Sharplink, Inc.
For the period ended Sep 30, 2026. Filed Nov 6, 2026.
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Sep 30, 2026 · Filed Nov 6, 2026
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ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS
You should carefully consider the risks described below before making an investment decision. The risks and uncertainties described in this section may not be the only ones we face. Additional risks and uncertainties that are not currently known to us, or that we currently deem immaterial, may also impair our business operations or financial condition. If any of the risks described below or any such additional risks actually occur, our business, financial condition, results of operations and the market price of our securities could be materially adversely affected. In particular, because we have adopted a treasury strategy centered on acquiring and holding ETH, and a substantial portion of our assets are concentrated in ETH and related digital intangible asset holdings, our financial results and the market price of our securities are subject to significant volatility and may be adversely impacted by events affecting the price, perception, regulation, or technological underpinnings of ETH. The following risk factors highlight the material risks associated with our ETH Treasury Management strategy and related exposures.
The price of ETH has historically been subject to dramatic price fluctuations and is highly volatile.
Because we intend to purchase additional ETH in future periods and increase our overall holdings of ETH, we expect that the proportion of our total assets represented by our ETH holdings will increase in the future. As a result, and in particular due to our adoption of ASU 2023-08, volatility in our earnings may be significantly more than what we experienced in prior periods.
Our historical financial statements do not reflect the potential variability in earnings that we may experience in the future from holding or selling significant amounts of ETH.
Our ETH holdings are less liquid than our existing cash and cash equivalents and may not be able to serve as a source of liquidity for us to the same extent as cash and cash equivalents.
Historically, the ETH market has been characterized by significant volatility in price, limited liquidity and trading volumes compared to sovereign currency markets, relative anonymity, a developing regulatory landscape, potential susceptibility to market abuse and manipulation, compliance and internal control failures at exchanges, and various other risks inherent in its entirely electronic, virtual form and decentralized network. During times of market instability, we may not be able to sell our ETH at favorable prices or at all. For example, a number of ETH trading venues temporarily halted deposits and withdrawals in 2022, although the Coinbase exchange (our principal market for ETH) has, to date, not done so. As a result, our ETH holdings may not be able to serve as a source of liquidity for us to the same extent as cash and cash equivalents. Further, ETH we hold with our custodians do not enjoy the same protections as are available to cash or securities deposited with or transacted by institutions subject to regulation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. Additionally, we may be unable to enter into term loans or other capital raising transactions collateralized by our unencumbered ETH or otherwise generate funds using our ETH holdings, including in particular during times of market instability or when the price of ETH has declined significantly. If we are unable to sell our ETH, enter into additional capital raising transactions, including capital raising transactions using ETH as collateral, or otherwise generate funds using our ETH holdings, or if we are forced to sell our ETH at a significant loss, in order to meet our working capital requirements, our business and financial condition could be negatively impacted.
Although the SEC and CFTC have issued joint interpretive guidance identifying ETH as a “digital commodity” rather than a “digital security,” that guidance is non-binding and could be modified or rejected by a court, and any determination that ETH is a “security” would subject us to additional regulation and could materially impact the operation of our business.
On March 17, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), joined by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), issued a joint interpretation (the “Joint Interpretation”) clarifying the application of the federal securities laws to crypto assets and establishing a taxonomy of five categories: “digital commodities,” “digital collectibles,” “digital tools,” “stablecoins,” and “digital securities.” The Joint Interpretation expressly identifies ETH as an example of a digital commodity, and the SEC and CFTC have each stated that they will administer their respective statutes consistent with the Joint Interpretation. The Joint Interpretation is consistent with our long-held view, described below, that ETH is not a “security” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws and that registration of the Company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “Investment Company Act”), is therefore not required under the applicable securities laws.
The Joint Interpretation is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking and does not itself have the force of law. It could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking. Federal and state courts are not bound by the Joint Interpretation, and the ultimate legal question of whether any particular digital asset, or any particular transaction involving a digital asset, is a “security” remains subject to judicial determination under tests articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, including in the Howey and Reves cases. In addition, the Joint Interpretation acknowledges that a crypto asset that is not itself a security may nonetheless become subject to an “investment contract” depending on the manner in which it is offered or sold, so classification of ETH as a digital commodity does not foreclose the possibility that particular transactions involving ETH could be characterized as securities transactions.
