CURIS INC

We are subject to a number of risks that could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations and future prospects, including those identified in Item 1A, “Risk Factors” of Part I of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, which was filed with the SEC on March 31, 2025, as supplemented by the updated risk factors set forth below.

We are not in compliance with the requirements for continued listing on the Nasdaq Capital Market. If we fail to regain and maintain compliance with Nasdaq’s requirements, our common stock could be delisted from trading, which would decrease the liquidity of our common stock and our ability to raise additional capital.

Our common stock is currently listed on the Nasdaq Capital Market. We are required to meet specified requirements to maintain our listing on the Nasdaq Capital Market, including a minimum bid price of $1.00 per share for our common stock and standards relative to minimum stockholders’ equity, minimum market value of publicly held shares and various additional requirements. In the past we have, from time to time, received deficiency letters from Nasdaq as a consequence of our failure to satisfy such requirements. On February 21, 2025, we received a deficiency letter from Listing Qualifications Department, or Staff, of Nasdaq notifying us that the market value of our listed securities had closed for the last 30 consecutive business days below the minimum $35,000,000 requirement for continued listing on the Nasdaq Capital Market pursuant to Nasdaq Listing Rule 5550(b)(2), or Minimum MVLS Requirement. We had 180 calendar days, or until August 20, 2025, or Compliance Period, to regain compliance with the Minimum MVLS Requirement. In order to have regained compliance, during the Compliance Period, the market value of our listed securities must have closed at $35,000,000 or more for a minimum of ten consecutive business days. On August 21, 2025, we received notice from the Staff stating that, because we have not regained compliance with the MVLS Requirement, our securities would be delisted from The Nasdaq Capital Market unless we timely appeal the Staff’s delisting determination by requesting a hearing before the Nasdaq Hearings Panel, or Panel, by August 28, 2025. We appealed the delisting determination and presented our compliance plan. On October 20, 2025, we received notice that the Panel granted us an exemption until November 14, 2025 to regain compliance with the Minimum MVLS Requirement. There can be no assurance that we can regain compliance with the Minimum MVLS Requirement by such date or maintain compliance with other continued listing requirements.

If we fail to satisfy the Nasdaq Capital Market’s continued listing requirements and we are delisted from Nasdaq, we may transfer to and commence trading on the OTC Markets or another quotation medium. As a result, an investor would likely find it more difficult to trade or obtain accurate price quotations for our shares. Delisting would likely also reduce the visibility, liquidity, and value of our common stock, could have a material adverse effect on our access to capital markets and our ability to raise capital on terms acceptable to us, or at all, to provide stock-based incentives to attract and retain personnel, reduce institutional investor interest in our company, and may increase the volatility of our common stock. Delisting could also be considered a material adverse event or an event of default in certain of our third-party contracts or cause a loss of confidence of potential industry partners, lenders, and employees, which could further harm our business and our future prospects. In addition, our common stock could be deemed to be a “penny stock,” which could result in reduced levels of trading in our common stock, and we would also become subject to additional state securities regulations in connection with any sales of our securities. Some or all of these material adverse consequences may contribute to a further decline in our stock price.

Changes in and uncertainty surrounding U.S. trade policy and international trade policies, particularly with respect to China, could have a material adverse impact on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

We rely on third party contract manufacturing organizations, or CMOs, to produce our product candidate. One of our CMOs has a Chinese subcontractor that produces regulatory starting materials. Another CMO operates in Canada and produces our drug product. This past spring, the U.S. government initiated a series of tariff-related actions against U.S. trading partners. On April 2, 2025, President Trump issued an executive \order announcing a “baseline” reciprocal tariff of 10% on all U.S. trading partners effective April 5, 2025, and higher individualized reciprocal tariffs on 57 countries (with certain product exemptions for pharmaceutical-related products, among others). Previously, the Trump administration had imposed a 25% tariff on Canada and Mexico for goods not covered by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, and tariffs equaling 20% on China. In response, several countries threatened retaliatory measures, including Canada and China, which then imposed retaliatory tariffs. Prior to when the country-specific reciprocal tariffs were scheduled to take effect, the Trump administration delayed the effective date of such tariffs for all countries except China to August 1, 2025. Later, the U.S. and China reached a framework agreement that ultimately resulted in the suspension of the higher reciprocal tariffs on China until November 11, 2025. Since the April announcement, several countries including the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, among others, have reached deals with the U.S. that include reduced tariff rates to varying levels and other measures. On July 31, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order detailing new reciprocal tariff rates for individual countries that took effect on August 7, 2025. The new reciprocal rates, which are consistent with the rates reflected in the trade deals already announced, range from 10% to 41% with imports from Switzerland receiving a 39% rate. The new rates do not apply to Canada, China, Mexico and a few other countries. For China, the 10% baseline reciprocal tariff announced in April remains in effect, in addition to a minimum of an additional 20%. Regarding Canada and Mexico, the rate remains 25% for goods that are not covered by the USMCA for Mexico and, effective August 1, 2025, was increased to 35% on imports from Canada that are not covered by the USMCA. Sustained uncertainty about, or the further escalation of, trade and political tensions between the United States and China could result in a disadvantageous research and manufacturing environment in China, particularly for U.S. based companies, including retaliatory restrictions that hinder or potentially inhibit our ability to rely on CMOs and other service providers that operate in China. Certain countries have reached agreements with the U.S. that cap pharmaceutical tariffs at 15%. These include the European Union, Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom.

