, our business.

Current wording

In March 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the “ACA”) as a significant healthcare reform. Many provisions within the ACA have impacted or could in the future impact our business, including Medicare reimbursement reductions and promotion of alternative payment models, such as accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) and bundled payment initiatives. The nature and substance of state and federal healthcare laws are subject to change frequently, by means of both broad-based healthcare reform legislation, like the ACA, and targeted legislative and regulatory action.

Previous wording

For Medicare providers like us, these laws include reductions in CMS’s annual adjustments to Medicare reimbursement rates, commonly known as a “market basket update.” In accordance with Medicare laws and statutes, CMS makes market basket updates by provider type in an effort to compensate providers for rising operating costs. The ACA required reductions, the last of which ended in 2019, in the annual market basket updates for hospital providers ranging from 10 to 75 basis points. In addition, the ACA requires the market basket updates for hospital providers to be reduced by a productivity adjustment on an annual basis. The productivity adjustment equals the trailing 10-year average of changes in annual economy-wide private nonfarm business multi-factor productivity. To date, the productivity adjustments have typically resulted in decreases to the market basket updates ranging from 20 to 100 basis points.

Current wording

In accordance with federal statutes, CMS makes an annual adjustment to Medicare reimbursement rates, commonly known as a “market basket update,” by provider type in an effort to compensate providers for rising operating costs. The ACA requires the market basket updates for hospital providers to be reduced by a productivity adjustment on an annual basis. The productivity adjustment equals the trailing 10-year average of changes in annual economy-wide private nonfarm business multi-factor productivity. To date, the productivity adjustments have typically resulted in decreases to the market basket updates ranging from 20 to 100 basis points.

Previous wording

Other federal legislation can also have a significant impact on our Medicare reimbursement. For example, on August 2, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Budget Control Act of 2011, which provided for an automatic 2% reduction of Medicare program payments. This automatic reduction, known as “sequestration,” began affecting payments received after April 1, 2013. Under current law, for each year through mid-fiscal year 2032, the reimbursement we receive from Medicare, after first taking into account all annual payment adjustments including the market basket update, will be reduced by sequestration unless it is repealed or modified before then.

Current wording

Other federal legislation can also have a significant impact on our Medicare reimbursement. For example, on August 2, 2011, President Obama signed into law the Budget Control Act of 2011, which provided for an automatic 2% reduction of Medicare program payments to reduce deficit spending. This automatic reduction, known as “sequestration,” began affecting payments received after April 1, 2013. Under current law, for each year through the first five months of fiscal year 2033, the reimbursement we receive from Medicare, after first taking into account all annual payment adjustments including the market basket update, will be reduced by sequestration unless it is repealed or modified before then. On July 4, 2025, President Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (“OBBBA”). The OBBBA contains a range of healthcare-related provisions impacting coverage, financing, and provider reimbursement in state Medicaid programs. Most of these provisions take effect in 2027 or later and likely require additional federal and state regulatory action to implement.

Previous wording

Additionally, concerns held by federal policymakers about the federal deficit, national debt levels, or healthcare spending specifically, including solvency of the Medicare trust fund, could result in enactment of further federal spending reductions, including by means of significant staffing reductions at HHS, further entitlement reform legislation affecting the

Current wording

Concerns held by federal policymakers about the federal deficit, national debt levels, or healthcare spending specifically, including solvency of the Medicare trust fund, could result in enactment of further federal spending reductions, including by means of significant staffing reductions at HHS, further entitlement reform legislation affecting the Medicare and

Previous wording

Medicare and Medicaid programs, and further reductions to provider payments. In October 2014, President Obama signed into law the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (the “IMPACT Act”). The IMPACT Act directs HHS, in consultation with healthcare stakeholders, to implement standardized data collection processes for post-acute quality and outcome measures. Although the IMPACT Act did not specifically call for the implementation of a new post-acute payment system, this act laid the foundation for possible future post-acute payment policies in which Medicare payments are driven primarily by patients’ medical conditions and other clinical factors rather than the setting where the care is provided. CMS has made changes to existing current post-acute payment systems to improve comparability of patient assessment and clinical characteristic data across settings, which could make it easier to develop a unified payment system for post-acute providers in the future. For example, in the last five years, CMS established new case-mix classification models for both home health and skilled nursing facilities, which rely on patient characteristics rather than the amount of therapy received to determine payments. Another example is CMS’s implementation of the new patient assessment measures for IRFs discussed below. The IMPACT Act also created additional data reporting requirements for our hospitals in the domains of functional and cognitive status, skin integrity, medication reconciliation, incidence of major falls, and transfer of health information. The precise details of these new reporting requirements, including timing and content, were developed and implemented by CMS through the regulatory process over several years, and CMS may continue to make changes to these quality measures and standardized patient assessment data elements in the future. We cannot quantify the potential future effects, if any, of the IMPACT Act on us.

Current wording

Medicaid programs, and further reductions to provider payments. In October 2014, President Obama signed into law the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (the “IMPACT Act”). The IMPACT Act directs HHS, in consultation with healthcare stakeholders, to collect standardized data for post-acute quality and outcome measures. Although the IMPACT Act did not specifically call for the implementation of a new post-acute payment system, this act laid the foundation for possible future post-acute payment policies in which Medicare payments are driven primarily by patients’ medical conditions and other clinical factors rather than the costs of the setting where the care is provided. CMS has made changes to existing current post-acute payment systems to improve comparability of patient assessment and clinical characteristic data across settings, which could make it easier to develop payment system reforms for post-acute providers in the future. For example, in 2019, CMS implemented new patient assessment measures for the inpatient rehabilitation facility prospective payment system (the “IRF-PPS”) as discussed below. The IMPACT Act also created additional data reporting requirements for our hospitals in the domains of functional and cognitive status, skin integrity, medication reconciliation, incidence of major falls, and transfer of health information. The precise details of these new reporting requirements, including timing and content, were developed and implemented by CMS through the regulatory process over several years, and CMS may continue to make changes to these quality measures and standardized patient assessment data elements in the future. We cannot quantify the potential future effects, if any, of the IMPACT Act on us.

Previous wording

Each year, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (“MedPAC”), an independent agency, advises Congress on issues affecting Medicare and makes payment policy recommendations to Congress for a variety of Medicare payment systems including, among others, the inpatient rehabilitation facility prospective payment system (the “IRF-PPS”). MedPAC also provides comments to CMS on proposed rules, including the prospective payment system rules. Neither Congress nor CMS is obligated to adopt MedPAC recommendations, and, based on outcomes in previous years, there can be no assurance MedPAC’s recommendations will be adopted in a given year. However, MedPAC’s recommendations have, and could in the future, become the basis for legislative or regulatory action.

Current wording

Each year, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (“MedPAC”), an independent agency, advises Congress on issues affecting Medicare and makes payment policy recommendations to Congress for a variety of Medicare payment systems including, among others, the IRF-PPS. MedPAC also provides comments to CMS on proposed rules, including the prospective payment system rules. Neither Congress nor CMS is obligated to adopt MedPAC recommendations, and, based on outcomes in previous years, there can be no assurance MedPAC’s recommendations will be adopted in a given year. However, MedPAC’s recommendations have, and could in the future, become the basis for legislative or regulatory action.

Previous wording

In a June 2018 report mandated by the IMPACT Act, MedPAC reiterated its recommendation that Congress adopt a unified payment system for all post-acute care (a “PAC-PPS”) in lieu of separate systems for inpatient rehabilitation facilities (“IRFs”), skilled nursing facilities, long-term acute-care hospitals, and home health agencies. A PAC-PPS would reimburse providers for care based primarily on patients’ medical conditions and other clinical factors rather than the care settings. MedPAC found a PAC-PPS to be feasible and desirable but also suggested many existing regulatory requirements, including, for IRFs, the 60% rule discussed below and the requirement for a minimum of three hours of therapy per day, should be waived or modified as part of implementing a PAC-PPS. MedPAC previously estimated, although we cannot verify the methodology or the accuracy of that estimate, a PAC-PPS would result in a 15% reduction in IRF reimbursements. As a precursor to a PAC-PPS, MedPAC discussed in November 2017 a potential recommendation to change the case-mix weights in each post-acute setting for 2019 and 2020 to a blend of the current setting specific weight and the proposed PAC-PPS weight, which MedPAC suggested would shift money from for-profit and freestanding IRFs to non-profit and hospital-based IRFs. MedPAC has also called for aligning Medicare regulatory requirements across post-acute providers, although the agency has acknowledged it could take years to complete this effort. MedPAC issued another report on the PAC-PPS in June 2023. In that report, MedPAC concluded the design of a PAC-PPS is “relatively straight-forward” but noted “developing companion policies could take many years; implementing them would be complex and possibly controversial.” Additionally, MedPAC previously suggested that Medicare should ultimately move from fee-for-service reimbursement to more integrated payment models.