We have adapted, and expect to continue to adapt, our process for analyzing the U.S. federal securities law status of ETH and other cryptocurrencies over time, as guidance, interpretive releases, and case law have evolved. As part of our U.S. federal securities law analytical process, we take into account a number of factors, including the various definitions of “security” under U.S. federal securities laws and federal court decisions interpreting the elements of these definitions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, as well as court rulings, reports, orders, press releases, public statements, and speeches by the SEC Commissioners and SEC Staff — including, most recently, the Joint Interpretation — providing guidance on when a digital asset, or a transaction to which a digital asset may relate, may be a security for purposes of U.S. federal securities laws. Our position that ETH is not a “security” is premised, among other reasons, on our conclusion that ETH does not meet the elements of the Howey test. Among the reasons for our conclusion that ETH is not a security is that holders of ETH do not have a reasonable expectation of profits from our efforts in respect of their holding of ETH. Also, ETH ownership does not convey the right to receive any interest, rewards, or other returns.
Notwithstanding the Joint Interpretation and our own conclusion, we acknowledge that a federal or state court, state securities regulator, future SEC or CFTC leadership, or private plaintiff could take a different view as to the status of ETH or any particular transaction involving ETH. State “blue sky” regulators are not formally bound by the Joint Interpretation, and private litigants are not bound by the views of any federal regulator. Application of securities laws to the specific facts and circumstances of digital assets is complex and subject to change. As such, we remain at risk of private litigation, state enforcement proceedings, and — in the event the Joint Interpretation is modified, withdrawn, or judicially rejected — federal enforcement proceedings, any of which could result in potential injunctions, cease-and-desist orders, fines, penalties, damages, or a requirement that we register as an investment company under the Investment Company Act, and any of which could adversely affect our business, results of operations, financial condition and prospects.
Regulatory developments regarding the classification of digital assets as “commodities” or “digital commodities” by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), including recent joint SEC-CFTC interpretive guidance and pending legislation, could subject us to additional regulatory burdens and oversight by the CFTC and could adversely affect the market price of ETH and the market price of our listed securities.
The CFTC has stated it believes, and judicial decisions involving CFTC enforcement actions have confirmed, that at least some digital assets fall within the definition of a “commodity” under the U.S. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936 (the “CEA”) and the rules promulgated by the CFTC thereunder (“CFTC Rules”). On March 17, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), joined by the CFTC, issued a joint interpretation (the “Joint Interpretation”) clarifying the application of the federal securities laws to crypto assets and establishing a token taxonomy distinguishing “digital commodities,” “digital collectibles,” “digital tools,” “stablecoins,” and “digital securities.” The Joint Interpretation expressly identifies ETH as an example of a digital commodity, and the CFTC has stated that it will administer the CEA consistent with the Joint Interpretation.
While the CFTC has enforcement authority to police against fraud and manipulation in spot commodity markets (including the spot market for digital assets that are commodities), the CFTC continues to have regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction only with respect to “commodity interest” transactions, such as futures, options, and swaps on a commodity (including a digital asset commodity) and certain leveraged, margined, or financed transactions in commodities involving retail customers. The Joint Interpretation did not expand the CFTC’s statutory jurisdiction over spot digital asset activities. Accordingly, we are not currently regulated or supervised by the CFTC and are not subject to the legal and regulatory obligations that are applicable to CFTC-registered entities under the CEA and CFTC Rules.
The Joint Interpretation is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking, and it does not itself have the force of law. It could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking. No assurance can be given that ETH will continue to be treated as a digital commodity under this or any future guidance, or that the current allocation of jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC with respect to ETH and other digital assets will remain unchanged. A change in ETH’s regulatory classification, or in the coordinated posture between the SEC and the CFTC, could materially increase our compliance burden, restrict our ability to hold or transact in ETH, and adversely affect the market price of ETH and the market price of our listed securities.
