Riot Platforms, Inc.

Investors should carefully review and consider the information regarding certain factors that could materially affect our business, results of operations, financial condition, cash flows, and equity as set forth herein and in Part I, Item 1A. “Risk Factors” of our 2025 Annual Report. Except as set forth below, there have been no material changes to the risk factors set forth in our 2025 Annual Report. We may disclose changes to our risk factors or disclose additional risk factors from time to time in our future filings with the SEC. Additional risks and uncertainties not presently known to us or that we currently believe not to be material may also adversely impact our business, financial condition, results of operations, cash flows, and equity.

The following risk factors supplement, and to the extent inconsistent, supersede, the risk factors previously disclosed in our 2025 Annual Report.

We depend on grid operators, electrical distribution providers, and regulators for access to power, and changes in the laws, rules, and market requirements applicable to large electrical loads could increase our costs, delay or prevent the interconnection of new capacity, or require us to curtail our operations.

Our access to power depends on our electrical distribution providers, grid operators, and regulators. In Texas, the PUCT, ERCOT, and Oncor oversee the regulatory, administrative, and delivery aspects of our power supply. In Kentucky, MISO and Big Rivers Electric Corporation oversee the power supply at our Commerce site, and the Tennessee Valley Authority oversees the power supply at our Blue Steel site. Scrutiny of the electricity consumption of bitcoin mining and data center facilities has intensified at the state and federal levels, including from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”). This scrutiny has led, and may continue to lead, to new measures that regulate, restrict, or increase the cost of electricity use by large loads such as our facilities.

In Texas, SB 6, enacted in 2025, and the rules adopted and proposed to implement it have changed, and continue to change, the terms on which large loads connect to and use the ERCOT grid. New or expanded large loads must now post significant financial security, pay study and direct interconnection costs in advance, make extensive technical disclosures, and commit to minimum billing demand, and may forfeit posted security if a project is withdrawn or is not energized on schedule. New large loads must also proceed through ERCOT’s batch study process, which has been delayed by a state-directed audit of data center projects, and further delays could postpone the energization of expansion capacity at our Texas facilities or of any new sites. In addition, SB 6 requires ERCOT to ensure that utilities serving customers interconnected after December 31, 2025 develop protocols, including the installation of any necessary equipment before interconnection, to enable the curtailment of those loads during firm load-shed events. SB 6 also requires the PUCT to revise its transmission cost-allocation rules by December 31, 2026. The PUCT is considering measures that could shift a greater share of transmission upgrade costs to large loads, impose long-term minimum demand charges, and replace the current 4CP methodology with a 12CP methodology. If adopted substantially as proposed, these measures could materially increase our transmission-related charges and reduce the benefit of the demand-response and 4CP-avoidance strategies on which we have historically relied. SB 6 further directs ERCOT and the PUCT to establish curtailment obligations for certain large loads during firm load-shed events and a reliability service under which ERCOT may direct large loads to reduce demand on short notice.

ERCOT has also adopted, and continues to develop, grid-stability requirements for large loads. Voltage and frequency ride-through requirements for large computational loads became effective on August 1, 2026. Although our existing operations qualify for an exemption from these requirements, expansion capacity may not qualify. In addition, ERCOT has established IROLs for regional groups of large loads and may limit the aggregate consumption of the loads within a group, which could require us to install additional equipment, modify cooling and electrical systems, or limit our equipment and facility design choices. Our Corsicana Facility is included in one of these groups, and its consumption could be capped or curtailed as other loads in the group increase their consumption, even if our own usage does not change. ERCOT and Oncor also periodically test and monitor our Texas facilities, and

we have experienced curtailments in connection with those grid conditions. Any curtailment or interruption of power at our data center facilities could also adversely affect our ability to meet our obligations to our data center tenants.

