Grayscale Ethereum Trust ETH

Summary of Risk Factors

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Extreme volatility of trading prices that many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced in recent periods and may continue to experience, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value;

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The value of the Shares is dependent on the acceptance of digital assets, such as ETH, which represent a new and rapidly evolving industry;

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The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of ETH held by the Trust, the value of which may be highly volatile and subject to fluctuations;

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Because of the holding period under Rule 144, the lack of an ongoing redemption program, and the Trust’s ability to halt creations from time to time, there is no arbitrage mechanism to keep the value of the Shares closely linked to the Index Price and the Shares have historically traded at a substantial premium over, or a substantial discount to, the NAV per Share;

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The Shares may trade at a price that is at, above or below the Trust’s NAV per Share as a result of the non-current trading hours between OTCQX and the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market;

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A determination that ETH or any other digital asset is a “security” may adversely affect the value of ETH and the value of the Shares, and result in potentially extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to, or termination of, the Trust;

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Regulatory changes or actions by the U.S. Congress or any U.S. federal or state agencies may affect the value of the Shares or restrict the use of ETH, validating activity or the operation of the Ethereum Network or the Digital Asset Markets in a manner that adversely affects the value of the Shares;

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Changes in the policies of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) could adversely impact the value of the Shares;

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Regulatory changes or other events in foreign jurisdictions may affect the value of the Shares or restrict the use of one or more digital assets, validating activity or the operation of their networks or the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market in a manner that adversely affects the value of the Shares;

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The Trust may be required to disclose information, including information relating to investors, to regulators;

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The Trust relies on third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to the affairs of the Trust and the replacement of such service providers could pose a challenge to the safekeeping of the Trust’s ETH and to the operations of the Trust.

Risk Factors Related to Digital Assets

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ETH, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. For instance, following significant increases throughout the majority of 2020, digital asset prices, including ETH, experienced significant volatility throughout 2021 and 2022. This volatility became extreme in November 2022 when FTX halted customer withdrawals. See “—Recent developments in the digital asset economy have led to extreme volatility and disruption in digital asset markets, a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem, significant negative publicity surrounding digital assets broadly and market-wide declines in liquidity.” Digital asset prices, including ETH, have continued to fluctuate widely throughout 2023 and through the date of this Annual Report.

Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. Furthermore, negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset economy may reduce confidence in the digital asset economy and may result in greater volatility in the price of ETH and other digital assets, including a depreciation in value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actions to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of ETH. For additional information that quantifies the volatility of ETH prices and the value of the Shares, see “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Historical NAV and ETH Prices.”

Digital assets such as ETH were only introduced within the past two decades, and the medium-to-long term value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies and to the fundamental investment characteristics of digital assets.

Digital assets such as ETH were only introduced within the past two decades, and the medium-to-long term value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies, such as the recentness of their development, their dependence on the internet and other technologies, their dependence on the role played by users, developers and validators and the potential for malicious activity. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:

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Digital asset networks are dependent upon the internet. A disruption of the internet or a digital asset network, such as the Ethereum Network, would affect the ability to transfer digital assets, including ETH, and, consequently, their value.

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The acceptance of software patches or upgrades by a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the users and validators in a digital asset network, such as the Ethereum Network, could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate networks.

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The open-source structure of many digital asset network protocols, such as the protocol for the Ethereum Network, means that developers and other contributors are generally not directly compensated for their contributions in maintaining and developing such protocols. As a result, the developers and other contributors of a particular digital asset may lack a financial incentive to maintain or develop the network or may lack the resources to adequately address emerging issues. Alternatively, some developers may be funded by companies whose interests are at odds with other participants in a particular digital asset network. A failure to properly monitor and upgrade the protocol of the Ethereum Network could damage that network.

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Moreover, in the past, flaws in the source code for digital assets have been exposed and exploited, including flaws that disabled some functionality for users, exposed users’ personal information and/or resulted in the theft of users’ digital assets. The cryptography underlying ETH could prove to be flawed or ineffective, or developments in mathematics and/or technology, including advances in digital computing, algebraic geometry and quantum computing, could result in such cryptography becoming ineffective. In any of these circumstances, a malicious actor may be able to take the Trust’s ETH, which would adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, functionality of the Ethereum Network may be negatively affected such that it is no longer attractive to users, thereby dampening demand for ETH. Even if another digital asset other than ETH were affected by similar circumstances, any reduction in confidence in the source code or cryptography underlying digital assets generally could negatively affect the demand for digital assets and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares.

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The Ethereum Network is in the process of implementing a series of software upgrades and other changes to its protocol, which were previously referred to collectively as Ethereum 2.0 and some of which were implemented during 2022, such as the Merge. These upgrades will result in new iterations of the Ethereum Network. Many of the contemplated upgrades the

Ethereum Network will include updates to material aspects of its source code. Although some of these upgrades have been successfully implemented, such as the Merge, previously successful upgrades do not guarantee that future upgrades will be successful, and any failure to properly implement future changes could have a material adverse effect on the value of ETH and the value of the Shares. One prospective upgrade is known as the “Dencun” upgrade, which could increase the scalability of the Ethereum Network by allowing easy synchronization with Layer 2 networks capable of processing many more transactions than the Ethereum Blockchain alone. The intended effect would be to increase the rate of transactions that can be processed by the Ethereum Network. As a result, it is possible that the amount of ETH required to sync Layer 2 networks with the Ethereum Blockchain would be reduced and therefore the demand for ETH could be reduced, which could have a material adverse effect on the value of ETH and the value of the Shares. See “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ETH Industry and Market—Modifications to the ETH Protocol” for additional information. In addition, the acceptance of software patches or upgrades by a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the users and validators in a digital asset network could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate networks. See “A temporary or permanent “fork” could adversely affect the value of the Shares” for additional information.

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The Ethereum Network is still in the process of developing and making significant decisions that will affect policies that govern the supply and issuance of ETH as well as other Ethereum Network protocols. For example, the Ethereum Network has on three separate occasions reduced the quantity of ETH rewarded per block and may make additional changes in the future, see “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ETH Industry and Market—Creation of New ETH” for additional information. If the Ethereum Network does not successfully develop its policies on supply and issuance, or does so in a manner that is not attractive to network participants, there may not be sufficient network level support for such network, which could lead to a decline in the support and price of ETH.

Moreover, because digital assets, including ETH, have been in existence for a short period of time and are continuing to develop, there may be additional risks in the future that are impossible to predict as of the date of this Annual Report.

The first digital asset, Bitcoin, was launched in 2009. ETH launched in 2015 and, along with Bitcoin, was one of the first cryptographic digital assets to gain global adoption and critical mass. In general, digital asset networks, including the Ethereum Network and other cryptographic and algorithmic protocols governing the issuance of digital assets represent a new and rapidly evolving industry that is subject to a variety of factors that are difficult to evaluate. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:

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ETH is only selectively accepted by retail and commercial outlets, and use of ETH by consumers remains limited. Banks and other established financial institutions may refuse to process funds for ETH transactions; process wire transfers to or from Digital Asset Trading Platforms, ETH-related companies or service providers; or maintain accounts for persons or entities transacting in ETH. As a result, the prices of ETH are largely determined by speculators and validators, thus contributing to price volatility that makes retailers less likely to accept ETH in the future. While the use of other digital assets, such as Bitcoin, to purchase goods and services from commercial or service businesses is developing, ETH has not yet been accepted in the same manner because it has a slightly different purpose than Bitcoin.

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Banks may not provide banking services, or may cut off banking services, to businesses that provide digital asset-related services or that accept digital assets as payment, which could dampen liquidity in the market and damage the public perception of digital assets generally or any one digital asset in particular, such as ETH, and their or its utility as a payment system, which could decrease the price of digital assets generally or individually.

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Certain privacy-preserving features have been or are expected to be introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If any such features are introduced to the Ethereum Network, any trading platforms or businesses that facilitate transactions in ETH may be at an increased risk of criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having banking services cut off if there is a concern that these features interfere with the performance of anti-money laundering duties and economic sanctions checks.

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Users, developers and validators may otherwise switch to or adopt certain digital assets at the expense of their engagement with other digital asset networks, which may negatively impact those networks, including the Ethereum Network.

Smart contracts are a new technology and ongoing development may magnify initial problems, cause volatility on the networks that use smart contracts and reduce interest in them, which could have an adverse impact on the value of ETH.

Smart contracts are programs that run on a blockchain that execute automatically when certain conditions are met. Since smart contracts typically cannot be stopped or reversed, vulnerabilities in their programming can have damaging effects. For example, in June 2016, a vulnerability in the smart contracts underlying The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization for venture capital funding, allowed an attack by a hacker to syphon approximately $60 million worth of ETH from The DAO’s accounts into a segregated account. In the aftermath of the theft, certain developers and core contributors pursued a “hard fork” of the Ethereum Network in order to erase any record of the theft. Despite these efforts, the price of ETH dropped approximately 35% in the aftermath of the attack and subsequent hard fork. In addition, in July 2017, a vulnerability in a smart contract for a multi-signature wallet software developed by Parity led to a $30 million theft of ETH, and in November 2017, a new vulnerability in Parity’s wallet software led to roughly $160 million worth of ETH being indefinitely frozen in an account. Other smart contracts, such as bridges between blockchain networks and DeFi protocols have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators such that attackers syphoned over $3.8 billion worth of digital assets from smart contracts in 2022. Initial problems and continued problems with the development, design and deployment of smart contracts may have an adverse effect on the value of ETH, which could have a negative impact on the value of the Shares.