The regulation of digital assets in the U.S. also remains subject to change through the enactment and adoption of new laws and regulations, and the Joint Interpretation is expressly intended to complement, rather than substitute for, Congressional market structure legislation. The proposed CLARITY Act which was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in July 2025 but failed to proceed in a procedural vote in the U.S. Senate on September 15, 2026, and other draft digital asset market structure and regulation bills, have proposed granting the CFTC additional regulatory and supervisory powers with respect to spot digital assets as “digital commodities.” While it is not possible to predict if and in what form such proposals will be adopted, if any, changes to or expansion of the jurisdiction of the CFTC with respect to activities in spot digital assets could result in the imposition of additional regulatory obligations and burdens, which could include registration, disclosure, reporting, and business conduct requirements. For example, it is possible that if the CLARITY Act were to become law as currently proposed, our ETH Treasury Management strategy could cause us to be deemed a “commodity pool” under the CEA such that our operators and advisors may need to register with the CFTC as commodity pool operators and comply with other CFTC regulations as well as the rules of the National Futures Association. Such additional regulatory burdens and oversight could materially increase the cost of our business, could adversely affect the market price of ETH, and in turn could adversely affect the market price of our listed securities.
We may be subject to regulatory developments related to digital assets and digital asset markets, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
As digital assets are relatively novel and the application of state and federal securities laws and other laws and regulations to digital assets is still evolving, it is possible that regulators in the United States or foreign countries may interpret or apply existing laws and regulations in a manner that adversely affects the price of digital assets. The U.S. federal government, states, regulatory agencies, and foreign countries may also enact new laws and regulations, or pursue regulatory, legislative, enforcement or judicial actions, that could materially impact the price of digital assets or the ability of individuals or institutions such as us to own or transfer digital assets.
On January 23, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology” (the “Executive Order”) aimed at supporting “the responsible growth and use of digital assets, blockchain technology, and related technologies across all sectors of the economy.” The Executive Order also established an interagency working group that is tasked with “proposing a Federal regulatory framework governing the issuance and operation of digital assets” in the United States. Pursuant to this Executive Order, the working group released a report in July 2025 outlining the administration’s recommendations to Congress and various agencies reflecting the administration’s “pro-innovation mindset toward digital assets and blockchain technologies.” In particular, the report recommends that Congress enact legislation regarding self-custody of digital assets, clarifying the applicability of Bank Secrecy Act obligations with respect to digital asset service providers, granting the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) authority to regulate spot markets in non-security digital assets, prohibiting the adoption of a central bank digital currency (“CBDC”), and clarifying tax laws as relevant to digital assets. In addition, the report recommends that agencies reevaluate existing guidance on digital asset activities, use existing authorities to enable the trading of digital assets at the federal level, embrace DeFi, launch or relaunch digital asset innovation efforts, and promote U.S. private sector leadership in the responsible development of cross-border payments and financial markets technologies, among others.
Consistent with the Executive Order and the July 2025 working group report, on March 17, 2026, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), joined by the CFTC, issued a joint interpretation (the “Joint Interpretation”) clarifying the application of the federal securities laws to crypto assets. The Joint Interpretation establishes a taxonomy of five categories — “digital commodities,” “digital collectibles,” “digital tools,” “stablecoins,” and “digital securities” — and expressly identifies ETH as an example of a digital commodity. The SEC and CFTC have each stated that they will administer their respective statutes consistent with the Joint Interpretation. While we believe the Joint Interpretation provides meaningful additional clarity regarding the regulatory status of ETH, it is interpretive guidance rather than a rulemaking, does not itself have the force of law, and is not binding on federal or state courts, state securities regulators, or private litigants. The Joint Interpretation could be modified, withdrawn, or superseded by future SEC or CFTC leadership, narrowed or invalidated through judicial challenge, or rendered obsolete by subsequent legislation or rulemaking, and it also acknowledges that a crypto asset that is not itself a security may nonetheless become subject to an “investment contract” depending on the manner in which it is offered or sold.