Current wording

In a June 2023 report mandated by the IMPACT Act, MedPAC reviewed the considerations associated with Congress designing and adopting a unified payment system for all Medicare post-acute care (a “PAC-PPS”) in lieu of separate systems for inpatient rehabilitation facilities (“IRFs”), skilled nursing facilities, long-term acute-care hospitals, and home health agencies. A PAC-PPS would reimburse providers for care based primarily on patients’ medical conditions and other clinical factors rather than the costs associated with care settings. MedPAC found a PAC-PPS to be feasible and desirable but also suggested policymakers may want to consider other “smaller scale site-neutral policies” given the considerable resources required to develop and implement a PAC-PPS. MedPAC previously estimated, although we cannot verify the methodology or the accuracy of that estimate, a PAC-PPS would result in a 15% reduction in IRF reimbursements and shift aggregate reimbursements from for-profit and freestanding IRFs to non-profit and hospital-based IRFs.

Previous wording

We cannot predict what alternative or additional deficit reduction initiatives, including significant staffing reductions at HHS, Medicare payment reductions, or post-acute care reforms, if any, will be adopted or enacted into law, or the timing or effect of any initiatives or reductions. Since taking office in January 2025, President Trump has taken a number of executive actions, including those associated with recommendations of the Department of Government Efficiency, intended to reduce federal spending, including Medicare and Medicaid. Those initiatives, reductions, or actions would be in addition to many ordinary course reimbursement rate changes that CMS adopts each year as part of the market basket update rulemaking process for various provider categories. While we do not expect the drive toward integrated payment models, value-based purchasing, and unified post-acute payment systems in Medicare reimbursement to subside, there will almost certainly be new or alternative healthcare reforms in the future which may change these initiatives and other healthcare laws and regulations. We cannot predict the nature or timing of any changes to the laws, regulations, or the operations of governmental agencies that either currently affect, or may in the future affect, our government reimbursement or business.

Current wording

We cannot predict what alternative or additional deficit reduction initiatives, including significant staffing reductions at HHS, Medicare payment reductions, or post-acute care reforms, if any, will be adopted or enacted into law, or the timing or effect of any initiatives or reductions. However, given the uncertainty in the funding of Medicare and Medicaid spending in the future, there will almost certainly be new proposals for healthcare reforms and other changes to the laws, regulations, or the operations of governmental agencies that will affect our government reimbursement or business. There can be no assurance future governmental action will not result in substantial changes to, or material reductions in, our reimbursements, including through Medicaid and related state directed and supplemental payment programs.

Previous wording

There can be no assurance future governmental action will not result in substantial changes to, or material reductions in, our reimbursements, including through Medicaid and related state directed and supplemental payment programs. Similarly, we may experience material increases in our operating costs. For example, in 2022 and 2023, our wage and benefit costs increased at a rate in excess of our aggregate Medicare reimbursement rate increases. In any given year, the net effect of statutory and regulatory changes may result in a decrease in our reimbursement rate, and that decrease may occur at a time when our expenses are increasing. As a result, there could be a material adverse effect on our business, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. For additional discussion of how we are reimbursed by Medicare, see Item 1, Business, “Regulatory and Reimbursement Challenges” and “Sources of Revenues—Medicare Reimbursement.”

Current wording

In any given year, the net effect of statutory and regulatory changes may result in a decreases in our reimbursement rates and amounts, and those decreases may occur at times when our expenses are increasing. For example, in some recent years, our wage and benefit costs increased at a rate in excess of our aggregate Medicare reimbursement rate increases. Similar changes in our revenues and expenses could result in a material adverse effect on our business, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. For additional discussion of how we are reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid, see Item 1, Business, “Regulatory and Reimbursement Challenges” and “Sources of Revenues.”

Previous wording

CMS has developed and instituted various audit programs under which CMS contracts with private companies to conduct claims and medical record audits. These audits are in addition to those conducted by existing MACs. Some contractors are paid a percentage of the overpayments recovered. One type of audit contractor, the Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”), receive claims data directly from MACs on a monthly or quarterly basis and are authorized to review previously paid claims. RAC audits of IRFs have focused on reviews of patient coding, medical necessity, and billing accuracy. CMS has, however, authorized RACs to conduct complex reviews of the medical records associated with IRF reimbursement claims. CMS has previously operated a demonstration project that expanded the RAC program to include prepayment review of Medicare fee-for-service claims from primarily acute-care hospitals. It is unclear whether CMS intends to conduct RAC prepayment reviews in the future and if so, what providers and claims would be the focus of those reviews.

Current wording

CMS has developed and instituted various audit programs under which CMS contracts with private companies to conduct claims and medical record audits. These audits are in addition to those conducted by existing MACs. Some contractors are paid a percentage of the overpayments recovered. One type of audit contractor, the Recovery Audit Contractor (“RAC”), receives claims data directly from MACs on a monthly or quarterly basis and is authorized to review previously paid claims. RAC audits of IRFs have focused on reviews of patient coding, medical necessity, and billing accuracy. CMS has, however, authorized RACs to conduct complex reviews of the medical records associated with IRF reimbursement claims. CMS has previously operated a demonstration project that expanded the RAC program to include prepayment review of Medicare fee-for-service claims from primarily acute-care hospitals. It is unclear whether CMS intends to conduct RAC prepayment reviews in the future and if so, what providers and claims would be the focus of those reviews.

Previous wording

CMS has also established other types of contractors, including the Uniform Program Integrity Contractors (“UPICs”) and the Supplemental Medical Review Contractor (“SMRC”). The UPICs conduct audits with a focus on potential fraud and abuse issues. Like the RACs, the UPICs conduct audits and have the ability to refer matters to the HHS-OIG or the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Unlike RACs, however, UPICs do not receive a specific financial incentive based on the amount of the error. In December 2017, we received notice of a UPIC audit at one of our hospitals. The UPIC sampled 100 claims and challenged the propriety of a subset of the sample representing $1.3 million in previously paid claims. The UPIC extrapolated the alleged error rate to all claims from that hospital during a period of approximately four years, resulting in an alleged overpayment of $33.9 million. Our MAC later reduced the determination of overpayment to $30.5 million, which it collected through recoupment of current claims during 2019. We appealed the overpayment determination to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who heard the appeal in August 2021. In October 2022, the ALJ overturned $12.5 million of the overpayment determination. We received payment of this amount, plus $3.2 million in interest, in December 2022. We have appealed the remaining $18.0 million of the overpayment determination to the next level of administrative appeal, challenging both the denials and the improper use of extrapolation. It is not possible to predict when this matter will be resolved or the ultimate outcome. The SMRC conducts nationwide medical reviews of Medicare claims to determine compliance with coverage, coding, payment, and billing requirements. During the first quarter of 2023, the SMRC initiated a review of a subset of claims from March 2020 through December 2020 totaling approximately $21 million. We have received initial results for the claims under review and, as of December 31, 2024, approximately 89% of these have been approved with $0.1 million still under appeal.

Current wording

CMS has also established other types of contractors, including the Uniform Program Integrity Contractor (“UPIC”) and the Supplemental Medical Review Contractor (“SMRC”). The UPICs conduct audits with a focus on potential fraud and abuse issues. Like the RACs, the UPICs conduct audits and have the ability to refer matters to the HHS-OIG or the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). Unlike RACs, however, UPICs do not receive a specific financial incentive based on the amount of the error. In December 2017, we received notice of a UPIC audit at one of our hospitals. The UPIC sampled 100 claims and challenged the propriety of a subset of the sample representing $1.3 million in previously paid claims. The UPIC extrapolated the alleged error rate to all claims from that hospital during a period of approximately four years, resulting in an alleged overpayment of $33.9 million. Our MAC later reduced the determination of overpayment to $30.5 million, which it collected through recoupment of current claims during 2019. We appealed the overpayment determination to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), who heard the appeal in August 2021. In October 2022, the ALJ overturned $12.5 million of the overpayment determination. We received payment of this amount, plus $3.2 million in interest, in December 2022. We have appealed the remaining $18.0 million of the overpayment determination to the next level of administrative appeal, challenging both the denials and the improper use of extrapolation. It is not possible to predict when this matter will be resolved or the ultimate outcome. The SMRC conducts nationwide medical reviews of Medicare claims to determine compliance with coverage, coding, payment, and billing requirements.