Layer 2 solutions on the Ethereum Network were only recently conceived and may not properly function as intended, which could have an adverse impact on the value of ETH and an investment in the Shares.

So-called “Layer 2” solutions are protocols built on top of an underlying smart contract platform blockchain intended to provide scalability to the underlying blockchain by increasing transaction efficiency. For example, Arbitrum is a smart contract platform protocol built on top of the Ethereum Blockchain; it is intended to provide scalability to Ethereum by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on the Ethereum Network. Under this model, Ethereum functions as the base layer, or “Layer 1” blockchain. Such solutions are intended to improve upon the transaction speed, cost and efficiency of transactions on their respective Layer 1. Layer 2 solutions therefore rely, to various degrees, on the functionality of the underlying Layer 1 blockchain.

The details of how this is done vary significantly between different Layer 2 technologies and implementations. For example, “rollups” perform transaction execution outside the Layer 1 blockchain and then post the data, typically in batches, back to the Layer 1 Ethereum blockchain where consensus is reached. “Zero knowledge rollups” are generally designed to run the computation needed to validate the transactions off-chain, on the Layer 2 protocol, and submit a proof of validity of a batch of transactions (not the entire transactions themselves). By contrast, “optimistic rollups” assume transactions are valid by default and only run computation, via a fraud proof, in the event of a challenge. Other proposed Layer 2 scaling solutions include, among others, “state channels”, which are designed to allow participants to run a large number of transactions on the Layer 2 side channel protocol and only submit two transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum blockchain (the transaction opening the state channel, and the transaction closing the channel), “side chains”, in which an entire Layer 2 blockchain network with similar capabilities to the existing Layer 1 Ethereum blockchain runs in parallel with the existing Layer 1 Ethereum blockchain and allows smart contracts and DApps to run on the Layer 2 side chain without burdening the main Layer 1 network, and others. To date, the Ethereum Network community has not coalesced overwhelmingly around any particular Layer 2 solution, though this could change. There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the speed and throughput of settlement of Ethereum Network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could cause the Ethereum Network to not adequately resolve scaling challenges and adversely impact the adoption of ether and the Ethereum Network and the value of the Shares. There is no guarantee that any potential scaling solution, whether a change to the Layer 1 blockchain or the introduction of a Layer 2 solution like rollups, state channels or side chains, will achieve widespread adoption. It is possible that proposed changes to the Layer 1 Ethereum Network could divide the community, potentially even causing a hard fork, or that the decentralized governance of the Ethereum Network causes network participants to fail to coalesce overwhelmingly around any particular solution, causing the Ethereum Network to suffer reduced adoption or causing users or validators to migrate to other blockchain networks. It is also possible that scaling solutions could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects or flaws, security risks, or other problems that could cause them to suffer operational disruptions. For example, in multiple instances throughout 2022 and 2023, the Arbitrum network experienced outages due to failures in its primary node responsible for submitting transactions to Ethereum.

Further, smart contracts deployed on one Layer 2 solution may not be interoperable with smart contracts deployed on other Layer 2 solutions. In particular, the advent of Layer 2 solutions presents the possibility of fracturing liquidity of DeFi DApps on a smart contract platform’s mainchain by splitting such liquidity among multiple, non-interoperable Layer 2 solutions, which could limit their use case or reduce efficiency. As Layer 2 solutions grow in popularity and total value locked, these types of difficulties may lead to transactional congestion or forfeiture of value held on the Ethereum Network, which in turn could have an adverse impact on the value of ETH.

The governance of decentralized networks, such as the Ethereum Network, is by voluntary consensus and open competition. As a result, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on the governance of any particular decentralized digital asset network, which may stymie such network’s utility and ability to grow and face challenges. The foregoing notwithstanding, the protocols for some decentralized networks, such as the Ethereum Network, are informally managed by a group of core developers that propose amendments to the relevant network’s source code. Core developers’ roles evolve over time, largely based on self-determined participation. If a significant majority of users and validators were to adopt amendments to the Ethereum Network based on the proposals of such core developers, the Ethereum Network would be subject to new protocols that may adversely affect the value of ETH.

Many digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges due to the fact that public blockchains generally face a tradeoff between security and scalability. One means through which public blockchains achieve security is decentralization, meaning that no intermediary is responsible for securing and maintaining these systems. For example, a greater degree of decentralization generally means a given digital asset network is less susceptible to manipulation or capture. In practice, this typically means that every single node on a given digital asset network is responsible for securing the system by processing every transaction and maintaining a copy of the entire state of the network. As a result, a digital asset network may be limited in the number of transactions it can process by the capabilities of each single fully participating node. Many developers are actively researching and testing scalability solutions for public blockchains that do not necessarily result in lower levels of security or decentralization, such as off-chain payment channels and Layer 2 networks. Off-chain payment channels would allow parties to transact without requiring the full processing power of a blockchain. Layer 2 networks can increase the scalability of a blockchain by allowing users to transact on a second blockchain deployed on top of a Layer 1 network.

As of December 31, 2023, the Ethereum Network handled approximately 12 transactions per second. In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital assets are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. For example, in 2024, the Ethereum Network may begin the final stages of implementing an upgrade referred to as Dencun that includes proto-danksharding. See “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ETH Industry and Market—Creation of New ETH” and “—Modifications to the ETH Protocol” for additional information.

As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average fees and settlement times may increase considerably. For example, the Ethereum Network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. Since January 1, 2021, ETH average daily transaction fees have ranged from $0.97 per transaction on October 2, 2022, to as high as $200.27 per transaction on May 1, 2022. As of December 31, 2023, ETH average daily transaction fees were $3.82 per transaction. Increased fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for ETH (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ETH, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the scale of settlement of Ethereum Network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Digital asset networks are often developed by a diverse set of contributors and the perception that high-profile contributors may no longer contribute to the network may have an adverse effect on the market price of any related digital assets. For example, in June 2017, an unfounded rumor circulated that Ethereum protocol developer Vitalik Buterin had died. Following the rumor, the price of ETH decreased approximately 20% before recovering after Buterin himself dispelled the rumor. Some have speculated that the rumor led to the decrease in the price of ETH. In the event a high-profile contributor to the Ethereum Network, such as Vitalik Buterin, is perceived as no longer contributing to the Ethereum Network due to death, retirement, withdrawal, incapacity, or otherwise, whether or not such perception is valid, it could negatively affect the price of ETH, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

As of December 31, 2023, the largest 100 ETH wallets held approximately 51.7% of the ETH in circulation. Moreover, it is possible that other persons or entities control multiple wallets that collectively hold a significant number of ETH, even if they individually only hold a small amount, and it is possible that some of these wallets are controlled by the same person or entity. As a result of this concentration of ownership, large sales or distributions by such holders could have an adverse effect on the market price of ETH.

If the digital asset award or transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expanding validating power or demand high transaction fees, which could negatively impact the value of ETH and the value of the Shares.

In 2021, the Ethereum Network implemented the EIP-1559 upgrade. EIP-1559 changed the methodology used to calculate transaction fees paid to ETH validators in such a manner that reduced the total net issuance of ETH fees paid to validators. If the digital asset awards for validating blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum Network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expending validating power to validate blocks and confirmations of transactions on the Ethereum Blockchain could be slowed. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:

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If the profit margins of digital asset validating operations are not sufficiently high, digital asset validators are more likely to immediately sell tokens earned by validating, resulting in an increase in liquid supply of that digital asset, which would generally tend to reduce that digital asset’s market price.

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A reduction in digital assets staked by validators on the Ethereum Network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet obtaining control. See “—If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the validating power on the Ethereum Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.”

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Validators have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most digital asset networks. If validators demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions in the Ethereum Blockchain or a software upgrade automatically charges fees for all transactions on the Ethereum Network, the cost of using ETH may increase and the marketplace may be reluctant to accept ETH as a means of payment. Alternatively, validators could collude in an anti-competitive manner to reject low transaction fees on the Ethereum Network and force users to pay higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network. Higher transaction confirmation fees resulting through collusion or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network, the value of ETH and the value of the Shares.

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To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in validated blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Ethereum Blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in the digital asset network.

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During the course of ordering transactions and validating blocks, validators may be able to prioritize certain transactions in return for increased transaction fees, an incentive system known as “Maximal Extractable Value” or MEV. For example, in blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum Network, users may attempt to gain an advantage over other users by increasing offered transaction fees. Certain software solutions, such as Flashbots, have been developed which facilitate validators in capturing MEV produced by these increased fees. The MEV incentive system may lead to an increase in transaction fees on the Ethereum Network, which may diminish its use. Users or other stakeholders on the Ethereum Network could also view the existence of MEV as unfair manipulation of decentralized digital asset networks, and refrain from using DeFi protocols or the Ethereum Network generally. In addition, it’s possible regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict the use of MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum Network among users and validators. Any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of ETH and the value of the Shares.

If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the validating power on the Ethereum Network, or otherwise obtains control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.

If a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtains a majority of the validating power on the Ethereum Network, it may be able to alter the Ethereum Blockchain on which transactions in ETH rely by constructing fraudulent blocks or preventing certain transactions from completing in a timely manner, or at all. The malicious actor or botnet could also control, exclude or modify the ordering of transactions. Although the malicious actor or botnet would not be able to generate new tokens or transactions using such control, it could “double-spend” its own tokens (i.e., spend the same tokens in more than one transaction) and prevent the confirmation of other users’ transactions for so long as it maintained control. To the extent that such malicious actor or botnet did not yield its control of the validating power on the Ethereum Network or the ETH community did not reject the fraudulent blocks as malicious, reversing any changes made to the Ethereum Blockchain may not be possible. Further, a malicious actor or botnet could create a flood of transactions in order to slow down the Ethereum Network.