There have also been several bills introduced in Congress that propose to establish additional regulation and oversight of the digital asset markets. For example, the CLARITY Act was passed by the House of Representatives in July 2025, which would, if enacted, regulate digital asset markets and digital asset trading platforms in the United States and provide statutory backing for the allocation of jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC reflected in the Joint Interpretation. In addition, also in July 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (the “GENIUS Act”) became the first federal law specifically regulating the issuance, custody and other stablecoin-related matters in the United States. It is difficult to predict whether, or when, the CLARITY Act or another bill that would regulate digital asset markets and digital asset trading platforms may become law or what any such bill may entail.
It is difficult to predict whether, or when, as a result of these developments, Congress will grant additional authorities to the SEC, the CFTC, or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how additional legislation and/or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function, the willingness of financial and other institutions to continue to provide services to the digital assets industry, or how any new regulations, changes to existing regulations, or changes to or withdrawal of existing interpretive guidance might impact the value of digital assets generally and ETH held by the Company specifically. The consequences of these potential developments, including any narrowing, modification, or withdrawal of the Joint Interpretation, could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition, and prospects, as well as the market price of ETH, which in turn could adversely affect the market price of our listed securities.
We may engage in decentralized finance transactions and deploy ETH using liquid staking and liquid restaking protocols, which present additional risk as opposed to simply holding our digital assets.
We intend to invest and deploy ETH using one or more decentralized finance protocols. All trading and investment activity involves risk, which is heightened in the case of decentralized finance due to the irrevocable nature of blockchain transactions and the possibility of errors in smart contracts. Decentralized finance protocols also attract hackers and persons looking to exploit flaws in or the ability to misuse smart contracts. We also may incur losses in connection with our decentralized finance activity due to human error or our inability to predict future price movements. Any losses we sustain in connection with decentralized finance activities could cause an adverse impact on our financial condition, results of operations, and the market price of our Common Stock.
Decentralized finance protocols also pose heightened regulatory concerns even beyond those that face digital asset networks and digital assets generally. The U.S. financial system is extensively regulated at both the federal and state level with a particular focus on intermediaries such as banks, broker-dealers, futures commission merchants, investment funds, investment advisers, financial asset exchanges, trading platforms, clearinghouses and custodians. U.S. laws and regulations impose specific obligations on financial services intermediaries both for the protection of their customers and for the protection of the U.S. financial system as a whole. These include, among others, capital requirements, activities restrictions, reporting and disclosure requirements and obligations to monitor the activities of their customers and to ensure that the intermediaries’ activities and the activities of their customers are conducted in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Non-U.S. laws and regulatory requirements may impose similar obligations. By seeking to eliminate or substantially limit the role of traditional financial services intermediaries in lending, brokering, advisory, trading, clearing, custody and other financial services activities, DeFi protocols pose numerous challenges to the longstanding oversight framework developed under U.S. law and used by U.S. and other regulators. Legislative bodies and regulators may be required to adapt their regulatory models to accommodate decentralized financial activities, or take novel steps to supervise, limit or even prohibit decentralized financial activities. It is not possible to predict how or when these challenges will be resolved or what the impact on specific decentralized finance protocols will be, and it is likely that the decentralized finance industry will face a prolonged period of regulatory uncertainty. It is possible that some decentralized finance protocols will be subjected to costly and burdensome compliance regimes or even prohibited outright.