Separately, in April 2025, the Department of Commerce initiated an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 into the impact on U.S. national security of the imports of pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients, including finished drug products, medical countermeasures, critical inputs such as active pharmaceutical ingredients, and key starting materials, and derivative products of those items. On September 25, 2025, via a post on Truth Social, President Trump announced that, beginning October 1, 2025, all branded or patented drugs imported in the U.S. would face a 100% tariff. At the same time, Trump indicated that these tariffs could be avoided by building pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities in the U.S. Thereafter, Trump delayed the October 1st effective date of the tariffs on branded or patented pharmaceutical products announcing that the Administration had now “begun preparing” tariffs on manufacturers that don’t build in the U.S. or enter into a most-favored-nation drug pricing agreement with the Trump administration.

Further, trade tensions and conflicts between the United States and China have been escalated in recent years and, as such, we are exposed to the possibility of product supply disruption and increased costs and expenses in the event of changes to the laws, rules, regulations and policies of the governments of the United States or China, or due to geopolitical unrest and unstable economic conditions. Certain Chinese biotechnology companies may become subject to trade restrictions, sanctions, other regulatory requirements or proposed legislation by the U.S. government, which could restrict or even prohibit our ability to work with such entities, thereby potentially disrupting their supply of material to us. For example, in February 2024, U.S. lawmakers called for investigations into and the imposition of possible economic sanctions against Chinese biotechnology companies WuXi AppTec and WuXi Biologics, or collectively WuXi, over alleged ties to the Chinese military.

In addition, in 2024, the U.S. Congress considered legislation referred to as the BIOSECURE Act. If this legislation had been enacted into law, it would have prohibited, subject to limited exceptions, the direct or indirect use of U.S. federal government contract, grant, and loan funds for purchasing biotechnology equipment and services from certain Chinese biotechnology companies, possibly including WuXi entities. On October 9, 2025, the U.S. Senate passed a revised version of the BIOSECURE legislation as part of its National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2026. Instead of specifying particular Chinese entities for restrictions, the Senate bill would initially target biotechnology companies that have been identified on the so-called 1260H List by the U.S. Department of Defense as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States. This list currently includes BGI Group, BGI Genomics Co., Ltd. (BGI), Forensic Genomics International (FGI), and MGI Tech Co., Ltd. (MGI), but does not include WuXi entities. The legislation would allow for other biotechnology companies, possibly including WuXi entities, to be added to the federal funding prohibitions at a later time. The U.S. House of Representatives has passed a version of the bill that does not contain similar biotechnology provisions, so it is not currently known whether the House or Senate language or other language or neither may become law.

As a result of changes in tariffs that have been announced and/or implemented, and the underlying uncertainty currently surrounding international trade, we could experience a negative impact to our costs of materials and production processes, and supply chain disruptions and delays as a result of any new tariff policies or trade restrictions. If we are unable to obtain necessary raw materials or product components in sufficient quantity and in a timely manner due to disruptions in the global supply chain caused by macroeconomic events and conditions, the development, testing and clinical trials of our product candidate may be delayed or infeasible, and regulatory approval or commercial launch of any resulting product may be delayed or not obtained, which could significantly harm our business. We cannot yet predict the effect of the recently imposed U.S. tariffs on imports, or the extent to which other countries, in particular, China, will impose and maintain quotas, duties, tariffs, taxes or other similar restrictions upon imports or exports in the future, nor can we predict future trade policy or the terms of any renegotiated trade agreements and their impact on our business.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, and comparable regulatory agencies in foreign jurisdictions, such as the European Medicines Agency, or EMA, and the EMA’s Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use, play a critical role in the development of our product candidates by providing guidance on our clinical development programs and reviewing and approving our regulatory submissions, including investigational new drug applications, or INDs, requests for special designations and marketing applications. If these oversight and review activities are disrupted or delayed or previous alignment with the agencies is changed, then correspondingly our ability to develop and secure timely approval of our product candidates could be impacted in a negative manner.