In addition, in May 2019, the Bitcoin Cash network experienced a 51% attack when two large mining pools reversed a series of transactions in order to stop an unknown miner from taking advantage of a flaw in a recent Bitcoin Cash protocol upgrade. Although this particular attack was arguably benevolent, the fact that such coordinated activity was able to occur may negatively impact perceptions of the Bitcoin Cash network. Although the two attacks described above took place on proof-of-work-based networks, it is possible that a similar attack may occur on the Ethereum Network, which could negatively impact the value of ETH and the value of the Shares.

Although there are no known reports of malicious control of the Ethereum Network, if groups of coordinating or connected ETH holders that together have more than 50% of outstanding ETH were to stake that ETH and run validators, they could exert authority over the validation of ETH transactions. This risk is heightened if over 50% of the validating power on the network falls within the jurisdiction of a single governmental authority. If network participants, including the core developers and the administrators of validating pools, do not act to ensure greater decentralization of ETH, the feasibility of a malicious actor obtaining control of the validating power on the Ethereum Network will increase, which may adversely affect the value of the Shares.

A malicious actor may also obtain control over the Ethereum Network through its influence over core developers by gaining direct control over a core developer or an otherwise influential programmer. To the extent that the ETH ecosystem does not grow, the possibility that a malicious actor may be able to maliciously influence the Ethereum Network in this manner will remain heightened.

The Ethereum Network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can download the software, modify it and then propose that the users and validators of ETH adopt the modification. When a modification is introduced and a substantial majority of users and validators’ consent to the modification, the change is implemented and the network remains uninterrupted. However, if less than a substantial majority of users and validators’ consent to the proposed modification, and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Ethereum Network, with one group running the pre-modified software and the other running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two versions of ETH running in parallel, yet lacking interchangeability. For example, in September 2022, the Ethereum Network transitioned to a proof-of-stake model, in an upgrade referred to as the “Merge.” Following the Merge, a hard fork of the Ethereum Network occurred, as certain Ethereum miners and network participants planned to maintain the proof-of-work consensus mechanism that was removed as part of the Merge. This version of the network was rebranded as “Ethereum Proof-of-Work.”

Furthermore, a hard fork can lead to new security concerns. For example, when the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum trading platforms through at least October 2016. An Ethereum trading platform announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of validating power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validating pool’s validating power to exceed 50% of the validating power of a digital asset network that retained or attracted less validating power, thereby making digital asset networks that rely on proof-of-stake more susceptible to attack.

Protocols may also be cloned. Unlike a fork, which modifies an existing blockchain, and results in two competing networks, each with the same genesis block, a “clone” is a copy of a protocol’s codebase, but results in an entirely new blockchain and new genesis block. Tokens are created solely from the new “clone” network and, in contrast to forks, holders of tokens of the existing network that was cloned do not receive any tokens of the new network. A “clone” results in a competing network that has characteristics substantially similar to the network it was based on, subject to any changes as determined by the developer(s) that initiated the clone.

A hard fork may adversely affect the price of ETH at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Furthermore, while the Trust would be entitled to both versions of the digital asset running in parallel, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which version of the digital asset is generally accepted as the Ethereum Network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Either of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares. For example, following the DAO hack in July 2016, holders of Ethereum voted on-chain to reverse the hack, effectively causing a hard fork. For the days following the vote, the price of Ethereum rose from $11.65 on July 15, 2016 to $14.66 on July 21, 2016, the day after the first Ethereum Classic block was mined. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ETH at the time of announcement or adoption. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash Network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash Network that eliminated the Founders’ Reward. For the days following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZEC fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash Network launch on October 28, 2016. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ETH at the time of announcement or adoption.

A future fork in or clone of the Ethereum Network could adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.

In addition to forks, a digital asset may become subject to a similar occurrence known as an “airdrop.” In an airdrop, the promoters of a new digital asset announce to holders of another digital asset that such holders will be entitled to claim a certain amount of the new digital asset for free, based on the fact that they hold such other digital asset. We refer to the right to receive any such benefit as an “Incidental Right” and any such virtual currency acquired through an Incidental Right as “IR Virtual Currency.” Shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks, the Trust may not choose, or be able, to participate in an airdrop, and the timing of receiving any benefits from a fork, airdrop or similar event is uncertain.

For example, on September 16, 2022, the Sponsor of the Trust announced that it had declared a distribution and established a record date for the distribution, to shareholders of record as of the close of business on September 26, 2022 (the “Record Date”), of the Incidental Right to the ETH Proof of Work tokens (“ETHPoW”) held by the Trust. On the Record Date, the Trust, acting on behalf of the Record Date Shareholders and pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement governing the Trust, appointed Grayscale Investments, LLC as agent to act on behalf of the Record Date Shareholders and transferred the Incidental Rights to ETHPoW tokens held by the Trust to Grayscale Investments, LLC, in its capacity as agent. As of the Record Date, the Trust determined such Incidental Rights to have a fair value of $0 and no gain or loss was recognized as part of the Incidental Rights distribution, due to the lack of a trading venue accessible to the Authorized Participant of the Trust and uncertainty regarding the ability to safely access and custody the ETHPoW.

Moreover, there are likely to be operational, tax, securities law, regulatory, legal and practical issues that significantly limit, or prevent entirely, shareholders’ ability to realize a benefit, through their Shares in the Trust, from any such Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. For instance, the Custodian may not agree to provide access to the IR Virtual Currency. In addition, the Sponsor may determine that there is no safe or practical way to custody the IR Virtual Currency, or that trying to do so may pose an unacceptable risk to the Trust’s holdings in ETH, or that the costs of taking possession and/or maintaining ownership of the IR Virtual Currency exceed the benefits of owning the IR Virtual Currency. Additionally, laws, regulation or other factors may prevent shareholders from benefitting from the Incidental Right or IR Virtual Currency even if there is a safe and practical way to custody and secure the IR Virtual Currency. For example, it may be illegal to sell or otherwise dispose of the Incidental Right or IR Virtual Currency, or there may not be a suitable market into which the Incidental Right or IR Virtual Currency can be sold (immediately after the fork or airdrop, or ever). The Sponsor may also determine, in consultation with its legal advisers, that the Incidental Right or IR Virtual Currency is, or is likely to be deemed, a security under federal or state securities laws. In such a case, the Sponsor would irrevocably abandon, as of any date on which the Trust creates Shares, such Incidental Right or IR Virtual Currency if holding it would have an adverse effect on the Trust and it would not be practicable to avoid such effect by disposing of the Incidental Right or IR Virtual Currency in a manner that would result in shareholders receiving more than insignificant value thereof. In making such a determination, the Sponsor expects to take into account a number of factors, including the various definitions of a “security” under the federal securities laws and federal court decisions interpreting elements of these definitions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, as well as reports, orders, press releases, public statements and speeches by the SEC and its staff providing guidance on when a digital asset may be a security for purposes of the federal securities laws.

The Trust has informed the Custodian that it is irrevocably abandoning, as of any date on which the Trust creates Shares, any Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency to which it would otherwise be entitled as of such date and with respect to which it has not taken any Affirmative Action at or prior to such date. In order to avert abandonment of an Incidental Right or IR Virtual Currency, the Trust will send a notice to the Custodian of its intention to retain such Incidental Right or IR Virtual Currency. The Sponsor intends to evaluate each future fork or airdrop on a case-by-case basis in consultation with the Trust’s legal advisers, tax consultants and Custodian. Any inability to recognize the economic benefit of a hard fork or airdrop could adversely affect the value of the Shares. See “Item 1. Business—Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency.”

In the event of a hard fork of the Ethereum Network, the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, use its discretion to determine, in good faith, which peer-to-peer network, among a group of incompatible forks of the Ethereum Network, is generally accepted as the Ethereum Network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes. The Sponsor will base its determination on a variety of then relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the Sponsor’s beliefs regarding expectations of the core developers of ETH, users, services, businesses, validators and other constituencies, as well as the actual continued acceptance of, validating power on, and community engagement with, the Ethereum Network. There is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork, and the Sponsor’s decision may adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result. The Sponsor may also disagree with shareholders, security vendors and the Index Provider on what is generally accepted as ETH and should therefore be considered “ETH” for the Trust’s purposes, which may also adversely affect the value of the Shares as a result.

Any name change and any associated rebranding initiative by the core developers of ETH may not be favorably received by the digital asset community, which could negatively impact the value of ETH and the value of the Shares.

From time to time, digital assets may undergo name changes and associated rebranding initiatives. For example, Bitcoin Cash may sometimes be referred to as Bitcoin ABC in an effort to differentiate itself from any Bitcoin Cash hard forks, such as Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision, and in the third quarter of 2018, the team behind ZEN rebranded and changed the name of ZenCash to “Horizen.” We cannot predict the impact of any name change and any associated rebranding initiative on ETH. After a name change and an associated rebranding initiative, a digital asset may not be able to achieve or maintain brand name recognition or status that is comparable to the recognition and status previously enjoyed by such digital asset. The failure of any name change and any associated rebranding initiative by a digital asset may result in such digital asset not realizing some or all of the anticipated benefits contemplated by the name change and associated rebranding initiative, and could negatively impact the value of ETH and the value of the Shares.

If the Ethereum Network is used to facilitate illicit activities, businesses that facilitate transactions in ETH could be at increased risk of criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having services cut off, which could negatively affect the price of ETH and the value of the Shares.