We have also deployed ETH using liquid staking and liquid restaking protocols, including by staking ETH through Liquid Collective in exchange for LsETH, through ether.fi in exchange for weETH, the wrapped, non-rebasing form of eETH and through Lido protocol, a decentralized liquid staking protocol, in exchange for wstETH. Liquid staking protocols are even newer than many decentralized finance protocols and are a novel and evolving technology, and liquid restaking protocols — which layer additional restaking and validation arrangements on top of liquid staking and use the underlying ETH (or its receipt tokens) to provide cryptoeconomic security to other protocols and services — are even more novel and have an even more limited operating history. Although the staff of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance has provided a statement that the staff does not generally believe liquid staking services are securities offerings, and that it does not believe receipt tokens obtained through such liquid staking services are generally securities, there is no guarantee that courts agree. That staff statement is, by its terms, addressed to liquid staking and does not directly address liquid restaking arrangements or the receipt tokens obtained from liquid restaking protocols, such as weETH; the regulatory treatment of liquid restaking arrangements under the federal securities laws therefore remains uncertain. It is also possible that the liquid staking or liquid restaking protocols we use, or specific features of those protocols, do not fit within the scope of the staff statement. If it is determined that the liquid staking or liquid restaking protocols we use, or the receipt tokens we receive (including LsETH and weETH), are securities offerings, the providers of those protocols may be required to pay fines or be subject to other third-party claims, and the ETH we have deposited with them may be available to their creditors to fulfill those claims. See “Our shift towards an ETH-focused treasury strategy requires substantial changes in our day-to-day operations and exposes us to significant operational risks” in Item 1A. Risk Factors of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2025 and “We face risks relating to the custody of our digital assets, including the loss or destruction of private keys required to access our digital assets and cyberattacks or other data loss relating to our digital assets and insolvency of our custodians” in Item 1A. Risk Factors of this Form 10-Q. There is also ongoing uncertainty as to the regulatory treatment of liquid staking and liquid restaking services from other regulators and agencies.
Prior to August 2026, weETH was a liquid restaking token. In August 2026, ether.fi removed restaking from weETH, and the ETH backing weETH is now staked through Ethereum validators only. As a result, we do not currently participate in liquid restaking arrangements, however, we may participate in restaking arrangements in the future. Liquid restaking activities involve risks beyond those associated with native staking or liquid staking. In a liquid restaking arrangement, the underlying ETH (or its receipt token) is used to provide cryptoeconomic security not only to the Ethereum proof-of-stake protocol but also to additional services, such as the EigenCloud Autonomous Verifiable Services (“AVSs”) that we secured through ether.fi, prior to August 2026. This exposed our underlying ETH to potential slashing, forfeiture or other penalties arising from issues outside of the Ethereum staking protocol itself, including operational failures, validator or operator misconduct, or technical problems with the AVSs being secured, and any future restaking would expose us to similar risks. The AVSs and other services secured through restaking are themselves new, with limited operating history, and there can be no assurance that they will function as designed. We have deployed a portion of our ETH treasury into weETH issued by ether.fi, and any losses sustained in connection with that deployment — whether from slashing, smart contract exploits, protocol failure or otherwise — could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition, results of operations and the market price of our Common Stock. In addition, we have bridged weETH from the Ethereum mainnet to Linea, a zkEVM Layer 2 network, using ether.fi’s weETH OFT bridge powered by LayerZero v2. Cross-chain bridges have historically been a frequent target of exploits in decentralized finance, and any failure, vulnerability or exploit affecting the bridge, the messaging layer or the destination network — or any disruption to or change in the Linea sequencer, prover, governance or future upgrades — could result in delays in accessing, or partial or total loss of, the weETH we have bridged.
Both decentralized finance protocols and liquid staking and liquid restaking protocols typically rely on the use of smart contracts. Smart contracts are computer programs that run on a digital asset network or related protocol that execute automatically when certain conditions are met. Because smart contract functions typically cannot be stopped or reversed, vulnerabilities in or unforeseen consequences of their programming can have damaging effects for the underlying digital asset network or protocol and the value of digital assets that use or interact with such smart contracts. For example, in June 2016, a vulnerability in the smart contracts underlying a protocol that was deployed on the Ethereum network, The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization for venture capital funding, allowed an attack by a hacker to siphon approximately $60 million worth of ETH from The DAO into a separate account. In the aftermath of the theft, certain developers of and core contributors to the Ethereum network pursued a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network in order to erase any record of the theft. Despite these efforts, the price of ETH dropped approximately 35% in the aftermath of the attack and subsequent hard fork. In addition, in July 2017, a vulnerability in a smart contract for a multi-signature wallet software developed by Parity led to a $30 million theft of ETH, and in November 2017, a new vulnerability in Parity’s wallet software led to roughly $160 million worth of ETH being indefinitely frozen in an account.