Previous wording

Ordinary course Medicare pre-payment denials by MACs, as well as denials resulting from post-payment audits, are subject to appeal by providers. HHS provides an initial appeal process through its ALJs. We have historically appealed a majority of our claims denials. Due to the sheer number of appeals by all Medicare providers and various administrative inefficiencies, including a shortage of judges, appeals that are required by statute to be resolved in a matter of months have in the past taken years to complete. In recent years, this protracted appeals process led to a significant backlog of appeals of denials, which a federal judge ultimately ordered HHS to resolve by the end of 2022. By December 31, 2022, substantially all of our backlog awaiting ALJ hearing had been resolved. However, there can be no assurance significant backlogs will not develop in the future in the event the rate of new claims denials exceeds the rate at which those claims are resolved in the appeal process.

Current wording

Ordinary course Medicare pre-payment denials by MACs, as well as denials resulting from post-payment audits, are subject to appeal by providers. HHS provides an initial appeal process through its ALJs. We have historically appealed a majority of our claims denials. Due to the sheer number of appeals by all Medicare providers and various administrative inefficiencies, including a shortage of judges, appeals that are required by statute to be resolved in a matter of months have in the past taken years to complete. In recent years, this protracted appeals process led to a significant backlog of appeals of denials, which a federal judge ultimately ordered HHS to resolve. Changes implemented by CMS to resolve the backlog may have harmed the ability of providers like us to recover on valid Medicare claims. The Medicare appeals adjudication process is administered by the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (“OMHA”). Beginning in March 2020, OMHA increased the frequency of ALJ hearings and the number of claims set at each hearing, which we believe added to the substantive and procedural deficiencies in the ALJ appeals process. There can be no assurance significant backlogs will not develop in the future or that CMS will not address such a backlog in a manner that we believe compromises providers’ due process rights.

Previous wording

Providers may appeal adverse ALJ rulings to the Department Appeals Board (the “DAB”). Denials by the DAB may be appealed to United States district courts. As of December 31, 2024, we have approximately $4 million and $30 million in denied claims awaiting review at the ALJ and DAB levels, respectively. In addition, we have approximately $7 million in claims denied by the DAB pending review by United States district courts as of December 31, 2024.

Current wording

Providers may appeal adverse ALJ rulings to the Department Appeals Board (the “DAB”). Denials by the DAB may be appealed to United States district courts. As of December 31, 2025, we have approximately $12 million and $21 million in denied claims awaiting review at the ALJ and DAB levels, respectively. In addition, we have approximately $6 million in claims denied by the DAB pending review by United States district courts as of December 31, 2025.

Previous wording

Based on a number of factors, including prior experience in the appeals process, we record our estimates for pre-payment denials and for post-payment audit denials that will ultimately not be collected as a component of Net operating revenues. See Note 1, Summary of Significant Accounting Policies, “Net Operating Revenues,” to the accompanying consolidated financial statements. In the fourth quarter of 2023, we recorded an aggregate amount of $21.9 million in additional reserves for estimated uncollectible amounts associated with claims that were part of the prior appeal backlog. The increase in reserves was driven principally by an increase in unfavorable adjudication outcomes experienced at the DAB during the second half of 2023 and largely offset the remaining net carrying value of these claims. We may experience additional decreases in Net operating revenues and decreases in cash flow as a result of greater frequency of unfavorable resolution of denials or increasing unresolved denials and the associated increasing accounts receivable, which may in turn force us to change the patients we admit and conditions we treat. Any of these impacts could have an adverse effect on our financial position, results of operations, and liquidity.

Current wording

Based on a number of factors, including prior experience in the appeals process, we record our estimates for pre-payment denials and for post-payment audit denials that will ultimately not be collected as a component of Net operating revenues. See Note 1, Summary of Significant Accounting Policies, “Net Operating Revenues,” to the accompanying consolidated financial statements. We have in the past, and may again in the future, experience decreases in Net operating revenues and decreases in cash flow as a result of greater frequency of unfavorable resolution of denials or increasing unresolved denials and the associated increasing accounts receivable, which may in turn force us to change the patients we admit and conditions we treat. Any of these impacts could have an adverse effect on our financial position, results of operations, and liquidity.

Previous wording

Health insurers and managed care companies, including Medicare Advantage plans, may utilize certain third parties, known as conveners, and their own internal analytics to attempt to control costs. Conveners offer patient placement and care transition services to those payors as well as bundled payment participants, ACOs, and other healthcare providers with the intent of managing post-acute utilization and associated costs. Conveners may influence referral source decisions on which post-acute setting to recommend, as well as how long to remain in a particular setting. Given their focus on perceived financial savings, conveners customarily suggest that patients avoid higher acuity post-acute settings altogether or move as soon as practicable to lower acuity settings as those settings are reimbursed at lower rates due to the lower level of care they are required to provide. Conveners are not healthcare providers and may suggest a post-acute setting or duration of care that may not be appropriate from a clinical perspective potentially resulting in worse patient outcomes and costly acute-care hospital readmissions. Additionally, large Medicare Advantage plans have acquired home health operators. Those Medicare Advantage plans may attempt to shift patients who would benefit from intensive inpatient rehabilitation to home health in order to reduce costs to the plans in the near term.

Current wording

Health insurers and managed care companies, including Medicare Advantage plans, may utilize certain third parties, known as conveners, and their own internal analytics to attempt to control costs. Conveners offer patient placement and care transition services to those payors as well as bundled payment participants, ACOs, and other healthcare providers with the intent of managing post-acute utilization and associated costs. Conveners may influence referral source decisions on which post-acute setting to recommend, as well as how long to remain in a particular setting. Given their focus on perceived financial savings, conveners customarily suggest that patients avoid higher acuity post-acute settings altogether or move as soon as practicable to lower acuity settings as those settings are reimbursed at lower rates due to the lower level of care they are required to provide. Conveners are not healthcare providers and may suggest a post-acute setting or duration of care that may not be appropriate from a clinical perspective potentially resulting in worse patient outcomes and costly acute-care hospital readmissions.

Previous wording

The focus on alternative payment models and value-based purchasing of healthcare services has led to more extensive quality of care reporting requirements. In many cases, the new reporting requirements are linked to reimbursement incentives. For example, under the ACA, CMS established new quality data reporting, effective October 1, 2012, for all IRFs. A facility’s failure to submit the required quality data results in a two percentage point reduction to that facility’s annual market basket increase factor for payments made for discharges in the subsequent Medicare fiscal year. Hospitals began submitting quality data to CMS in October 2012. To date, only two of our hospitals have experienced payment reductions, both for fiscal year 2025. However, we have contested those two determinations.

Current wording

The focus on alternative payment models and value-based purchasing of healthcare services has led to more extensive quality of care reporting requirements. In many cases, the new reporting requirements are linked to reimbursement incentives. For example, under the ACA, CMS established new quality data reporting, effective October 1, 2012, for all IRFs. A facility’s failure to submit the required quality data results in a two percentage point reduction to that facility’s annual market basket increase factor for payments made for discharges in the subsequent Medicare fiscal year. Hospitals began submitting quality data to CMS in October 2012. To date, only two of our hospitals have experienced payment reductions, both for fiscal year 2025. We contested those two determinations and have not yet received final decisions.

Previous wording

In recent years, HHS has been studying the feasibility of bundling, including conducting a voluntary, multi-year bundling pilot program to test and evaluate alternative payment methodologies. CMS’ voluntary Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced (“BPCI Advanced”) initiative began October 1, 2018, runs through December 31, 2025, and covers 29 types of inpatient, three types of outpatient clinical episodes, and two multi-setting clinical episodes, including stroke and hip fracture. Providers participating in BPCI Advanced are subject to a semi-annual reconciliation process where CMS compares the aggregate Medicare expenditures for all items and services included in a clinical episode against the target price for that type of episode to determine whether the participant is eligible to receive a portion of the savings, or is required to repay a portion of the payment above target. Accordingly, reimbursement may be increased or decreased, compared to what would otherwise be due, based on whether the total Medicare expenditures and patient outcomes meet, exceed or fall short of the targets.

Current wording

In recent years, HHS has been studying the feasibility of bundling, including conducting a voluntary, multi-year bundling pilot program to test and evaluate alternative payment methodologies. CMS’ voluntary Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced (“BPCI Advanced”) initiative began October 1, 2018, ran through December 31, 2025, and covered 29 types of inpatient, three types of outpatient clinical episodes, and two multi-setting clinical episodes, including stroke and hip fracture. Providers participating in BPCI Advanced are subject to a semi-annual reconciliation process where CMS compares the aggregate Medicare expenditures for all items and services included in a clinical episode against the target price for that type of episode to determine whether the participant is eligible to receive a portion of the savings, or is required to repay a portion of the payment above target. Accordingly, reimbursement may be increased or decreased, compared to what would otherwise be due, based on whether the total Medicare expenditures and patient outcomes meet, exceed or fall short of the targets. BPCI Advanced did not have a material impact on our hospitals.