Digital asset networks have in the past been, and may continue to be, used to facilitate illicit activities. If the Ethereum Network is used to facilitate illicit activities, businesses that facilitate transactions in ETH could be at increased risk of potential criminal or civil lawsuits, or of having banking or other services cut off, if there is a concern that certain smart contracts on the Ethereum Network could interfere with the performance of anti-money laundering activities and economic sanctions checks. There is also a risk that digital asset trading platforms may remove ETH from their platforms as a result of these concerns. Other service providers of such businesses may also cut off services if there is a concern that the Ethereum Network is being used to facilitate crime. Any of the aforementioned occurrences could increase regulatory scrutiny of the Ethereum Network and/or adversely affect the price of ETH, the attractiveness of the Ethereum Network and an investment in the Shares of the Trust.

When the Trust and the Sponsor, acting on behalf of the Trust, sell or deliver, as applicable, ETH, Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency, they generally do not transact directly with counterparties other than the Authorized Participant, a Liquidity Provider or other similarly eligible financial institutions that are subject to federal and state licensing requirements and maintain practices and policies designed to comply with AML and KYC regulations. When an Authorized Participant or Liquidity Provider sources ETH in connection with the creation of the Shares or facilitates transactions in ETH at the direction of the Trust or the Sponsor, it directly faces its counterparty and, in all instances, the Authorized Participant or Liquidity Provider, as applicable, follow policies and procedures designed to ensure that it knows the identity of its counterparty. The Authorized Participant is a registered broker-dealer and therefore subject to AML and countering the financing of terrorism obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act as administered by FinCEN and further overseen by the SEC and FINRA.

Further, in March 2023, the FDIC accepted Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank into receivership. Also, in March 2023, Silvergate Bank announced plans to wind down and liquidate its operations. Following these events, a number of companies that provide digital asset-related services have been unable to find banks that are willing to provide them with bank accounts and banking services. Although these events did not have a material impact on the Trust or the Sponsor, it is possible that a future closing of a bank with which the Trust or the Sponsor has a financial relationship could subject the Trust or the Sponsor to adverse conditions and pose challenges in finding an alternative suitable bank to provide the Trust or the Sponsor with bank accounts and banking services.

Continued disruption and instability in the digital asset markets as these events develop, including further declines in the trading prices and liquidity of ETH, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.

The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of ETH, the value of which may be highly volatile and subject to fluctuations due to a number of factors.

The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of the ETH held by the Trust and fluctuations in the price of ETH could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The market price of ETH may be highly volatile, and subject to a number of factors, including:

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An increase in the global ETH supply;

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The adoption of ETH as a medium of exchange, store-of-value or other consumptive asset and the maintenance and development of the open-source software protocol of the Ethereum Network;

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Forks in the Ethereum Network;

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Investors’ expectations with respect to interest rates, the rates of inflation of fiat currencies or ETH, and digital asset trading platform rates;

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Consumer preferences and perceptions of ETH specifically and digital assets generally;

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Investment and trading activities of large investors that invest directly or indirectly in ETH;

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A “short squeeze” resulting from speculation on the price of ETH, if aggregate short exposure exceeds the number of Shares available for purchase;

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An active derivatives market for ETH or for digital assets generally;

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A determination that ETH is a security or changes in ETH’s status under the federal securities laws;

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Monetary policies of governments, trade restrictions, currency devaluations and revaluations and regulatory measures or enforcement actions, if any, that restrict the use of ETH as a form of payment or the purchase of ETH on the Digital Asset Markets;

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Fees associated with processing an ETH transaction and the speed at which ETH transactions are settled;

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The Trust’s own acquisitions or dispositions of ETH, since there is no limit on the number of ETH that the Trust may acquire.

In addition, there is no assurance that ETH will maintain its value in the long or intermediate term. In the event that the price of ETH declines, the Sponsor expects the value of the Shares to decline proportionately.

The value of an ETH as represented by the Index Price or by the Trust’s principal market may also be subject to momentum pricing due to speculation regarding future appreciation in value, leading to greater volatility that could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Momentum pricing typically is associated with growth stocks and other assets whose valuation, as determined by the investing public, accounts for future appreciation in value, if any. The Sponsor believes that momentum pricing of ETH has resulted, and may continue to result, in speculation regarding future appreciation in the value of ETH, inflating and making the Index Price more volatile. As a result, ETH may be more likely to fluctuate in value due to changing investor confidence, which could impact future appreciation or depreciation in the Index Price and could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of Digital Asset Trading Platforms, they may experience fraud, market manipulation, business failures, security failures or operational problems, which may adversely affect the value of ETH and, consequently, the value of the Shares.

Digital Asset Trading Platforms are relatively new and, in many ways, unregulated. While many prominent Digital Asset Trading Platforms provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management teams, corporate practices and regulatory compliance, many other Digital Asset Trading Platforms do not provide this information. Furthermore, while Digital Asset Trading Platforms are and may continue to be subject to federal and state licensing requirements in the United States, Digital Asset Trading Platforms do not appear to be subject to regulation in a similar manner as other regulated trading platforms, such as national securities exchanges or designated contract markets. As a result, the marketplace may lose confidence in Digital Asset Trading Platforms, including prominent trading platforms that handle a significant volume of ETH trading.

The SEC has also identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the Digital Asset Markets generally, including, among others (1) “wash-trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in ETH manipulating ETH pricing; (3) hacking of the Ethereum Network and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the Ethereum Network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in ETH, new sources of demand for ETH) or based on the dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins,” including Tether; and (7) fraud and manipulation at Digital Asset Markets. The use or presence of such acts and practices in the Digital Asset Markets could, for example, falsely inflate the volume of ETH present in the Digital Asset Markets or cause distortions in the price of ETH, among other things that could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to shareholders. Moreover, tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities, such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-trading, may not be available to or employed by Digital Asset Markets, or may not exist at all. Many Digital Asset Markets also lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers. As a result, the prices of ETH on Digital Asset Markets may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges.

In addition, over the past several years, some Digital Asset Trading Platforms have been closed, been subject to criminal and civil litigation and have entered into bankruptcy proceedings due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure and/or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such Digital Asset Trading Platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such Digital Asset Trading Platforms. While smaller Digital Asset Trading Platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger Digital Asset Trading Platforms more stable, larger Digital Asset

Trading Platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and their shortcomings or ultimate failures are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, and therefore may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, in February 2014, Mt. Gox, the largest Digital Asset Trading Platform at the time, halted withdrawals of Bitcoin and subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan following a hack that resulted in the loss of several hundred thousand Bitcoin. In the two weeks following the halt of Bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one Bitcoin fell on other trading platforms from around $795 to $578. Failure and shortcomings of large Digital Asset Trading Platforms have since continued; in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 Bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets, and in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 Bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex. The value of Bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. Regulatory enforcement actions have followed, such as in July 2017, when FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct Digital Asset Trading Platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based digital asset trading platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. In January 2018, the Japanese digital asset trading platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian digital asset trading platform, Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. More recently, in November 2022, FTX, another of the world’s largest Digital Asset Trading Platforms, filed for bankruptcy protection and subsequently halted customer withdrawals as well as trading on its FTX.US platform. While details and events surrounding the failure continue to develop, and it is unclear what the eventual impacts of its bankruptcy will be, it appears that fraud, security failures and operational problems all played a role in FTX’s issues. Moreover, Digital Asset Trading Platforms have been a subject of enhanced regulatory and enforcement scrutiny, and Digital Asset Markets have experienced continued instability, following the failure of FTX. In particular, in June 2023, the SEC brought the Binance Complaint and Coinbase Complaint, alleging that Binance and Coinbase operated unregistered securities exchanges, brokerages and clearing agencies. In addition, in November 2023, the SEC brought the Kraken Complaint, alleging that Kraken operated as an unregistered securities exchange, brokerage and clearing agency.

Negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the Digital Asset Markets and/or the closure or temporary shutdown of Digital Asset Trading Platforms due to fraud, business failure, security breaches or government mandated regulation, and associated losses by customers, may reduce confidence in the Ethereum Network and result in greater volatility in the prices of ETH. Furthermore, the closure or temporary shutdown of a Digital Asset Trading Platform used in calculating the Index Price may result in a loss of confidence in the Trust’s ability to determine its NAV on a daily basis. These potential consequences of such a Digital Asset Trading Platform’s failure could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Digital Asset Trading Platforms may be susceptible to “front-running,” which refers to the process when someone uses technology or market advantage to get prior knowledge of upcoming transactions. Front-running is a frequent activity on centralized as well as decentralized exchanges. By using bots functioning on a millisecond-scale timeframe, bad actors are able to take advantage of the forthcoming price movement and make economic gains at the cost of those who had introduced these transactions. The objective of a front runner is to buy tokens at a low price and later sell them at a higher price while simultaneously exiting the position. To the extent that front-running occurs, it may result in investor frustrations and concerns as to the price integrity of Digital Asset Trading Platforms and digital assets more generally.

Digital Asset Trading Platforms may be susceptible to wash trading. Wash trading occurs when offsetting trades are entered into for other than bona fide reasons, such as the desire to inflate reported trading volumes. Wash trading may be motivated by non-economic reasons, such as a desire for increased visibility on popular websites that monitor markets for digital assets so as to improve an exchange’s attractiveness to investors who look for maximum liquidity, or it may be motivated by the ability to attract listing fees from token issuers who seek the most liquid and high-volume exchanges on which to list their tokens. Results of wash trading may include unexpected obstacles to trade and erroneous investment decisions based on false information.

Even in the United States, there have been allegations of wash trading even on regulated venues. Any actual or perceived false trading on Digital Asset Trading Platforms, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of Bitcoin and/or negatively affect the market perception of ETH.