Other smart contracts, such as bridges between separate digital asset networks, have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators. Initial and continued problems with the development, design and deployment of smart contracts may have an adverse effect on the value of protocols, including liquid staking, liquid restaking and decentralized finance protocols, built on smart contract platforms or other digital assets that rely on smart contract technology, including any liquid staking or liquid restaking tokens such as LsETH and weETH. Liquid restaking tokens such as weETH are exposed not only to risks at the liquid staking protocol layer but also to risks at the additional restaking and AVS layers and, where bridged to other networks, to risks of the cross-chain bridge and the destination network. If any of the smart contracts with which we interact — whether decentralized finance, liquid staking, liquid restaking, cross-chain bridging or otherwise — suffer from such manipulation or exploit, or otherwise do not function as intended or as we anticipate, our ETH and any LsETH, weETH or similar tokens we hold may be exposed.
We have pursued, and may in the future pursue, mergers, acquisitions, investments, joint ventures and dispositions, which could adversely affect our results of operations.
Our growth strategy includes acquiring or investing in businesses that offer complementary products, services and technologies, or enhancing our market coverage, business strategy or technological capabilities. Any acquisitions we may undertake involve risks and uncertainties, which could hamper the execution of our business strategy, such as:
| ● | Our due diligence process may fail to identify significant issues with the acquired business’s products, financial disclosures, accounting practices, legal, tax and other contingencies, compliance with local laws and regulations (and interpretations thereof) in the U.S. and multiple international jurisdictions; |
| ● | Difficulties integrating the acquired business or company and managing and retaining acquired employees, vendors and customers; |
| ● | Incurring significant restructuring charges and amortization expense, assuming liabilities and ongoing or new lawsuits, potential impairment of acquired goodwill (if any) and other intangible assets (if any), and increasing our expenses and working capital requirements; |
| ● | The potential for deficiencies in internal controls of the acquired business, as well as implementing our own management information systems, operating systems and internal controls for the acquired business; |
From time to time, we may also seek to divest or wind down portions of our business or exit minority investments, any of which could materially affect our cash flows and results of operations. Such dispositions involve risks and uncertainties, including disruption to other parts of our business, potential loss of employees or customers, or exposure to unanticipated liabilities or ongoing obligations following any such dispositions. Such events could have a material adverse impact on our business and operations.
The regulation of AI continues to evolve, and our failure to comply with applicable AI regulations, or regulatory action against us, could adversely affect our business.
Regulatory frameworks governing AI are developing in the United States and in other jurisdictions and may become increasingly complex. U.S. federal and state regulators and lawmakers have proposed or adopted, or are currently considering, regulations and guidance addressing the use of AI. In the U.S., federal and state approaches to regulating AI continue to differ. New laws and regulations may be adopted in the U.S. and in non-U.S. jurisdictions, or existing laws and regulations may be interpreted, in ways that could affect how we use AI in our operations. We may need to adapt our practices to comply with such requirements. Any failure to comply with applicable requirements could result in regulatory action against us, which could adversely affect our business.
Our use of AI could give rise to legal or regulatory action or damage our reputation.
We currently use AI in certain of our business operations, subject to internal policies and oversight governing its use, including human review of AI-generated outputs. We continue to evaluate additional uses of AI in our ETH treasury and affiliate marketing businesses; however, our use of AI may not be successful and may present compliance and reputational risks. AI technologies are rapidly evolving and may generate outputs that appear correct but are inaccurate or incomplete. Although we maintain controls designed to address these risks, those controls may not identify or prevent every such issue. In addition, laws and regulations governing AI, including with respect to data privacy and intellectual property, continue to develop, and we may need to adapt our use of AI to comply with them. If we do not manage these risks effectively, we could be subject to legal or regulatory action or reputational harm.
We face risks relating to the custody of our ETH, including the loss or destruction of private keys required to access our ETH and cyberattacks or other data loss relating to our ETH.