Previous wording

Similarly, CMS has established, per the ACA, several separate ACO programs. The largest is the Medicare Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”), a voluntary ACO program in which hospitals, physicians, and other care providers pursue the delivery of coordinated healthcare on a more efficient, patient-centered basis. Conceptually, ACOs receive a portion of any savings generated above a certain threshold from care coordination as long as benchmarks for the quality of care are maintained. Under the MSSP, there are two ACO tracks from which participants can choose. Each track offers a different degree to which participants share any savings realized or any obligation to repay losses suffered. The ACO rules adopted by CMS are extremely complex and remain subject to further refinement by CMS. Based on CMS data, there will be slightly fewer MSSP ACOs in 2025 than there were in 2017.

Current wording

Similarly, CMS has established, per the ACA, several separate ACO programs. The largest is the Medicare Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”), a voluntary ACO program in which hospitals, physicians, and other care providers pursue the delivery of coordinated healthcare on a more efficient, patient-centered basis. Conceptually, ACOs receive a portion of any savings generated above a certain threshold from care coordination as long as benchmarks for the quality of care are maintained. Under the MSSP, there are two ACO tracks from which participants can choose. Each track offers a different degree to which participants share any savings realized or any obligation to repay losses suffered. The ACO rules adopted by CMS are extremely complex and remain subject to further refinement by CMS.

Previous wording

On November 16, 2015, CMS published its final rule establishing the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (“CJR”) payment model, which holds acute-care hospitals accountable for the quality of care they deliver to Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries for lower extremity joint replacements (i.e., knees and hips) from surgery through recovery. The CJR originally was mandatory for the acute-care hospitals in the 67 geographic areas covered. On November 30, 2017, CMS issued a final rule making the CJR voluntary in 33 of those areas. The CJR model’s original five-year term ended in December 2020, but CMS extended the model through 2024 for most providers in the 34 geographic areas with mandatory participation. Under CJR, healthcare providers in the mandatory participation areas are paid under existing Medicare payment systems. However, CMS holds the acute-care hospital where a joint replacement takes place accountable for the quality and costs of care for the entire episode of care — from the time of the original admission through 90 days after discharge. Depending on the quality and cost performance during the entire episode, the acute-care hospital may receive an additional payment or be required to repay Medicare a portion of the episode costs. As a result, CMS believes acute-care hospitals are incented to work with physicians and post-acute care providers to ensure beneficiaries receive the coordinated care they need in an efficient manner. Acute-care hospitals participating in the CJR model may enter into risk-sharing financial arrangements with post-acute providers, including IRFs. CJR has not had a material impact on our hospitals.

Current wording

On November 16, 2015, CMS published its final rule establishing the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (“CJR”) payment model, which holds acute-care hospitals accountable for the quality of care they deliver to Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries for lower extremity joint replacements (i.e., knees and hips) from surgery through recovery. The CJR originally was mandatory for the acute-care hospitals in the 67 geographic areas covered. On November 30, 2017, CMS issued a final rule making the CJR voluntary in 33 of those areas. The CJR model’s original five-year term ended in December 2020, but CMS extended the model through 2024 for most providers in the 34 geographic areas with mandatory participation. Under CJR, healthcare providers in the mandatory participation areas are paid under existing Medicare payment systems. However, CMS holds the acute-care hospital where a joint replacement takes place accountable for the quality and costs of care for the entire episode of care — from the time of the original admission through 90 days after discharge. Depending on the quality and cost performance during the entire episode, the acute-care hospital may receive an additional payment or be required to repay Medicare a portion of the episode costs. As a result, CMS believes acute-care hospitals are incented to work with physicians and post-acute care providers to ensure beneficiaries receive the coordinated care they need in an efficient manner. Acute-care hospitals participating in the CJR model may enter into risk-sharing financial arrangements with post-acute providers, including IRFs. CJR did not have a material impact on our hospitals.

Previous wording

On August 1, 2024, CMS published its final rule establishing the Transforming Episode Accountability Model (“TEAM”). This five-year mandatory model begins January 1, 2026 and ends on December 31, 2030. The model seeks to test whether 30-day episode-based payments for five common procedures will reduce Medicare expenditures without lowering quality of care. The five procedures are: lower extremity joint replacement, surgical hip femur fracture treatment, spinal fusion, coronary artery bypass graft, and major bowel procedures. All acute-care hospitals located in the 188 markets selected will be required to participate in TEAM. Under TEAM, healthcare providers in those markets are paid under existing Medicare payment systems. CMS will hold the acute-care hospital where these procedures take place accountable for the quality and costs of care for the entire episode of care — from the time of the original admission through 30 days after discharge. Acute healthcare providers will receive a target price based on all non-excluded Medicare Parts A & B items and services included in an episode. Depending on the quality and cost performance during the entire episode, the acute-care hospital may receive an additional payment or, beginning in the second year, be required to repay a portion of the episode costs. As a result, CMS believes acute-care hospitals are incented to work with physicians and post-acute care providers to ensure beneficiaries receive the coordinated care in an efficient manner.

Current wording

On August 1, 2024, CMS published its final rule establishing the Transforming Episode Accountability Model (“TEAM”). This five-year mandatory model began January 1, 2026 and ends on December 31, 2030. The model seeks to test whether 30-day episode-based payments for five common surgical procedures will reduce Medicare expenditures without lowering quality of care. The five procedures are: lower extremity joint replacement, surgical hip femur fracture treatment, spinal fusion, coronary artery bypass graft, and major bowel procedures. All acute-care hospitals located in the 189 markets selected will be required to participate in TEAM. Based on 2024 Medicare discharge data, approximately 2% of our total discharges were associated with the five procedures in the markets covered by the model. Under TEAM, healthcare providers in those markets are paid under existing Medicare payment systems. CMS will hold the acute-care hospital where these procedures take place accountable for the quality and costs of care for the entire episode of care — from the time of the original admission through 30 days after an acute-care discharge. Acute healthcare providers will receive a target price based on all non-excluded Medicare Parts A & B items and services included in an episode. Depending on the quality and cost performance during the entire episode, the acute-care hospital may receive an additional payment or, beginning in the second year, be required to repay a portion of the episode costs that exceed the target price. Before taking into account quality of care and outcomes, for each of the five procedures in TEAM, the 30-day average total spend in 2024 where an IRF stay followed the acute-care discharge exceeded the corresponding target price established by CMS.

Previous wording

HHS and CMS continue to explore ways to encourage and facilitate increased participation in alternative payment models and value-based purchasing initiatives. For example, the HHS-OIG and CMS finalized rules in 2020 modernizing the Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark law to, in part, promote a more coordinated, value-based system of care. The bundling and ACO initiatives have served as motivating factors for regulators and healthcare industry participants to identify and implement workable coordinated care and integrated payment models. Broad-based implementation of a new payment model would represent a significant transformation for us and the healthcare industry generally. The nature and timing of the evolution or transformation of the current healthcare system to coordinated care delivery and integrated payment models and value-based purchasing remain uncertain. The development of new delivery and payment systems will almost certainly take significant time and expense. Many of the alternative approaches, including those discussed above, being explored may not work or could change substantially prior to any nationwide implementations. While only a small percentage of our business currently is subject to the alternative payment models discussed above, we cannot be certain these models will not be expanded or made standard or new models will not be implemented broadly.

Current wording

HHS and CMS continue to explore ways to encourage and facilitate increased participation in alternative payment models and value-based purchasing initiatives. Broad-based implementation of a new payment model would represent a significant transformation for us and the healthcare industry generally. The nature and timing of the evolution or transformation of the current healthcare system to coordinated care delivery and integrated payment models and value-based purchasing remain uncertain. The development of new delivery and payment systems will almost certainly take significant time and expense. Many of the alternative approaches, including those discussed above, being explored may not work or could change substantially prior to any nationwide implementations. While only a small percentage of our business currently is subject to the alternative payment models discussed above, we cannot be certain these models will not be expanded or made standard or new models will not be implemented broadly.

Previous wording

Additionally, as the number and types of bundling, direct contracting, and ACO models increase, the number of Medicare beneficiaries who are treated in one of the models increases. Our willingness or inability to participate in integrated payment and other alternative payment models and the referral patterns of other providers participating in those models may limit our access to Medicare patients who would benefit from treatment in inpatient rehabilitation hospitals. In an attempt to reduce costs or increase reimbursements, referral sources may seek to discourage referrals to post-acute care all together. To the extent that acute-care hospitals participating in those models do not perceive our quality of care or cost efficiency favorably compared to alternative post-acute providers, we may experience a decrease in volumes and Net operating revenues, which could adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. For further discussion of coordinated care and integrated payment models and value-based purchasing initiatives, the associated challenges, and our efforts to respond to them, see the “Executive Overview—Key Challenges—Changes in Medicare Reimbursement and Regulatory Requirements for Operating IRFs” section of Item 7, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.