To the extent that wash trading either occurs or appears to occur in Digital Asset Trading Platforms, investors may develop negative perceptions about ETH and the digital assets industry more broadly, which could adversely impact the price of ETH and, therefore, the price of the Shares. Wash trading also may place more legitimate Digital Asset Trading Platforms at a relative competitive disadvantage.

The Index has a limited history and the Index Price is a composite reference rate calculated using trading price data from various Digital Asset Trading Platforms chosen by the Index Provider. The Digital Asset Trading Platforms chosen by the Index Provider have also changed over time. For example, on January 28, 2023, the Index Provider added Binance.US to the Index due to the trading platform meeting the minimum liquidity requirement, and did not remove any Constituent Trading Platforms as part of its scheduled quarterly review. On June 17, 2023, the Index Provider removed Binance.US from the Index due to Binance.US’s announcement that the trading platform was suspending U.S. dollar (“USD”) deposits and withdrawals and planned to delist its USD trading pairs, and did not add any Constituent Trading Platforms as part of its review. On October 28, 2023, the Index Provider added Crypto.com to the Index due to the trading platform meeting the minimum liquidity requirement, and did not remove any Constituent Trading Platforms as part of its scheduled quarterly review. The Index Provider may remove or add Digital Asset Trading Platforms to the Index in the future at its discretion. For more information on the inclusion criteria for Digital Asset Trading Platforms in the Index, see “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ETH Industry and Market—ETH Value—The Index and the Index Price.”

Although the Index is designed to accurately capture the market price of ETH, third parties may be able to purchase and sell ETH on public or private markets not included among the constituent Digital Asset Trading Platforms of the Index, and such transactions may take place at prices materially higher or lower than the Index Price. Moreover, there may be variances in the prices of ETH on the various Digital Asset Trading Platforms, including as a result of differences in fee structures or administrative procedures on different Digital Asset Trading Platforms. For example, based on data provided by the Index Provider, on any given day during the year ended December 31, 2023, the maximum differential between the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot price of any single Digital Asset Trading Platform included in the Index and the Index Price was 2.76% and the average of the maximum differentials of the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot price of each Digital Asset Trading Platform included in the Index and the Index Price was 0.75%. During this same period, the average differential between the 4:00 p.m., New York time spot prices of all the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index and the Index Price was 0.012%. All Digital Asset Trading Platforms that were included in the Index throughout the period were considered in this analysis. To the extent such prices differ materially from the Index Price, investors may lose confidence in the Shares’ ability to track the market price of ETH, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

The Index Price used to calculate the value of the Trust’s ETH may be volatile, and purchasing activity in the Digital Asset Markets associated with Basket creations may affect the Index Price and Share trading prices, adversely affecting the value of the Shares.

The price of ETH on public Digital Asset Trading Platforms has a very limited history, and during this history, ETH prices on the Digital Asset Markets more generally, and on Digital Asset Trading Platforms individually, have been volatile and subject to influence by many factors, including operational interruptions. While the Index is designed to limit exposure to the interruption of individual Digital Asset Trading Platforms, the Index Price, and the price of ETH generally, remains subject to volatility experienced by Digital Asset Trading Platforms, and such volatility could adversely affect the value of the Shares. For example, from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023, the Index Price ranged from $102.84 to $4,776.32, with the straight average being $1,408.44 through December 31, 2023. In addition, during the year ended December 31, 2023, the Index Price ranged from $1,200.90 to $2,375.87. The Sponsor has not observed a material difference between the Index Price and average prices from the constituent Digital Asset Trading Platforms individually or as a group. The price of ETH more generally has experienced volatility similar to the Index Price during these periods. For additional information on movement of the Index Price and the price of ETH, see “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations—Historical NAV and ETH Prices.”

Furthermore, because the number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms is limited, the Index will necessarily be composed of a limited number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms. If a Digital Asset Trading Platform were subjected to regulatory, volatility or other pricing issues, the Index Provider would have limited ability to remove such Digital Asset Trading Platform from the Index, which could skew the price of ETH as represented by the Index. Trading on a limited number of Digital Asset Trading Platforms may result in less favorable prices and decreased liquidity of ETH and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares.

Purchasing activity associated with acquiring ETH required for the creation of Baskets may increase the market price of ETH on the Digital Asset Markets, which will result in higher prices for the Shares. Increases in the market price of ETH may also occur as a result of the purchasing activity of other market participants. Other market participants may attempt to benefit from an increase in the market price of ETH that may result from increased purchasing activity of ETH connected with the issuance of Baskets. Consequently, the market price of ETH may decline immediately after Baskets are created. Decreases in the market price of ETH may also occur as a result of sales in Secondary Markets by other market participants. If the Index Price declines, the value of the Shares will generally also decline.

Competition from the emergence or growth of other digital assets or methods of investing in ETH could have a negative impact on the price of ETH and adversely affect the value of the Shares.

As of December 31, 2023, ETH was the second largest digital asset by market capitalization, as tracked by CoinMarketCap.com. As of December 31, 2023, the alternative digital assets tracked by CoinMarketCap.com had a total market capitalization of approximately $1,518.3 billion (including the approximately $274 billion market cap of ETH), as calculated using market prices and total available supply of each digital asset, excluding tokens pegged to other assets. In addition, many consortiums and financial institutions are also researching and investing resources into private or permissioned smart contracts platforms rather than open platforms like the Ethereum Network. Competition from the emergence or growth of alternative digital assets and smart contracts platforms, such as Solana, Avalanche or Cardano, could have a negative impact on the demand for, and price of, ETH and thereby adversely affect the value of the Shares.

In addition, some digital asset networks, including the Ethereum Network, may be the target of ill will from users of other digital asset networks. For example, in July 2016, the Ethereum Network underwent a contentious hard fork that resulted in the creation of a new digital asset network called Ethereum Classic. As a result, some users of the Ethereum Classic Network may harbor ill will toward the Ethereum Network. These users may attempt to negatively impact the use or adoption of the Ethereum Network. For additional information on the hard fork that resulted in the creation of Ethereum Classic, see “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ETH Industry and Market—Introduction to ETH and the Ethereum Network—The DAO and Ethereum Classic.”

Investors may invest in ETH through means other than the Shares, including through direct investments in ETH and other potential financial vehicles, possibly including securities backed by or linked to ETH and digital asset financial vehicles similar to the Trust. Market and financial conditions, and other conditions beyond the Sponsor’s control, may make it more attractive to invest in other financial vehicles or to invest in ETH directly, which could limit the market for, and reduce the liquidity of, the Shares. In addition, to the extent digital asset financial vehicles other than the Trust tracking the price of ETH are formed and represent a significant proportion of the demand for ETH, large purchases or redemptions of the securities of these digital asset financial vehicles, or private funds holding ETH, could negatively affect the Index Price, the NAV, the value of the Shares, the Principal Market NAV and the Principal Market NAV per Share. Moreover, any reduced demand for Shares of the Trust may cause the Shares of the Trust to trade at a discount to the NAV per Share.

Prices of ETH may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and U.S. Dollar Coin (“USDC”)), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment.

Given the role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their fundamental liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for ETH. Because a large portion of the digital asset market still depends on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC, there is a risk that a disorderly de-pegging or a run on Tether or USDC could lead to dramatic market volatility in, and/or materially and adversely affect the prices of, digital assets more broadly.

Volatility in stablecoins, operational issues with stablecoins (for example, technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns about the sufficiency of any reserves that support stablecoins, or regulatory concerns about stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, such as Bitcoin spot markets, that support stablecoins, could impact individuals’ willingness to trade on trading venues that rely on stablecoins and could impact the price of ETH, and in turn, an investment in the Shares.

Failure of funds that hold digital assets or that have exposure to digital assets through derivatives to receive SEC approval to list their shares on exchanges could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

There have been a growing number of attempts to list on national securities exchanges the shares of funds that hold digital assets or that have exposures to digital assets through derivatives. These investment vehicles attempt to provide institutional and retail investors exposure to markets for digital assets and related products. With the exception of funds that hold Bitcoin and certain Ethereum-based derivatives, the SEC has repeatedly denied such requests. In January 2018, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management outlined several questions that sponsors would be expected to address before the SEC will consider granting approval for funds holding “substantial amounts” of cryptocurrencies or “cryptocurrency-related products.” The questions, which focus on specific requirements of the Investment Company Act, generally fall into one of five key areas: valuation, liquidity, custody, arbitrage and potential manipulation. The SEC has not explicitly stated whether each of the questions set forth would also need to be addressed by entities with similar products and investment strategies that instead pursue registered offerings under the Securities Act, although such entities would need to comply with the registration and prospectus disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. After several years of the SEC denying requests to list shares of various digital asset funds holding Bitcoin on national securities exchanges, including the request to list the shares of Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) on NYSE Arca in June 2022, the Sponsor petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the SEC’s final order denying approval to list shares of Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) on NYSE Arca as an exchange-traded product. In August 2023, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Sponsor’s petition and vacated the SEC’s order as arbitrary and capricious. The SEC did not seek panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. In October 2023, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the SEC. Ultimately, on January 10, 2024, the SEC approved NYSE Arca’s 19b-4 application to list the shares of the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) on NYSE Arca as an exchange-traded product, as well as requests to list shares of various other digital asset funds holding Bitcoin on national securities exchanges.

