CURIS INC

We are subject to a number of risks that could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations and future prospects, including those identified in Item 1A, “Risk Factors” of Part I of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, which was filed with the SEC on March 31, 2025, and the updated risk factors set forth below.

We are not in compliance with the requirements for continued listing on the Nasdaq Capital Market. If we fail to regain and maintain compliance with Nasdaq’s requirements, our common stock could be delisted from trading, which would decrease the liquidity of our common stock and our ability to raise additional capital.

Our common stock is currently listed on the Nasdaq Capital Market. We are required to meet specified requirements to maintain our listing on the Nasdaq Capital Market, including a minimum bid price of $1.00 per share for our common stock and standards relative to minimum stockholders’ equity, minimum market value of publicly held shares and various additional requirements. In the past we have, from time to time, received deficiency letters from Nasdaq as a consequence of our failure to satisfy such requirements. On February 21, 2025, we received a deficiency letter from Listing Qualifications Department of Nasdaq notifying us that the market value of our listed securities had closed for the last 30 consecutive business days below the minimum $35,000,000 requirement for continued listing on the Nasdaq Capital Market pursuant to Nasdaq Listing Rule 5550(b)(2), or Minimum MVLS Requirement. We have 180 calendar days, or until August 20, 2025, or Compliance Period, to regain compliance with the Minimum MVLS Requirement. In order to regain compliance, during the Compliance Period, the market value of our listed securities must close at $35,000,000 or more for a minimum of ten consecutive business days. If we do not regain compliance within the Compliance Period, we will receive written notification that our securities are subject to delisting from the Nasdaq Capital Market. At that time, we expect to appeal the delisting determination to a hearings panel pursuant to the procedures set forth in the applicable Nasdaq Listing Rules. The outcome of any such Nasdaq process is inherently uncertain. There can be no assurance that we can regain, or maintain in the future, compliance with the Nasdaq continued listing requirements.

If we fail to satisfy the Nasdaq Capital Market’s continued listing requirements and we are delisted from Nasdaq, we may transfer to and commence trading on the OTC Markets or another quotation medium. As a result, an investor would likely find it more difficult to trade or obtain accurate price quotations for our shares. Delisting would likely also reduce the visibility, liquidity, and value of our common stock, could have a material adverse effect on our access to capital markets and our ability to raise capital on terms acceptable to us, or at all, to provide stock-based incentives to attract and retain personnel, reduce institutional investor interest in our company, and may increase the volatility of our common stock. Delisting could also be considered a material adverse event or an event of default in certain of our third-party contracts or cause a loss of confidence of potential industry partners, lenders, and employees, which could further harm our business and our future prospects. In addition, our common stock could be deemed to be a “penny stock,” which could result in reduced levels of trading in our common stock, and we would also become subject to additional state securities regulations in connection with any sales of our securities. Some or all of these material adverse consequences may contribute to a further decline in our stock price.

We rely on third party contract manufacturing organizations, or CMOs, to produce our product candidate. One of our CMOs has a Chinese subcontractor that produces regulatory starting materials. Another CMO operates in Canada and produces our drug product. This past spring, the Trump administration initiated a series of tariff-related actions against U.S. trading partners. On April 2, 2025, the President issued an executive \order announcing a “baseline” reciprocal tariff of 10% on all U.S. trading partners effective April 5, 2025, and higher individualized reciprocal tariffs on 57 countries (with certain product exemptions for pharmaceutical-related products, among others). Previously, the administration had imposed a 25% tariff on Canada and Mexico for goods not covered by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, and tariffs equaling

20% on China. In response, several countries threatened retaliatory measures, including Canada and China, which then imposed retaliatory tariffs. Prior to when the country-specific reciprocal tariffs were scheduled to take effect, the administration delayed the effective date of such tariffs for all countries except China. Later, the U.S. and China reached a framework agreement that resulted in the suspension of the higher reciprocal tariffs on China until August 10, 2025. Three other countries, the United Kingdom, Vietnam and Indonesia, have also reached deals with the US that include reduced tariff rates and other measures. The administration has not indicated the effective date for these deals. Recently, the administration announced an extension of the deadline for the effective date of the country-specific tariffs for all remaining countries until August 1, 2025.