Current wording

Additionally, as the number and types of bundling, direct contracting, and ACO models increase, the number of Medicare beneficiaries who are treated in one of the models increases. Our willingness or inability to participate in integrated payment and other alternative payment models and the referral patterns of other providers participating in those models may limit our access to Medicare patients who would benefit from treatment in inpatient rehabilitation hospitals. In an attempt to reduce costs or increase reimbursements, referral sources may seek to discourage referrals to IRFs or post-acute care all together. To the extent that acute-care hospitals participating in those models do not perceive our quality of care or cost efficiency favorably compared to alternative post-acute providers, we may experience a decrease in volumes and Net operating revenues, which could adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. For further discussion of coordinated care and integrated payment models and value-based purchasing initiatives, the associated challenges, and our efforts to respond to them, see the “Executive Overview—Key Challenges—Changes in Medicare Reimbursement and Regulatory Requirements for Operating IRFs” section of Item 7, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.

Previous wording

In addition to the legislative and regulatory actions that directly affect our reimbursement rates or further the evolution of the current healthcare delivery system, other legislative and regulatory changes, including as a result of ongoing healthcare reform, affect healthcare providers like us from time to time. For example, the ACA provides for the expansion of the federal Anti-Kickback Law and the False Claims Act (the “FCA”) that, when combined with other recent federal initiatives, are likely to increase investigation and enforcement efforts in the healthcare industry generally. Changes include increased resources for enforcement, lowered burden of proof for the government in healthcare fraud matters, expanded definition of claims under the FCA, enhanced penalties, and increased rewards for relators in successful prosecutions. CMS may also suspend payment for claims prospectively if, in its opinion, credible allegations of fraud exist. The initial suspension period may be up to 180 days. However, the payment suspension period can be extended almost indefinitely if the matter is under investigation by the HHS-OIG or DOJ. Any such suspension would adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows.

Current wording

In addition to the legislative and regulatory actions that directly affect our reimbursement rates or further the evolution of the current healthcare delivery system, other legislative and regulatory changes affect healthcare providers like us from time to time. For example, the ACA expanded the federal Anti-Kickback Law and the False Claims Act (the “FCA”) increasing compliance scrutiny in the healthcare industry generally. Those changes included additional resources for enforcement, lowered burden of proof for the government in healthcare fraud matters, expanded definition of claims under the FCA, enhanced penalties, and increased rewards for relators in successful prosecutions. CMS may also suspend payment for claims prospectively if, in its opinion, credible allegations of fraud exist. The initial suspension period may be up to 180 days. However, the payment suspension period can be extended almost indefinitely if the matter is under investigation by the HHS-OIG or DOJ. Any such suspension would adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows.

Previous wording

On December 14, 2020, CMS announced the proposal of a five-year review choice demonstration for inpatient rehabilitation services (the “IRF RCD”). In August 2023, IRFs located in Alabama began participation in IRF RCD. On March 1, 2024, CMS announced the expansion of IRF RCD, effective June 17, 2024, to include IRFs located in Pennsylvania and billing to a certain MAC. We do not bill to that MAC, so we are not subject to the program in Pennsylvania at this time. CMS plans to expand IRF RCD further to Texas and California, but the timing for doing so is not known. We operate 48 inpatient rehabilitation hospitals (representing approximately 29% of our IRF Medicare claims) in the initial four IRF RCD states. After the initial four states, CMS intends to expand the demonstration to include additional IRFs based on the MAC to which those IRFs submit claims. There are no details of that expansion at this time.

Current wording

On December 14, 2020, CMS announced the proposal of a five-year review choice demonstration for inpatient rehabilitation services (the “RCD”). In August 2023, IRFs located in Alabama began participation in RCD. On June 17, 2024, CMS expanded RCD to include IRFs located in Pennsylvania and billing to a certain MAC. We do not bill to that MAC, so we are not subject to the program in Pennsylvania at this time. In December 2025, CMS announced the expansion of RCD to Texas and California, effective March 2, 2026 and May 1, 2026, respectively. With the expansion to those two states, we expect 33 of our current inpatient rehabilitation hospitals (representing approximately 11.9% of our IRF Medicare claims) to be subject to RCD. After the initial four states, CMS intends to expand the demonstration to include additional IRFs based on the MAC to which those IRFs submit claims. There are no details of that expansion at this time.

Previous wording

Under the IRF RCD, participating IRFs have an initial choice between pre-claim or post-payment review of 100% of Medicare claims submitted to demonstrate compliance with applicable coverage and clinical documentation requirements. We elected the pre-claim review option for our IRFs in Alabama for the first cycle. Under the pre-claim review choice, services can begin prior to the submission of the review request and continue while the decision is being made. The pre-claim review request with required documentation must be submitted, reviewed, and approved before the final claim is paid. If a certain percentage of the claims reviewed are found to be valid, the IRF may then opt out of the 100% review. The opt-out validation percentages for the second and third cycles were 85% or greater and 90% or greater, respectively. In opting out, the IRF may elect spot prepayment reviews of samples consisting of 5% of total claims or selective post-payment review of a statistically valid random sample. Our claim validation rate for the first cycle ending in February 2024 exceeded the required 80% at our IRFs in Alabama. For the second cycle, which began on May 1, 2024, we elected not to opt out, so our IRFs in Alabama remained subject to the 100% pre-claim review. None of our IRFs in Alabama achieved the 85% claim validation rate for the second cycle ending in October 2024. We believe many of the non-affirmations in the second cycle were based on application of improper standards or requirements that directly conflict with the Medicare coverage criteria for IRFs. In the third cycle, we are again submitting 100% of review requests pre-claim. We have engaged, and will continue to engage, with the MAC and CMS to ensure the review process is consistent with existing rules, regulations and statutes. Given the inconsistent review process applied by the MAC across the previous two cycles, we cannot predict the impact, if any, RCD may have on the collectability of our Medicare claims over its five-year term. We may ultimately experience decreases in Net operating revenuesand in cash flow, or we may incur costs associated with patient care for which the Medicare claim is subsequently denied, any of which could have an adverse effect on our financial position, results of operations, and liquidity.

Current wording

Under the RCD, participating IRFs have an initial choice between pre-claim or post-payment review of 100% of Medicare claims submitted to demonstrate compliance with applicable coverage and clinical documentation requirements. We elected the pre-claim review option for our IRFs in Alabama for the first cycle. Under the pre-claim review choice, services can begin prior to the submission of the review request and continue while the decision is being made. The pre-claim review request with required documentation must be submitted, reviewed, and approved before the final claim is paid. If a certain percentage of the claims reviewed are found to be valid, the IRF may then opt out of the 100% review. The opt-out validation percentages for the first, second, and third cycles were 80% or greater, 85% or greater and 90% or greater, respectively. In opting out, the IRF may elect spot prepayment reviews of samples consisting of 5% of total claims or selective post-payment review of a statistically valid random sample. Our claim validation rate for the first cycle ending in February 2024 exceeded the 80% threshold at all participating hospitals. For the second cycle, which began on May 1, 2024, we elected not to opt out, so our hospitals in Alabama remained subject to the 100% pre-claim review. None of our hospitals in Alabama achieved the opt-out claim validation rate for the second or third cycles ending in October 2024 and June 2025, respectively. We believe many of the non-affirmations in these cycles were based on application of improper standards or requirements that directly conflict with the Medicare coverage criteria for IRFs. We have engaged, and will continue to engage, with the MAC and CMS to ensure the review process is consistent with existing rules, regulations and statutes. In the fourth cycle which began September 1, 2025, the affirmation rate required to opt-out remains 90% or greater. Given the inconsistent review process applied by the MAC across the previous cycles, we cannot predict the impact, if any, RCD may have on the collectability of our Medicare claims over its five-year term. We may ultimately experience decreases in Net operating revenuesand in cash flow, or we may incur costs associated with patient care for which the Medicare claim is subsequently denied, any of which could have an adverse effect on our financial position, results of operations, and liquidity.

Previous wording

We cannot predict what legislative or regulatory reforms or changes, if any, will ultimately be enacted, or the timing or effect any of those changes or reforms will have on us. If enacted, they may be challenging for all providers and have the effect of limiting Medicare beneficiaries’ access to healthcare services and could have a material adverse impact on our Net operating revenues, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. For additional discussion of healthcare reform and other factors affecting reimbursement for our services, see Item 1, Business, “Regulatory and Reimbursement Challenges” and “Sources of Revenues—Medicare Reimbursement.”

Current wording

We cannot predict what legislative or regulatory reforms or changes, if any, will ultimately be proposed, enacted, or implemented, or the timing or effect any of those changes or reforms will have on us. If enacted, they may be challenging for all providers and have the effect of limiting Medicare beneficiaries’ access to healthcare services and could have a material adverse impact on our Net operating revenues, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. For additional discussion of healthcare reform and other factors affecting reimbursement for our services, see Item 1, Business, “Regulatory and Reimbursement Challenges” and “Sources of Revenues—Medicare Reimbursement.”