At the federal level, new or revised NERC reliability standards, whether applied to our facilities directly or through our grid operators and electrical distribution providers, could impose additional technical, reporting, and compliance obligations. In addition, in August 2026, the President issued Executive Order 14421 addressing national security risks associated with certain foreign-produced electric equipment used in the bulk-power system, and the U.S. Department of Energy is considering how to implement it, including through potential procurement restrictions and requirements affecting existing equipment. Depending on how these measures are implemented and whether they apply to infrastructure serving our facilities, they could limit available suppliers, require us to mitigate or replace equipment, increase our costs, or delay the interconnection or expansion of our facilities.

If we cannot secure adequate electrical power on acceptable terms, whether due to reliability curtailments, new interconnection requirements, increased costs, or other regulatory constraints, we may be forced to reduce or shut down our operations or to delay or abandon the development of new capacity, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, prospects, financial condition, and results of operations. For a discussion of recent regulatory developments in Texas, see Part I, Item 2. “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Business Overview and Trends—Texas Large Load Regulation” of this Quarterly Report.

Increasing political and regulatory scrutiny of data centers in Texas could delay or prevent our data center development, increase our costs, and reduce the incentives available to our projects.

Texas state officials have taken a series of actions directed at data center development. In August 2026, the Governor directed the PUCT and ERCOT to audit data center projects in ERCOT’s interconnection process and to deny interconnection to projects that fail to meet applicable requirements. In September 2026, the Governor directed the TCEQ to suspend the issuance of permits sought by data center projects pending completion of that audit and a state evaluation of the impact of data centers on municipal water supplies. The Governor has also indicated that future permitting may be conditioned on, among other things, project sponsors bearing the full cost of dedicated grid infrastructure, reporting electricity and water usage, and complying with local setback ordinances, and has stated an intention to work with the Texas Legislature to eliminate tax exemptions and economic development incentives for data centers. In addition, Texas officials have intensified enforcement of mandatory water-use survey requirements, and the OAG has opened an investigation into data center compliance with those requirements.

Our future data center projects in Texas, including expansions of our existing facilities and any new sites, may require new or modified TCEQ permits or other approvals. These actions, and any similar measures adopted by state or local authorities in Texas or elsewhere, could delay or prevent those projects, increase our compliance and development costs, or reduce or eliminate tax abatements or other incentives on which the economics of our projects depend. Any failure to satisfy applicable reporting obligations could also expose us to enforcement proceedings and penalties and adversely affect our ability to obtain or maintain required permits.

In addition, the PUCT is litigating rulings of the OAG requiring disclosure, under the Texas Public Information Act, of certain facility-location information collected through the PUCT’s energy and water use survey of data centers and virtual currency mining facilities. Depending on the outcome of that litigation and of other public information requests, sensitive information about our facilities that we have submitted to regulators could become public, which could create competitive or security risks and increase our costs to protect that information.

We rely on third-party custodians to safeguard our bitcoin, and the loss, theft, or inaccessibility of bitcoin held in custody, or the failure or insolvency of a custodian, could have a material adverse effect on our liquidity, financial condition, and results of operations.

We currently hold our bitcoin with BitGo Bank & Trust, National Association (“BitGo”) and Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC (each, a “Custodian”). In October 2026, we transitioned custody of our bitcoin from NYDIG Trust Company LLC to BitGo. Transitions between custodians require the transfer of bitcoin between wallets and expose us to operational risks, including errors in transfer instructions, delays, and cybersecurity threats targeting assets in transit. Although our bitcoin is held in segregated custodial accounts for our benefit, our Custodians maintain only limited insurance coverage that is shared among their customers, may be modified or terminated without notice to us, and may be insufficient to cover our losses, and our bitcoin is not insured by us or protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.

The treatment of digital assets held by a custodian in an insolvency, receivership, or similar proceeding is not fully settled. If a Custodian were to become insolvent, suffer a security breach, or otherwise fail to perform its obligations, our access to our bitcoin

could be delayed or our bitcoin could be lost, and we may be required to self-custody our bitcoin until we are able to engage a replacement custodian, which would increase our exposure to theft, loss, and operational error. Any such event could adversely affect our ability to implement our Bitcoin Treasury Strategy and fund our operations and could have a material adverse effect on our liquidity, financial condition, and results of operations and the market price of our securities.