Currently, the 10% baseline reciprocal tariff announced in April remains in effect, in addition to the other tariffs on China (a minimum of an additional 20% as of July 15, 2025) and Canada and Mexico (25% as of July 15, 2025 for goods that are not covered by the USMCA). Sustained uncertainty about, or the further escalation of, trade and political tensions between the United States and China could result in a disadvantageous research and manufacturing environment in China, particularly for U.S. based companies, including retaliatory restrictions that hinder or potentially inhibit our ability to rely on contract development and manufacturing organizations and other service providers that operate in China.

As a result of changes in tariffs that have been announced and/or implemented, and the underlying uncertainty currently surrounding international trade, we could experience a negative impact to our costs of materials and production processes, and supply chain disruptions and delays as a result of any new tariff policies or trade restrictions. If we are unable to obtain necessary raw materials or product components in sufficient quantity and in a timely manner due to disruptions in the global supply chain caused by macroeconomic events and conditions, the development, testing and clinical trials of our product candidate may be delayed or infeasible, and regulatory approval or commercial launch of any resulting product may be delayed or not obtained, which could significantly harm our business. We cannot yet predict the effect of the recently imposed U.S. tariffs on imports, or the extent to which other countries will impose quotas, duties, tariffs, taxes or other similar restrictions upon imports or exports in the future, nor can we predict future trade policy or the terms of any renegotiated trade agreements and their impact on our business.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, and comparable regulatory agencies in foreign jurisdictions, such as the European Medicines Agency, or EMA, and the EMA’s Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use, play a critical role in the development of our product candidates by providing guidance on our clinical development programs and reviewing and approving our regulatory submissions, including investigational new drug applications, or INDs, requests for special designations and marketing applications. If these oversight and review activities are disrupted or delayed or previous alignment with the agencies is changed, then correspondingly our ability to develop and secure timely approval of our product candidates could be impacted in a negative manner.

For example, the loss of FDA leadership and personnel could lead to disruptions and delays in FDA guidance, review and approval of our product candidates. Pursuant to President Trump's E.O. 14210, “Implementing the President’s ‘Department of Government Efficiency’ Workforce Optimization Initiative,” the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, or HHS, announced on March 27, 2025, a reorganization and Reduction in Force, or RIF, across HHS of approximately 20,000 employees (82,000 to 62,000), with FDA’s workforce of approximately 20,000 to decrease by 3,500 full-time employees. Subsequently, the FDA indicated that roughly a quarter of those employees who received RIF notices had been reinstated. On July 14, 2025, following litigation reaching the US Supreme Court, the administration began to carry out these layoffs across HHS, including the FDA. There are also ongoing deliberations within the administration and Congress over potentially substantial proposed cuts to the overall budget for HHS and funding of the FDA for the 2026 federal fiscal year.

Further, while the FDA’s review of marketing applications and other activities for new drugs and biologics is largely funded through the user fee program established under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, or PDUFA, it remains unclear how the administration’s RIF and budget cuts will impact this program and the ability of the FDA to provide guidance and review our product candidates in a timely manner. For example, while the FDA RIF did not reportedly specifically target FDA reviewers, many operations, administrative and policy staff that help support such reviews were affected and those losses could lead to delays in PDUFA reviews and related activities. As of July 15, 2025, there has been at least one report in which the FDA failed to meet a PDUFA goal date for approval of an NDA due to heavy workload and limited resources. In addition, while currently unclear, there is a risk that the RIF and budget cutbacks could threaten the integrity of the PDUFA program itself. That is because, for the FDA to obligate user fees collected under PDUFA in the first place, a certain amount of non-user fee appropriations must be spent on the process for the review of applications plus certain other costs during the same fiscal year.

In addition, government funding of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, and other government agencies on which our operations may rely, including those that fund research and development activities, is subject to the political process, which is inherently fluid and unpredictable. For example, over the last several years, the U.S. government has shut down several times and certain regulatory agencies, such as the FDA and the SEC, have had to furlough critical FDA, SEC and other government employees and stop critical activities. If a prolonged government shutdown occurs, it could significantly impact the ability of the FDA to timely review and process our regulatory submissions and could impact our ability to access the public markets and obtain necessary capital in order to properly capitalize and continue our operations.

Accordingly, if any of the foregoing developments and others impact the ability of the FDA to provide us with guidance regarding our clinical development programs or delay the agency’s review and processing of our regulatory submissions, including INDs and new drug applications/biologics license applications, our business would be negatively impacted. Further, any future government shutdown could impact our ability to access the public markets and obtain necessary capital in order to properly capitalize and continue our operations.