We hold our ETH with regulated custodians that have duties to safeguard our private keys. Our custodial services contracts do not restrict our ability to reallocate our ETH among our custodians, and our ETH holdings may be concentrated with a single custodian from time to time. In light of the significant amount of ETH we hold, we will seek to engage additional custodians to achieve a greater degree of diversification in the custody of our ETH as the extent of potential risk of loss is dependent, in part, on the degree of diversification. If there is a decrease in the availability of digital asset custodians that we believe can safely custody our ETH, for example, due to regulatory developments or enforcement actions that cause custodians to discontinue or limit their services in the United States, we may need to enter into agreements that are less favorable than our current agreements or take other measures to custody our ETH, and our ability to seek a greater degree of diversification in the use of custodial services would be materially adversely affected.
ETH is controllable only by the possessor of both the unique public key and private key(s) relating to the local or online digital wallet in which the ETH is held. While the ETH blockchain ledger requires a public key relating to a digital wallet to be published when used in a transaction, private keys must be safeguarded and kept private in order to prevent a third party from accessing the ETH held in such wallet. To the extent the private key(s) for a digital wallet are lost, destroyed, or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key(s) is accessible, neither we nor our custodians will be able to access the ETH held in the related digital wallet. Furthermore, we cannot provide assurance that our digital wallets, nor the digital wallets of our custodians held on our behalf, will not be compromised as a result of a cyberattack. ETH, as well as other digital assets and blockchain technologies, have been, and may in the future be, subject to security breaches, cyberattacks, or other malicious activities.
As of the date of this filing, the insurance that covers losses of our ETH holdings may cover none or only a small fraction of the value of the entirety of our ETH holdings, and there can be no guarantee that such insurance will be maintained as part of the custodial services we have or that such coverage will cover losses with respect to our ETH. Moreover, our use of custodians exposes us to the risk that the ETH our custodians hold on our behalf could be subject to insolvency proceedings and we could be treated as a general unsecured creditor of the custodian, inhibiting our ability to exercise ownership rights with respect to such ETH. Any loss associated with such insolvency proceedings is unlikely to be covered by any insurance coverage we maintain related to our ETH. The legal framework governing digital asset ownership and rights in custodial or insolvency contexts remains uncertain and continues to evolve, which could result in unexpected losses, protracted recovery processes or adverse treatment in insolvency proceedings.
We face risks relating to the potential compromise of the Ethereum network’s security by emerging technologies, such as quantum computing, which may materially and adversely impact our operations and financial condition.
The security and integrity of the Ethereum network are fundamentally dependent on the robustness of its cryptographic algorithms. The Ethereum protocol relies heavily on public key cryptography and hashing algorithms to secure transactions, safeguard private keys, secure validator participation in its proof-of-stake consensus mechanism and prevent double-spending. Advances in emerging technologies, particularly quantum computing, may pose significant risks to the Ethereum network’s security and operational stability and, as a result, to the value of the ETH and ETH-based receipt tokens. Quantum computing, in particular, presents a long-term threat to the cryptographic assumptions underpinning the Ethereum network. Should quantum computing achieve sufficient maturity, it could undermine the effectiveness of the cryptographic algorithms used to secure Ethereum. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could potentially derive private keys from exposed public keys or compromise the network’s proof-of-stake consensus mechanism, leading to the theft of digital assets, double-spending, and other forms of fraud. Although current quantum computing capabilities are not yet at this level, advancements in quantum technologies could materialize more rapidly than anticipated, creating significant systemic risks for the Ethereum network and for the ETH we hold, stake or deploy through liquid staking and decentralized finance protocols. There can be no assurance that Ethereum’s current cryptographic safeguards will be sufficient to protect against future technological advances. While research and development efforts are ongoing to develop quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols, the Ethereum network may face challenges in adopting such technologies at scale or on a timely basis, particularly given its decentralized governance structure. Any successful attack or perceived vulnerability arising from quantum computing could materially and adversely affect the price, liquidity, and adoption of ETH and could negatively impact our business, financial condition, results of operations and the market price of our Common Stock.
The text of this filing, as the company filed it with the SEC, without its images or exhibits. This is not investment advice.