Previous wording

The “60% Rule” is a Medicare requirement that at least 60% of an IRF’s patients must have a diagnosis or qualifying comorbidity from at least one of 13 specified medical conditions that typically require intensive therapy and supervision, such as stroke, brain injury, hip fracture, certain neurological conditions, and spinal cord injury. If an IRF does not demonstrate compliance with the 60% Rule by either the presumptive method or through a review of medical records, then its classification as an IRF may be terminated by CMS causing the facility to be paid under the acute-care payment system which would result in reduced reimbursement per discharge. If one or more of our hospitals fails to demonstrate compliance with the 60% Rule and CMS re-classifies it as an acute-care hospital, our revenue and profitability may be materially and adversely affected.

Current wording

The “60% Rule” is a Medicare requirement that at least 60% of an IRF’s patients must have a diagnosis or qualifying comorbidity from at least one of 13 specified medical conditions that typically require intensive therapy and supervision, such as stroke, brain injury, hip fracture, certain neurological conditions, and spinal cord injury. From time to time CMS has adopted changes in the medical conditions that presumptively count toward the 60% compliance threshold to qualify for reimbursement as an IRF. If a facility does not demonstrate compliance with the 60% Rule by either the presumptive method or through a review of medical records, then its classification as an IRF may be terminated by CMS causing the facility to be paid under the acute-care payment system which would result in reduced reimbursement per discharge. If one or more of our hospitals fails to demonstrate compliance with the 60% Rule and CMS re-classifies it as an acute-care hospital, our revenue and profitability may be materially and adversely affected.

Previous wording

Of note, the HHS-OIG periodically updates a work plan that identifies areas of compliance focus. In recent years, the HHS-OIG work plans for IRFs have focused on, among other items, the appropriate utilization of concurrent and group therapy, adverse and temporary patient harm events, and billing error rates for IRFs. In September 2018, the HHS-OIG released a report purporting to identify a high error rate (approximately 80% of claims) among inpatient rehabilitation hospital admissions in a small sample of 220 claims. Based on its findings, the HHS-OIG extrapolated the error rate to the universe of inpatient rehabilitation claims and, among other things, recommended reevaluation of the IRF-PPS. However, that HHS-OIG report involved an extremely small sample size, was not a random sample of cases, included some citations to coverage requirements that did not match actual regulations, appeared to conflate technical documentation requirements with medical necessity determinations, and was at odds with actual MAC reviews of claims during that same timeframe which found substantially lower error rates. On September 15, 2022, the HHS-OIG updated its work plan to conduct a nationwide audit of IRF claims in order to determine the extent to which CMS could clarify the Medicare IRF claim payment criteria. We expect the HHS-OIG to issue a report on this in fiscal year 2025. An HHS-OIG work plan, audit or similar future efforts could result in proposed changes to the payment systems for providers or increased denials of Medicare claims for patients notwithstanding the referring physicians’ judgment that treatment is appropriate.

Current wording

Of note, the HHS-OIG periodically updates a work plan that identifies areas of compliance focus. In recent years, the HHS-OIG work plans for IRFs have focused on, among other items, the appropriate utilization of concurrent and group therapy, adverse and temporary patient harm events, and billing error rates for IRFs. In September 2018, the HHS-OIG released a report purporting to identify a high error rate (approximately 80% of claims) among inpatient rehabilitation hospital admissions in a small sample of 220 claims. Based on its findings, the HHS-OIG extrapolated the error rate to the universe of inpatient rehabilitation claims and, among other things, recommended reevaluation of the IRF-PPS. However, that HHS-OIG report involved an extremely small sample size, was not a random sample of cases, included some citations to coverage requirements that did not match actual regulations, appeared to conflate technical documentation requirements with medical necessity determinations, and was at odds with actual MAC reviews of claims during that same timeframe which found substantially lower error rates. On September 15, 2022, the HHS-OIG updated its work plan to conduct a nationwide audit of IRF claims in order to determine the extent to which CMS could clarify the Medicare IRF claim payment criteria. We expect the HHS-OIG to issue a report on this in 2026. An HHS-OIG work plan, audit or similar future efforts could result in proposed changes to the payment systems for providers or increased denials of Medicare claims for patients notwithstanding the referring physicians’ judgment that treatment is appropriate.

Previous wording

Because Medicare comprises a significant portion of our Net operating revenues, failure to comply with the laws and regulations governing the Medicare program and related matters, including anti-kickback and anti-fraud requirements, could materially and adversely affect us. As discussed above in connection with the ACA, the federal government has in the last couple of years made compliance enforcement and fighting healthcare fraud top priorities. In the past few years, DOJ and HHS as well as federal lawmakers have significantly increased efforts to ensure strict compliance with various reimbursement related regulations as well as combat healthcare fraud. DOJ has pursued and recovered record amounts based on alleged healthcare fraud. The increased enforcement efforts have frequently included aggressive arguments and interpretations of laws and regulations that pose risks for all providers. For example, the federal government has increasingly asserted that incidents of erroneous billing or record keeping may represent violations of the FCA. Human error and oversight in record keeping and documentation, particularly where those activities are the responsibility of non-employees, are always a risk in business, and healthcare providers and independent physicians are not immune to this risk. Additionally, the federal government has been willing to challenge the medical judgment of independent physicians in determining issues such as the medical necessity of a given treatment plan. Furthermore, the federal government has increasingly asserted that violations of laws not directly related to Medicare billing, such as anti-kickback and anti-discrimination laws, represent FCA violations, which typically carry higher monetary penalties.

Current wording

Because Medicare comprises a significant portion of our Net operating revenues, failure to comply with the laws and regulations governing the Medicare program and related matters, including anti-kickback and anti-fraud requirements, could materially and adversely affect us. In the past few years, DOJ and HHS as well as federal lawmakers have significantly increased efforts to ensure strict compliance with various reimbursement related regulations as well as combat healthcare fraud. DOJ has pursued and recovered record amounts based on alleged healthcare fraud. The increased enforcement efforts have frequently included aggressive arguments and interpretations of laws and regulations that pose risks for all providers. For example, the federal government and individual relators have increasingly asserted that incidents of erroneous billing or record keeping may represent violations of the FCA. Human error and oversight in record keeping and documentation, particularly where those activities are the responsibility of non-employees, are always a risk in business, and healthcare providers and independent physicians are not immune to this risk. Additionally, the federal government has been willing to challenge the medical judgment of independent physicians in determining issues such as the medical necessity of a given treatment plan. Furthermore, the federal government has increasingly asserted that violations of laws not directly related to Medicare billing, such as anti-kickback and anti-discrimination laws, represent FCA violations, which typically carry higher monetary penalties.

Previous wording

Additionally, the federal government is increasingly turning to statistical sampling and extrapolation to expand claims denials and enforcement efforts and advocate for changes in reimbursement policy. Through sampling and extrapolation, the government takes a review of a small number of reimbursement claims and generalizes the results of that review to a much broader universe of claims, which can result in significant increases in the aggregate number and value of claims at issue. Increasing use of extrapolation can be found in payment review audits, such as those conducted by RACs and UPICs. In addition to payment reviews, government agencies may allege compliance violations, including submission of false claims, based on sampling and extrapolation and seek to change reimbursement policy. For example, the HHS-OIG issued a report in September 2018 purporting to identify a high error rate (approximately 80% of claims) among inpatient rehabilitation hospital admissions in a small sample of 220 claims. Based on its findings, the HHS-OIG extrapolated the error rate to the universe of inpatient rehabilitation claims and, among other things, recommended reevaluation of the IRF-PPS. However, the HHS-OIG report involves an extremely small sample size, is not a random sample of cases, includes incorrect references to coverage requirement regulations, appears to conflate technical documentation requirements with medical necessity determinations, and is at odds with actual MAC reviews of claims during that same timeframe which found substantially lower error rates. Notwithstanding the technical statistical flaws that can arise in sampling small groups of claims and the extremely problematic nature of extrapolation in the context of individualized decisions of medical judgment as some courts have noted, sampling and extrapolation pose a growing risk to healthcare providers in the form of more significant claims of overpayments and increased legal costs to defend against these problematic regulatory practices. In a recent federal court case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of CMS and affirmed the application of extrapolation errors identified in a sample of claims to support larger claims for overpayment. As discussed under “Reimbursement Risks” above, we are currently challenging, among other things, the use of extrapolation in a 2017 UPIC audit. Any associated loss of revenue or increased legal costs could materially and adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows.