For example, the loss and retirement of FDA leadership and personnel could lead to disruptions and delays in FDA guidance, review and approval of our product candidates. Pursuant to President Trump's E.O. 14210, “Implementing the President’s ‘Department of Government Efficiency’ Workforce Optimization Initiative,” the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, or HHS, announced on March 27, 2025, a reorganization and Reduction in Force, or RIF, across HHS of approximately 20,000 employees (82,000 to 62,000), with FDA’s workforce of approximately 20,000 to decrease by 3,500 full-time employees. Subsequently, the FDA indicated that roughly a quarter of those employees who received RIF notices had been reinstated. On July 14, 2025, following litigation reaching the US Supreme Court, the administration began to carry out these layoffs across HHS, including the FDA. There are also ongoing deliberations within the administration and Congress over potentially substantial proposed cuts to the overall budget for HHS and funding of the FDA for the 2026 federal fiscal year.

Further, while the FDA’s review of marketing applications and other activities for new drugs and biologics is largely funded through the user fee program established under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, or PDUFA, it remains unclear how the administration’s RIF and budget cuts will impact this program and the ability of the FDA to provide guidance and review our product candidates in a timely manner. For example, while the FDA RIF did not reportedly specifically target FDA reviewers, many operations, administrative and policy staff that help support such reviews were affected and those losses could lead to delays in PDUFA reviews and related activities. There have been several reports in which the FDA has failed to meet a PDUFA goal date for approval of an NDA or BLA due to heavy workload and limited resources. In addition, while currently unclear, there is a risk that the RIF and budget cutbacks could threaten the integrity of the PDUFA program itself. That is because, for the FDA to obligate user fees collected under PDUFA in the first place, a certain amount of non-user fee appropriations must be spent on the process for the review of applications plus certain other costs during the same fiscal year.

Similarly, actions by the U.S. government have significantly disrupted the operations of U.S. government agencies such as the National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and FDA, which have traditionally provided funding for basic research, research and development, and clinical testing. These U.S. government actions have included, among other things, suspending, terminating and withholding of disbursements of funds owed under ongoing contracts, grants, and other financial assistance agreements; declining to continue multi-year research projects for additional annual budget periods; canceling or delaying solicitations for new contract, grant and other financial assistance awards; canceling or delaying proposal evaluation processes and issuance of such new awards; substantially reducing federal agency staff responsible for managing contract and financial assistance programs; eliminating agency information and resources for facilitating research activity; delaying or terminating federal agency procedures for authorizing international transactions; initiating aggressive enforcement actions that may disrupt the operations of major research universities that are significant contributors to life sciences research in the U.S., and threatening access to federal agency contracts and other funding awards based on companies’ otherwise lawful corporate policies and choice of counsel. These U.S. government actions could, directly or indirectly, significantly disrupt, delay, prevent, or increase the costs of our research and product commercialization programs, including our ability to develop new product candidates, conduct clinical trials, implement research collaborations with other companies or institutions, and obtain approvals to market and sell new products.

In addition, government funding of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, and other government agencies on which our operations may rely, including those that fund research and development activities, is subject to the political process, which is inherently fluid and unpredictable. During the last several years, the U.S. government has shut down several times and certain regulatory agencies, such as the FDA and the SEC, have had to furlough critical FDA, SEC and other government employees and stop critical activities. If a prolonged government shutdown occurs, it could significantly impact the ability of the FDA to timely review and process our regulatory submissions and could impact our ability to access the public markets and obtain necessary capital in order to properly capitalize and continue our operations.

For example, the federal government shut down on October 1, 2025, and as of November 5, 2025, it has not reopened. With the shutdown, the FDA issued a public notice stating that agency operations would continue to the extent permitted by law, such as activities necessary to address imminent threats to the safety of human life and activities funded by carryover user fee funds. The FDA declared that, during the shutdown period, it does not have legal authority to accept user fees assessed for FY 2026 until an FY 2026 appropriation or Continuing Resolution for the FDA is enacted. As a result, the FDA will not be able to accept any regulatory submissions for FY 2026 that require a fee payment and that are submitted during the lapse period.

Accordingly, if any of the foregoing developments and others impact the ability of the FDA to provide us with guidance regarding our clinical development programs or delay the agency’s review and processing of our regulatory submissions, including INDs and new drug applications/biologics license applications, our business would be negatively impacted. Further, any future government shutdown could impact our ability to access the public markets and obtain necessary capital in order to properly capitalize and continue our operations.