On October 2, 2023, NYSE Arca filed an application with the SEC pursuant to Rule 19b-4 under the Exchange Act to list the Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca. As of the date of this filing, the NYSE Arca 19b-4 application has not been approved by the SEC and the Trust has not obtained relief from the SEC under Regulation M, and the Trust makes no representation as to when or if such approval and relief will be obtained. Even though NYSE Arca’s request with respect to Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) was approved, there is no guarantee that a similar application to list Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca, or another national securities exchange, will also be approved. In particular, Bitcoin is the only digital asset that the SEC has publicly indicated it does not currently view as a security and the SEC is unlikely to approve a request to list the shares of a spot exchange-traded product that holds a digital asset that the SEC believes is a security. Moreover, even if the SEC took the view that a digital asset was not a security, based on prior spot exchange-traded product disapprovals, the existence of a CFTC-regulated futures market for the relevant digital asset would be central to the SEC’s approval of any request to list the shares of a spot exchange-traded product holding such digital asset. As of the date hereof, there are only CFTC-regulated futures markets for Bitcoin and Ethereum. As such, significant barriers to regulatory approval for any request to list the shares of other digital asset investment vehicles, including the Shares of the Trust, remain, and investors should not assume that approval of a spot Bitcoin exchange-traded product would subsequently lead to approval of spot exchange-traded products holding other digital assets, such as the Trust. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will be successful in listing the Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca.

The exchange listing of shares of digital asset funds would create more opportunities for institutional and retail investors to invest in the digital asset market. If exchange-listing requests continue to be denied by the SEC, increased investment interest by institutional or retail investors could fail to materialize, which could reduce the demand for digital assets generally and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares.

The Trust relies on third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to the affairs of the Trust and the replacement of such service providers could pose a challenge to the safekeeping of the Trust’s ETH and to the operations of the Trust.

The Trust relies on the Custodian, the Authorized Participant and other third-party service providers to perform certain functions essential to managing the affairs of the Trust. In addition, the Authorized Participant may rely on one or more Liquidity Providers to source ETH in connection with the creation of Shares. Any disruptions to such service providers’ business operations, resulting from business failures, financial instability, security failures, government mandated regulation or operational problems could have an adverse impact on the Trust’s ability to access critical services and be disruptive to the operations of the Trust and require the Sponsor to replace such service provider. Moreover, the Sponsor could decide to replace a service provider to the Trust, or a Liquidity Provider could be replaced for other reasons.

If the Sponsor decides, or is required, to replace Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC as the custodian of the Trust’s ETH, transferring maintenance responsibilities of the Digital Asset Account to another party will likely be complex and could subject the Trust’s ETH to the risk of loss during the transfer, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets.

Moreover, the legal rights of customers with respect to digital assets held on their behalf by a third-party custodian, such as the Custodian, in insolvency proceedings are currently uncertain. The Custodian Agreement contains an agreement by the parties to treat the digital assets credited to the Trust’s Digital Asset Account as financial assets under Article 8 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code (“Article 8”), in addition to stating that the Custodian will serve as fiduciary and custodian on the Trust’s behalf. The Custodian’s parent, Coinbase Global Inc., has stated in its public securities filings that in light of the inclusion in its custody agreements of provisions relating to Article 8 it believes that a court would not treat custodied digital assets as part of its general estate in the event the Custodian were to experience insolvency. However, due to the novelty of digital asset custodial arrangements courts have not yet considered this type of treatment for custodied digital assets and it is not possible to predict with certainty how they would rule in such a scenario. If the Custodian became subject to insolvency proceedings and a court were to rule that the custodied digital assets were part of the Custodian’s general estate and not the property of the Trust, then the Trust would be treated as a general unsecured creditor in the Custodian’s insolvency proceedings and the Trust could be subject to the loss of all or a significant portion of its assets.

To the extent that Sponsor is not able to find a suitable party willing to serve as the custodian, the Sponsor may be required to terminate the Trust and liquidate the Trust’s ETH. In addition, to the extent that the Sponsor finds a suitable party and must enter into a modified Custodian Agreement that is less favorable for the Trust or Sponsor and/or transfer the Trust’s assets in a relatively short time period, the safekeeping of the Trust’s ETH may be adversely affected, which may in turn adversely affect value of the Shares. Likewise, if the Sponsor and/or the Authorized Participant is required to replace any other service provider, they may not be able to find a party willing to serve in such capacity in a timely manner or at all. If the Sponsor decides, or is required, to replace the Authorized Participant and/or if a Liquidity Provider is replaced or required to be replaced, this could negatively impact the Trust’s ability to create new Shares, which would impact the Shares’ liquidity and could have a negative impact on the value of the Shares.

Because of the holding period under Rule 144, the lack of an ongoing redemption program and the Trust’s ability to halt creations from time to time, there is no arbitrage mechanism to keep the value of the Shares closely linked to the Index Price and the Shares have historically traded at a substantial premium over, or a substantial discount to, the NAV per Share.

Shares purchased in the private placement are subject to a holding period under Rule 144. Pursuant to Rule 144, the minimum holding period for Shares purchased in the private placement is six months. In addition, the Trust does not currently operate an ongoing redemption program and may halt creations from time to time. As a result, the Trust cannot rely on arbitrage opportunities resulting from differences between the value of the Shares and the price of ETH to keep the value of the Shares closely linked to the Index Price. As a result, the value of the Shares of the Trust may not approximate the value of the Trust’s NAV per Share or meet the Trust’s investment objective, and may trade at a substantial premium over, or substantial discount to, the value of the Trust’s NAV per Share. For example, in the past, the price of the Shares as quoted on OTCQX varied significantly from the NAV per Share due to these factors, among others, and has historically traded at a substantial premium over, or a substantial discount to, the NAV per Share.

The Shares may trade at a price that is at, above or below the Trust’s NAV per Share as a result of the non-current trading hours between OTCQX and the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market.

The Trust’s NAV per Share will fluctuate with changes in the market value of ETH, and the Sponsor expects the trading price of the Shares to fluctuate in accordance with changes in the Trust’s NAV per Share, as well as market supply and demand. However, the Shares may trade on OTCQX at, above or below the Trust’s NAV per Share for a variety of reasons. For example, OTCQX is open for trading in the Shares for a limited period each day, but the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market is a 24-hour marketplace. During periods when OTCQX is closed but Digital Asset Trading Platforms are open, significant changes in the price of ETH on the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market could result in a difference in performance between the value of ETH as measured by the Index and the most recent NAV per Share or closing trading price. For example, if the price of ETH on the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market, and the value of ETH as measured by the Index, moves significantly in a negative direction after the close of OTCQX, the trading price of the Shares may “gap” down to the full extent of such negative price shift when OTCQX reopens. If the price of ETH on the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market drops significantly during hours OTCQX is closed, shareholders may not be able to sell their Shares until after the “gap” down has been fully realized, resulting in an inability to mitigate losses in a rapidly negative market. Even during periods when OTCQX is open, large Digital Asset Trading Platforms (or a substantial number of smaller Digital Asset Trading Platforms) may be lightly traded or closed for any number of reasons, which could increase trading spreads and widen any premium or discount on the Shares.

Historically, the Shares have traded at both premiums and discounts to the NAV per Share, which at times have been substantial. If the Shares trade at a premium, investors who purchase Shares on OTCQX will pay more for their Shares than investors who purchase Shares directly from Authorized Participants. In contrast, if the Shares trade on OTCQX at a discount, investors who purchase Shares directly from Authorized Participants will pay more for their Shares than investors who purchase Shares on OTCQX. The premium or discount at which the Shares have traded has fluctuated over time. From June 20, 2019 to December 31, 2023, the maximum premium of the closing price of the Shares quoted on OTCQX over the value of the Trust’s NAV per Share was 956%, the average premium was 191%, the maximum discount of the closing price of the Shares quoted on OTCQX below the value of the Trust’s NAV per Share was 60%, and the average discount was 26%. The closing price of the Shares, as quoted on OTCQX at 4:00 p.m., New York time, on each business day between June 20, 2019 and December 31, 2023, has been quoted at a discount on 711 days. As of December 29, 2023, the last business day of the period, the Trust’s Shares were quoted on OTCQX at a discount of 12% to the Trust’s NAV per Share. As a result, shareholders who purchase Shares on OTCQX may suffer a loss on their investment if they sell their Shares at a time when the premium has decreased from the premium at which they purchased the Shares even if the NAV per Share remains the same. Likewise, shareholders that purchase Shares directly from the Trust may suffer a loss on their investment if they sell their Shares at a time when the Shares are trading at a discount on OTCQX. Furthermore, shareholders may suffer a loss on their investment even if the NAV per Share increases because the decrease in any premium or increase in any discount may offset any increase in the NAV per Share.

The Sponsor’s Fee accrues daily in U.S. dollars at an annual rate based on the NAV Fee Basis Amount, which is based on the NAV of the Trust, and is paid to the Sponsor in ETH. See “Item 1. Business—Valuation of ETH and Determination of NAV—Disposition of ETH, Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency” and “Item 1. Business—Activities of the Trust—Hypothetical Expense Example.” As a result, the amount of Trust’s assets represented by each Share declines as the Trust pays the Sponsor’s Fee (or sells ETH in order to raise cash to pay any Additional Trust Expenses), which may cause the Shares to decrease in value over time or dampen any increase in value.

The value of the Shares may be influenced by a variety of factors unrelated to the value of ETH.