Current wording

Additionally, the federal government is increasingly turning to statistical sampling and extrapolation to expand claims denials and enforcement efforts and advocate for changes in reimbursement policy. Through sampling and extrapolation, the government takes a review of a small number of reimbursement claims and generalizes the results of that review to a much broader universe of claims, which can result in significant increases in the aggregate number and value of claims at issue. Increasing use of extrapolation can be found in payment review audits, such as those conducted by RACs and UPICs. In addition to payment reviews, government agencies may allege compliance violations, including submission of false claims, based on sampling and extrapolation and seek to change reimbursement policy. For example, the HHS-OIG issued a report in September 2018 purporting to identify a high error rate (approximately 80% of claims) among inpatient rehabilitation hospital admissions in a small sample of 220 claims. Based on its findings, the HHS-OIG extrapolated the error rate to the universe of inpatient rehabilitation claims and, among other things, recommended reevaluation of the IRF-PPS. However, the HHS-OIG report involves an extremely small sample size, is not a random sample of cases, includes incorrect references to coverage requirement regulations, appears to conflate technical documentation requirements with medical necessity determinations, and is at odds with actual MAC reviews of claims during that same timeframe which found substantially lower error rates. Notwithstanding the technical statistical flaws that can arise in sampling small groups of claims and the extremely problematic nature of extrapolation in the context of individualized decisions of medical judgment as some courts have noted, sampling and extrapolation pose a growing risk to healthcare providers in the form of more significant claims of overpayments and increased legal costs to defend against these problematic regulatory practices. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled in favor of CMS and affirmed the application of extrapolation errors identified in a sample of claims to support larger claims for overpayment. As discussed under “Reimbursement Risks” above, we are currently challenging, among other things, the use of extrapolation in a 2017 UPIC audit. Any associated loss of revenue or increased legal costs could materially and adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows.

Previous wording

For many years, a primary focus of the healthcare industry has been to increase the use of electronic health records, or “EHR,” and the sharing of the health data among providers, payors and other members of the industry. The federal government has been a significant driver of that initiative through rules and regulations. In 2009, as part of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (“HITECH”) Act, the federal government set aside $27 billion of incentives for acute-care hospitals and other providers, not including IRFs, to adopt EHR systems. In 2020, CMS and HHS’s Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (“ONC”) finalized policy changes implementing interoperability, information blocking, and patient access provisions of the 21st Century Cures Act and supporting the MyHealthEData initiative, designed to allow patients to access their health claims information electronically through the application of their choosing. The companion rules will transform the way in which healthcare providers, health information technology developers, health information exchanges/health information networks (“HIEs/HINs”), and health plans share patient information. For example, the ONC rule prohibits healthcare providers, health IT developers, and HIEs/HINs from engaging in practices that are likely to interfere with, prevent, materially discourage, or otherwise inhibit the access, exchange or use of electronic health information, also known as “information blocking.” The ONC rule also requires regulated actors to respond to requests for electronic health information in the content and manner requested, with some exceptions. Enforcement of ONC’s and CMS’ new health information access, exchange, and use standards began in 2021, and noncompliance can result in civil monetary penalties, exclusion from participation in federal health care programs and other appropriate “disincentives,” including reductions in Medicare reimbursements. The United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights (“HHS-OCR”) patient right of access initiative, which has similar objectives to the new ONC initiative, such as promoting and enforcing patient access to health information, has led to dozens of settlements of enforcement actions.

Current wording

For many years, a primary focus of the healthcare industry has been to increase the use of electronic health records, or “EHR,” and the sharing of the health data among providers, payors and other members of the industry. The federal government has been a significant driver of that initiative through rules and regulations. In 2009, as part of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (“HITECH”) Act, the federal government set aside $27 billion of incentives for acute-care hospitals and other providers, not including IRFs, to adopt EHR systems. In 2020, CMS and HHS’s Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (“ONC”) finalized policy changes implementing interoperability, information blocking, and patient access provisions of the 21st Century Cures Act and supporting the MyHealthEData initiative, designed to allow patients to access their health claims information electronically through the application of their choosing. The companion rules regulate the way in which healthcare providers, health information technology developers, health information exchanges/health information networks (“HIEs/HINs”), and health plans share patient information. For example, the ONC rule prohibits healthcare providers, health IT developers, and HIEs/HINs from engaging in practices that are likely to interfere with, prevent, materially discourage, or otherwise inhibit the access, exchange or use of electronic health information, also known as “information blocking.” The ONC rule also requires regulated actors to respond to requests for electronic health information in the content and manner requested, with some exceptions. Noncompliance with ONC’s and CMS’ health information access rules can result in civil monetary penalties, exclusion from participation in federal health care programs and other appropriate “disincentives,” including reductions in Medicare reimbursements. The United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights (“HHS-OCR”) patient right of access initiative, which has similar objectives to the ONC initiative, such as promoting and enforcing patient access to health information, has led to dozens of settlements of enforcement actions.

Previous wording

Each of our hospitals must comply with extensive enrollment requirements and conditions of participation for the Medicare program. If any of our hospitals fail to meet any of the Medicare enrollment requirements or conditions of participation, we may receive a notice of deficiency from the applicable survey agency or contractor, as applicable. If that hospital then fails to institute an acceptable plan of correction and correct the deficiency within the applicable correction period, it could lose the ability to bill Medicare. A hospital could be terminated from the Medicare program if it fails to address the deficiency within the applicable correction period. If CMS terminates one hospital, it may increase its scrutiny of others under common control. From time to time, we have individual hospitals that receive notices of deficiency. To date, we have addressed those as they have arisen, and we have not experienced a termination.

Current wording

Each of our hospitals must comply with extensive enrollment requirements and conditions of participation for the Medicare program. If any of our hospitals fail to meet any of the Medicare enrollment requirements or conditions of participation, we may receive a notice of deficiency from the applicable survey agency or contractor, as applicable. If that hospital then fails to institute an acceptable plan of correction and correct the deficiency within the applicable correction period, it could lose the ability to bill Medicare. A hospital could be terminated from the Medicare program if it fails to address the deficiency within the applicable correction period. If CMS terminates one hospital, it may increase its scrutiny of others under common control. From time to time, we have individual hospitals that receive notices of deficiency, some of which are triggered by adverse care incidents or patient complaints. To date, we have addressed those as they have arisen, and we have not experienced a termination.

Previous wording

Under this new rule, CMS may revoke a provider’s Medicare enrollment, including all of the provider’s locations, if the provider bills for services performed at, or items furnished from, one location that it knew or should have known did not comply with Medicare enrollment requirements, including making the disclosures discussed above. CMS has the ability to prevent applicants from enrolling in the program for up to three years if a provider is found to have submitted false or misleading information in its initial enrollment application. Additionally, CMS can now block providers and suppliers who are revoked from re-entering the Medicare program for up to 10 years. CMS may also revoke a provider’s enrollment if it fails to report on a timely basis any change in ownership or control, revocation or suspension of a federal or state license or certification, or any other change in its enrollment data.

Current wording

Under this rule, CMS may revoke a provider’s Medicare enrollment, including all of the provider’s locations, if the provider bills for services performed at, or items furnished from, one location that it knew or should have known did not comply with Medicare enrollment requirements, including making the disclosures discussed above. CMS has the ability to prevent applicants from enrolling in the program for up to three years if a provider is found to have submitted false or misleading information in its initial enrollment application. Additionally, CMS can now block providers and suppliers who are revoked from re-entering the Medicare program for up to 10 years. CMS may also revoke a provider’s enrollment if it fails to report on a timely basis any change in ownership or control, revocation or suspension of a federal or state license or certification, or any other change in its enrollment data.

Previous wording

If we are found to have violated applicable privacy and security laws and regulations or our contractual obligations, we could be subject to sanctions, fines, damages and other civil or criminal penalties, which could increase our liabilities, harm our reputation and have a material adverse effect on our business, financial position, results of operation and liquidity.

Current wording

If we are found to have violated applicable privacy and information security laws and regulations or our contractual obligations, we could be subject to sanctions, fines, damages and other civil or criminal penalties, which could increase our liabilities, harm our reputation and have a material adverse effect on our business, financial position, results of operation and liquidity.

Previous wording

In the absence of a comprehensive federal privacy law, there is increased focus at the state and local level on regulating the collection, storage, use, retention, security, disclosure, transfer and other processing of confidential, sensitive and personal information. In recent years, we have seen significant changes to data privacy regulations across the United States. New legislation proposed or enacted will continue to shape the data privacy environment. Certain state laws may be more stringent or broader in scope, or offer greater individual rights, with respect to confidential, sensitive and personal information than federal, international or other state laws, and such laws may conflict with each other, which significantly complicates compliance efforts.