The value of the Shares may be influenced by a variety of factors unrelated to the price of ETH and the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index that may have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. These factors include the following factors:

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Unanticipated problems or issues with respect to the mechanics of the Trust’s operations and the trading of the Shares may arise, in particular due to the fact that the mechanisms and procedures governing the creation and offering of the Shares and storage of ETH have been developed specifically for this product;

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The Trust could experience unforeseen issues relating to the performance and effectiveness of the security procedures used to protect the Digital Asset Account, or the security procedures may not protect against all errors, software flaws or other vulnerabilities in the Trust’s technical infrastructure, which could result in theft, loss or damage of its assets; or

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Although the Ethereum Network does not have any privacy enhancing features at this time, if any such features are introduced to the Ethereum Network in the future, service providers may decide to terminate their relationships with the Trust due to concerns that the introduction of privacy enhancing features to the Ethereum Network may increase the potential for ETH to be used to facilitate crime, exposing such service providers to potential reputational harm.

The restrictions on transfer and redemption may result in losses on the value of the Shares.

Shares purchased in the private placement may not be resold except in transactions exempt from registration under the Securities Act and state securities laws, and any such transaction must be approved in advance by the Sponsor. In determining whether to grant approval, the Sponsor will specifically look at whether the conditions of Rule 144 under the Securities Act and any other applicable laws have been met. Any attempt to sell Shares without the approval of the Sponsor in its sole discretion will be void ab initio. See “Item 1. Business—Description of the Shares—Transfer Restrictions” for more information.

At this time the Sponsor is not accepting redemption requests from shareholders, and the Trust must obtain relief from the SEC under Regulation M in order to do so. The Trust has not sought such relief as of the date of this Annual Report, and even if such relief is sought in the future, no assurance can be given as to the timing of such relief or that such relief will be granted. Therefore, unless the Trust is permitted to, and does, establish a Share redemption program, shareholders will be unable to (or could be significantly impeded in attempting to) sell or otherwise liquidate investments in the Shares, which could have a material adverse impact on demand for the Shares and their value.

Affiliates of the Trust previously entered into a settlement agreement with the SEC concerning the operation of one such affiliate’s former redemption programs.

On April 1, 2014, Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC), an affiliate of the Trust, launched a program pursuant to which its shareholders could request redemptions from Genesis, an affiliate of the Trust and the sole Authorized Participant of Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) at that time. On September 23, 2014, Genesis received a letter from the staff of the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations summarizing the staff’s findings from an onsite review of Genesis’s broker-dealer activities conducted in June 2014. In its exit report, the staff stated that it had concluded that Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC)’s redemption program, in which its shareholders were permitted to request the redemption of their shares through Genesis, appeared to violate Regulation M under the Exchange Act because such redemptions of shares took place at the same time Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) was in the process of creating shares. On July 11, 2016, Genesis and Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) entered into a settlement agreement with the SEC whereby they agreed to a cease-and-desist order against future violations of Rules 101 and 102 of Regulation M under the Exchange Act. Genesis also agreed to pay disgorgement of $51,650.11 in redemption fees it collected, plus prejudgment interest of $2,105.68, for a total of $53,755.79. The Trust currently has not sought an exemption from the SEC under Regulation M in order to instate a redemption program as of the date of this Annual Report, and even if such relief is sought in the future, no assurance can be given as to the timing of such relief or that such relief will be granted.

The Shares are qualified for public trading on OTCQX and an active trading market for the Shares has developed. However, there can be no assurance that such trading market will be maintained or continue to develop. In addition, OTCQX can halt the trading of the Shares for a variety of reasons. To the extent that OTCQX halts trading in the Shares, whether on a temporary or permanent basis, investors may not be able to buy or sell Shares, which could adversely affect the value of the Shares. If an active trading market for the Shares does not continue to exist, the market prices and liquidity of the Shares may be adversely affected.

The Sponsor is also seeking to list the Shares on NYSE Arca sometime in the future. NYSE Arca must receive approval from the SEC in order to list the Shares. The SEC has approved several futures-based Bitcoin and ETH ETFs since October 2021. The requests to list the shares of digital asset funds submitted by CBOE and the NYSE Arca in 2019 were withdrawn or received disapprovals. Subsequently, NYSE Arca and CBOE filed several new requests to list shares of various digital asset funds in 2021. Several of those requests were denied by the SEC in 2021 and 2022, including a second request by NYSE Arca to list the shares of Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC), which was denied in June 2022. In June 2023, NYSE Arca, CBOE and The Nasdaq Stock Market again submitted several new requests to list shares of various digital asset funds. The Sponsor petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the SEC’s final order denying approval to list shares of Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) on NYSE Arca as an exchange-traded product. On August 29, 2023, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Sponsor’s petition and vacated the SEC’s order as arbitrary and capricious. The SEC did not seek panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. On October 23, 2023, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the SEC. Ultimately, on January 10, 2024, the SEC approved NYSE Arca’s 19b-4 application to list the shares of the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) on NYSE Arca as an exchange-traded product, along with 19b-4 applications related to the listing of 10 other Bitcoin exchange-traded products on various exchanges. Shares of the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) began trading on NYSE Arca on January 11, 2024.

On October 2, 2023, NYSE Arca filed an application with the SEC pursuant to Rule 19b-4 under the Exchange Act to list the Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca. As of the date of this filing, the NYSE Arca 19b-4 application has not been approved by the SEC and the Trust has not obtained relief from the SEC under Regulation M, and the Trust makes no representation as to when or if such approval and relief will be obtained. Even though NYSE Arca’s request with respect to Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) was approved, there is no guarantee that a similar application to list Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca, or another national securities exchange, will also be approved. In particular, Bitcoin is the only digital asset that the SEC has publicly indicated it does not currently view as a security and the SEC is unlikely to approve a request to list the shares of a spot exchange-traded product that holds a digital asset that the SEC believes is a security. Moreover, even if the SEC took the view that a digital asset was not a security, based on prior spot exchange-traded product disapprovals, the existence of a CFTC-regulated futures market for the relevant digital asset would be central to the SEC’s approval of any request to list the shares of a spot exchange-traded product holding such digital asset. As of the date hereof, there are only CFTC-regulated futures markets for Bitcoin and Ethereum. As such, significant barriers to regulatory approval for any request to list the shares of other digital asset investment vehicles, including the Shares of the Trust, remain, and investors should not assume that approval of a spot Bitcoin exchange-traded product would subsequently lead to approval of spot exchange-traded products holding other digital assets, such as the Trust. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will be successful in listing the Shares of the Trust on NYSE Arca.

Security threats to the Digital Asset Account could result in the halting of Trust operations and a loss of Trust assets or damage to the reputation of the Trust, each of which could result in a reduction in the value of the Shares.

Security breaches, computer malware and computer hacking attacks have been a prevalent concern in relation to digital assets. The Sponsor believes that the Trust’s ETH held in the Digital Asset Account will be an appealing target to hackers or malware distributors seeking to destroy, damage or steal the Trust’s ETH and will only become more appealing as the Trust’s assets grow. To the extent that the Trust, the Sponsor or the Custodian is unable to identify and mitigate or stop new security threats or otherwise adapt to technological changes in the digital asset industry, the Trust’s ETH may be subject to theft, loss, destruction or other attack.

The Sponsor believes that the security procedures in place for the Trust, including, but not limited to, offline storage, or “cold storage”, multiple encrypted private key “shards”, usernames, passwords and 2-step verification, are reasonably designed to safeguard the Trust’s ETH. Nevertheless, the security procedures cannot guarantee the prevention of any loss due to a security breach, software defect or act of God that may be borne by the Trust.

The security procedures and operational infrastructure may be breached due to the actions of outside parties, error or malfeasance of an employee of the Sponsor, the Custodian, or otherwise, and, as a result, an unauthorized party may obtain access to a Digital Asset Account, the relevant private keys (and therefore ETH) or other data of the Trust. Additionally, outside parties may attempt to fraudulently induce employees of the Sponsor or the Custodian to disclose sensitive information in order to gain access to the Trust’s infrastructure. As the techniques used to obtain unauthorized access, disable or degrade service, or sabotage systems change frequently, or may be designed to remain dormant until a predetermined event and often are not recognized until launched against a target, the Sponsor and the Custodian may be unable to anticipate these techniques or implement adequate preventative measures.

An actual or perceived breach of a Digital Asset Account could harm the Trust’s operations, result in loss of the Trust’s assets, damage the Trust’s reputation and negatively affect the market perception of the effectiveness of the Trust, all of which could in turn reduce demand for the Shares, resulting in a reduction in the value of the Shares. The Trust may also cease operations, the occurrence of which could similarly result in a reduction in the value of the Shares.

ETH transactions are irrevocable and stolen or incorrectly transferred ETH may be irretrievable. As a result, any incorrectly executed ETH transactions could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

ETH transactions are typically not reversible without the consent and active participation of the recipient of the transaction. Once a transaction has been verified and recorded in a block that is added to the Blockchain, an incorrect transfer or theft of ETH generally will not be reversible and the Trust may not be capable of seeking compensation for any such transfer or theft. Although the Trust’s transfers of ETH will regularly be made to or from the Digital Asset Account, it is possible that, through computer or human error, or through theft or criminal action, the Trust’s ETH could be transferred from the Trust’s Digital Asset Account in incorrect amounts or to unauthorized third parties, or to uncontrolled accounts.

Such events have occurred in connection with digital assets in the past. For example, in September 2014, the Chinese Digital Asset Trading Platform Huobi announced that it had sent approximately 900 Bitcoins and 8,000 Litecoins (worth approximately $400,000 at the prevailing market prices at the time) to the wrong customers. To the extent that the Trust is unable to seek a corrective transaction with such third party or is incapable of identifying the third party which has received the Trust’s ETH through error or theft, the Trust will be unable to revert or otherwise recover incorrectly transferred ETH. The Trust will also be unable to convert or recover its ETH transferred to uncontrolled accounts. To the extent that the Trust is unable to seek redress for such error or theft, such loss could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

The lack of full insurance and shareholders’ limited rights of legal recourse against the Trust, Trustee, Sponsor, Transfer Agent and Custodian expose the Trust and its shareholders to the risk of loss of the Trust’s ETH for which no person or entity is liable.