Current wording

In the absence of comprehensive federal laws on data privacy and artificial intelligence, there is increased focus at the state and local level on regulating the collection, storage, use, retention, security, disclosure, transfer and other processing of confidential, sensitive and personal information and the use of artificial intelligence. In recent years, we have seen significant changes to data privacy and artificial intelligence regulations across the United States. Certain state laws may be more stringent or broader in scope, or offer greater individual rights, with respect to confidential, sensitive and personal information than federal, international or other state laws, and such laws may conflict with each other, which significantly complicates compliance efforts.

Previous wording

Complying with these various laws, rules, regulations and standards could cause us to incur substantial costs that are likely to increase over time, require us to change our business practices in a manner adverse to our business, divert resources from other initiatives and projects, and restrict the way products and services involving data are offered, all of which may have a material adverse effect on our business. Given the rapid development of cybersecurity and data privacy laws, we expect to encounter inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of these laws and regulations, as well as frequent changes to these laws and regulations which may expose us to significant penalties or liability for noncompliance, the possibility of fines, lawsuits (including class action privacy litigation), regulatory investigations, criminal or civil sanctions, audits, adverse media coverage, public censure, other claims, significant costs for remediation and damage to our reputation, or otherwise have a material adverse effect on our business and operations. Any allegations of a failure to adequately address data privacy or security-related concerns, even if unfounded, or to comply with applicable laws, regulations, standards and other obligations relating to data privacy and security, could result in additional cost and liability to us, damage our relationships with patients and business partners and have a material adverse effect on our business.

Current wording

Complying with these various laws, rules, regulations and standards could cause us to incur substantial costs that are likely to increase over time, require us to change our business practices in a manner adverse to our business, divert resources from other initiatives and projects, and restrict the way products and services involving data are offered, all of which may have a material adverse effect on our business. Given the rapid development of cybersecurity, data privacy, and artificial intelligence laws, we expect to encounter inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of these laws and regulations, as well as frequent changes to these laws and regulations which may expose us to significant penalties or liability for noncompliance, the possibility of fines, lawsuits (including class action privacy litigation), regulatory investigations, criminal or civil sanctions, audits, adverse media coverage, public censure, other claims, significant costs for remediation and damage to our reputation, or otherwise have a material adverse effect on our business and operations. Any allegations of a failure to adequately address data privacy or security-related concerns, even if unfounded, or to comply with applicable laws, regulations, standards and other obligations relating to data privacy and security and the use of artificial intelligence, could result in additional cost and liability to us, damage our relationships with patients and business partners and have a material adverse effect on our business.

Previous wording

We make public statements about our use and disclosure of personal information through our privacy policies, information provided on our website and press statements. Although we endeavor to comply with our public statements and documentation about patient privacy, we may at times fail to do so or be accused of having failed to do so. The publication of our privacy policies and other statements that provide promises and assurances about data privacy and security can subject us to potential government or legal action if they are found to be deceptive, unfair or misrepresentative of our actual practices. Moreover, from time to time, concerns may be expressed about whether our services or business practices compromise the privacy of patients and others. Any concerns about our data privacy and security practices, even if unfounded, could damage the reputation of our businesses, discourage potential patients from seeking our services and have a material adverse effect on our business.

Current wording

We make public statements about our use and disclosure of personal information through our privacy policies, information provided on our website and press statements. Although we endeavor to comply with our public statements and documentation about patient privacy, we may at times fail to do so or be accused of having failed to do so. The publication of our privacy policies and other statements that provide promises and assurances about data privacy and security can subject us to potential government or legal action if they are found to be deceptive, unfair or misrepresentative of our actual practices. Moreover, from time to time, concerns may be expressed about whether our services or business practices, including the use of artificial intelligence, compromise the privacy of patients and others. Any concerns about our data privacy and security practices, even if unfounded, could damage the reputation of our businesses, discourage potential patients from seeking our services and have a material adverse effect on our business.

Previous wording

Effective January 1, 2021, the hospital price transparency rule requires hospitals to publish on the internet in a consumer-friendly format their standard charges based on negotiated rates for all items and services and up to 300 common shoppable services. Shoppable services are those routinely provided in non-urgent situations and include those ancillary services that customarily accompany the primary service being provided. The charges for an individual item or service to be published include:

Current wording

The CMS hospital price transparency rule requires hospitals to publish on the internet in a consumer-friendly format their standard charges based on negotiated rates for all items and services and up to 300 common shoppable services. Shoppable services are those routinely provided in non-urgent situations and include those ancillary services that customarily accompany the primary service being provided. The charges for an individual item or service to be published include:

Previous wording

Many states have also passed or are debating legislation establishing price transparency websites, mandating that health plans or hospitals make price information available to consumers, or prohibiting practices associated with surprise billing. These requirements and restrictions vary from state to state. We cannot predict what the adverse effects, if any, of new federal or state pricing transparency and other consumer protection laws or regulations, such as the effect on relations with managed care payors and referral sources, may be for us. Our failure to maintain compliance with these rules could adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows.

Current wording

In January 2026, President Trump announced his intent to advance a healthcare bill to further pricing transparency. Many states have also passed or are debating legislation establishing price transparency websites, mandating that health plans or hospitals make price information available to consumers, or prohibiting practices associated with surprise billing. These requirements and restrictions vary from state to state. We cannot predict what the adverse effects, if any, of new federal or state pricing transparency and other consumer protection laws or regulations, such as the effect on relations with managed care payors and referral sources, may be for us. Our failure to maintain compliance with these rules could adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows.

Previous wording

To date, we are not aware of having experienced a material compromise from a cyber breach or attack. However, given the increasing cybersecurity threats in the healthcare industry, there can be no assurance we will not experience business interruptions; data loss, ransom, misappropriation or corruption, theft, or misuse of proprietary data, patient or other personally identifiable information; or litigation, investigation, or regulatory action related to any of those, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our patient care, ability to admit patients, financial position, and results of operations and harm our business reputation. Moreover, a security breach, or threat thereof, could require that we expend significant resources to repair or improve our information systems and infrastructure and could distract management and other key personnel from performing their primary operational duties. In the case of a material breach or cyber attack, the associated expenses and losses may exceed our current insurance coverage for such events. Some adverse consequences are not insurable, such as reputational harm and third-party business interruption. Failure to maintain proper function, security, or availability of our information systems or protect our data against unauthorized access could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. In addition, costs, unexpected problems, and interruptions associated with the implementation or transition to new systems or technology or with adequate support of those systems or technology across numerous hospitals could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows.

Current wording

To date, we are not aware of having experienced a material compromise from a cyber breach or attack. However, given the increasing cybersecurity threats in the healthcare industry, there can be no assurance we will not experience business interruptions; data loss, ransom, misappropriation or corruption, theft, or misuse of proprietary data, patient or other personally identifiable information; or litigation, investigation, or regulatory action related to any of those, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our patient care, ability to admit patients, financial position, and results of operations and harm our business reputation. Moreover, a security breach, or threat thereof, could require that we expend significant resources to repair or improve our information systems and infrastructure and could distract management and other key personnel from performing their primary operational duties. In the case of a material breach or cyber attack, the associated expenses and losses may exceed our current insurance coverage for such events. Some adverse consequences may not be insurable, such as reputational harm and third-party business interruption. Failure to maintain proper function, security, or availability of our information systems or protect our data against unauthorized access could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. In addition, costs, unexpected problems, and interruptions associated with the implementation or transition to new systems or technology or with adequate support of those systems or technology across numerous hospitals could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows.

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Rearranged current paragraphs (2)

Current report — wording carried from elsewhere

Medicare Advantage plans may use overly restrictive coverage determinations in the pre-authorization process to limit participating members’ access to needed inpatient rehabilitative care. Medicare Advantage plans must provide coverage for inpatient rehabilitative care to the extent conventional Medicare does. However, in our experience, Medicare Advantage plans frequently deny coverage for inpatient rehabilitative care when the patients would have qualified for that care under conventional Medicare rules. Additionally, large Medicare Advantage plans have acquired home health operators. Those Medicare Advantage plans may attempt to shift patients who would benefit from intensive inpatient rehabilitation to home health in order to reduce costs to the plans in the near term.

Current report — wording carried from elsewhere

In addition, our credit agreement requires us to maintain specified financial ratios and satisfy certain financial condition tests. See the “Liquidity and Capital Resources” section of Item 7, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, and Note 8, Long-term Debt, to the accompanying consolidated financial statements. Although we remained in compliance with the financial ratios and financial condition tests as of December 31,
Rearranged previous paragraphs (1)

Previous report — wording carried elsewhere

Changes implemented by CMS to resolve the prior appeal backlog may have harmed the ability of providers like us to recover on valid Medicare claims. The Medicare appeals adjudication process is administered by the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (“OMHA”). Beginning in March 2020, OMHA increased the frequency of ALJ hearings and the number of claims set at each hearing, which we believe added to the substantive and procedural deficiencies in the ALJ appeals process.