The Trust is not a banking institution or otherwise a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) or Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) and, therefore, deposits held with or assets held by the Trust are not subject to the protections enjoyed by depositors with FDIC or SIPC member institutions. In addition, neither the Trust nor the Sponsor insure the Trust’s ETH. While the Custodian has advised the Sponsor that it has insurance coverage of up to $320 million that covers losses of the digital assets it custodies on behalf of its clients, including the Trust’s ETH, resulting from theft, shareholders cannot be assured that the Custodian will maintain adequate insurance or that such coverage will cover losses with respect to the Trust’s ETH. While the Custodian maintains certain capital reserve requirements depending on the assets under custody, and such capital reserves may provide additional means to cover client asset losses, the Sponsor does not know the amount of such capital reserves, and neither the Trust nor the Sponsor have access to such information. The Trust cannot be assured that the Custodian will maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover losses with respect to the Trust’s digital assets.

Furthermore, under the Custodian Agreement, the Custodian’s liability with respect to the Trust will never exceed the value of the ETH on deposit in the Digital Asset Account at the time of, and directly relating to, the events giving rise to the liability occurred, as determined in accordance with the Custodian Agreement. In addition, for as long as a cold storage address holds ETH with a value in excess of the Cold Storage Threshold for a period of five consecutive business days or more without being reduced to the Cold Storage Threshold or lower, the Custodian’s maximum liability for such cold storage address shall be limited to the Cold Storage Threshold. The Sponsor monitors the value of ETH deposited in cold storage addresses for whether the Cold Storage Threshold has been met by determining the U.S. dollar value of ETH deposited in each cold storage address on business days. The Custodian is not liable for any lost profits or any special, incidental, indirect, intangible, or consequential damages, whether based in contract, tort, negligence, strict liability or otherwise, and whether or not the Custodian has been advised of such losses or the Custodian knew or should have known of the possibility of such damages. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Custodian is liable to the Sponsor and the Trust for the loss of any ETH to the extent that the Custodian directly caused such loss through a breach of the Custodian Agreement, even if the Custodian meets its duty of exercising best efforts, and the Custodian is required to return to the Trust a quantity equal to the quantity of any such lost ETH. Although the Cold Storage Threshold has never been met for a given cold storage address, to the extent it is met and not reduced within five business days, the Trust would not have a claim against the Custodian with respect to the digital assets held in such address to the extent the value exceeds the Cold Storage Threshold.

The shareholders’ recourse against the Sponsor and the Trust’s other service providers for the services they provide to the Trust, including those relating to the provision of instructions relating to the movement of ETH, is limited. Consequently, a loss may be suffered with respect to the Trust’s ETH that is not covered by insurance and for which no person is liable in damages. As a result, the recourse of the Trust or the shareholders, under New York law, is limited.

If the Trust is required to terminate and liquidate, or the Sponsor determines in accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement that it is appropriate to terminate and liquidate the Trust, such termination and liquidation could occur at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders, such as when the Actual Exchange Rate of ETH is lower than the Index Price was at the time when shareholders purchased their Shares. In such a case, when the Trust’s ETH is sold as part of its liquidation, the resulting proceeds distributed to shareholders will be less than if the Actual Exchange Rate were higher at the time of sale. See “Item 1. Business—Description of the Trust Agreement—Termination of the Trust” for more information about the termination of the Trust, including when the termination of the Trust may be triggered by events outside the direct control of the Sponsor, the Trustee or the shareholders.

The Sponsor is solely responsible for determining the value of the NAV and NAV per Shareand any errors, discontinuance or changes in such valuation calculations may have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares.

The Sponsor will determine the Trust’s NAV and NAV per Share on a daily basis as soon as practicable after 4:00 p.m., New York time, on each business day. The Sponsor’s determination is made utilizing data from the operations of the Trust and the Index Price, calculated at 4:00 p.m., New York time, on such day. If the Sponsor determines in good faith that the Index does not reflect an accurate ETH price, then the Sponsor will employ an alternative method to determine the Index Price under the cascading set of rules set forth in “Item 1. Business—Overview of the ETH Industry and Market—ETH Value—The Index and the Index Price—Determination of the Index Price When Index Price is Unavailable.” In the context of applying such rules, the Sponsor may determine in good faith that the alternative method applied does not reflect an accurate ETH price and apply the next alternative method under the cascading set of rules. If the Sponsor determines after employing all of the alternative methods that the Index Price does not reflect an accurate ETH price, the Sponsor will use its best judgment to determine a good faith estimate of the Index Price.

There are no predefined criteria to make a good faith assessment in these scenarios and such decisions will be made by the Sponsor in its sole discretion. The Sponsor may calculate the Index Price in a manner that ultimately inaccurately reflects the price of ETH. To the extent that the NAV, NAV per Share or the Index Price are incorrectly calculated, the Sponsor may not be liable for any error and such misreporting of valuation data could adversely affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust. Moreover, the terms of the Trust Agreement do not prohibit the Sponsor from changing the Index Price used to calculate the NAV and NAV per Share of the Trust. Any such change in the Index Price could affect the value of the Shares and investors could suffer a substantial loss on their investment in the Trust.

In consideration for the Sponsor’s Fee, the Sponsor has contractually assumed all ordinary-course operational and periodic expenses of the Trust. See “Item 1. Business—Expenses; Sales of ETH.” Extraordinary expenses incurred by the Trust, such as taxes and governmental charges; expenses and costs of any extraordinary services performed by the Sponsor (or any other service provider) on behalf of the Trust to protect the Trust or the interests of shareholders (including in connection with any Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency); or extraordinary legal fees and expenses are not assumed by the Sponsor and are borne by the Trust. The Sponsor will cause the Trust to either (i) sell ETH, Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency held by the Trust or (ii) deliver ETH, Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency in-kind to the Sponsor to pay Trust expenses not assumed by the Sponsor on an as-needed basis. Accordingly, the Trust may be required to sell or otherwise dispose of ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency at a time when the trading prices for those assets are depressed.

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The Trust is not actively managed and no attempt will be made to protect against or to take advantage of fluctuations in the prices of ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Consequently, if the Trust incurs expenses in U.S. dollars, the Trust’s ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency may be sold at a time when the values of the disposed assets are low, resulting in a negative impact on the value of the Shares.

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Because the Trust does not generate any income, every time that the Trust pays expenses, it will deliver ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency to the Sponsor or sell ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Any sales of the Trust’s assets in connection with the payment of expenses will decrease the amount of the Trust’s assets represented by each Share each time its assets are sold or transferred to the Sponsor.

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Assuming that the Trust is a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, each delivery or sale of ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency by the Trust to pay the Sponsor’s Fee and/or Additional Trust Expenses will be a taxable event to beneficial owners of Shares. Thus, the Trust’s payment of expenses could result in beneficial owners of Shares incurring tax liability without an associated distribution from the Trust. Any such tax liability could adversely affect an investment in the Shares. See “Item 1. Business—Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.”

The Trust’s delivery or sale of ETH to pay expenses or other operations of the Trust could result in shareholders’ incurring tax liability without an associated distribution from the Trust.

Assuming that the Trust is treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, each delivery of ETH by the Trust to pay the Sponsor’s Fee or other expenses and each sale of ETH by the Trust to pay Additional Trust Expenses will be a taxable event to beneficial owners of Shares. Thus, the Trust’s payment of expenses could result in beneficial owners of Shares incurring tax liability without an associated distribution from the Trust. Any such tax liability could adversely affect an investment in the Shares. See “Item 1. Business—Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.”

The Sponsor is not aware of any intellectual property rights claims that may prevent the Trust from operating and holding ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. However, third parties may assert intellectual property rights claims relating to the operation of the Trust and the mechanics instituted for the investment in, holding of and transfer of ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Regardless of the merit of an intellectual property or other legal action, any legal expenses to defend or payments to settle such claims would be extraordinary expenses that would be borne by the Trust through the sale or transfer of its ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Additionally, a meritorious intellectual property rights claim could prevent the Trust from operating and force the Sponsor to terminate the Trust and liquidate its ETH, Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. As a result, an intellectual property rights claim against the Trust could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Pandemics, epidemics and other natural and man-made disasters could negatively impact demand for digital assets, including ETH, and disrupt the operations of many businesses, including the businesses of the Trust’s service providers. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic had serious adverse effects on the economies and financial markets of many countries, resulting in increased volatility and uncertainty in economies and financial markets of many countries and in the Digital Asset Markets. Moreover, governmental authorities and regulators throughout the world have in the past responded to major economic disruptions, including as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, with a variety of fiscal and monetary policy changes, such as quantitative easing, new monetary programs and lower interest rates. An unexpected or quick reversal of any such policies, or the ineffectiveness of such policies, could increase volatility in economies and financial market generally, and could specifically increase volatility in the Digital Asset Markets, which could adversely affect the value of ETH and the value of the Shares.

A determination that ETH or any other digital asset is a “security” may adversely affect the value of ETH and the value of the Shares, and result in potentially extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to, or termination of, the Trust.

Depending on its characteristics, a digital asset may be considered a “security” under the federal securities laws. The test for determining whether a particular digital asset is a “security” is complex and difficult to apply, and the outcome is difficult to predict. Public, though non-binding, statements by senior officials at the SEC have indicated that the SEC did not consider Bitcoin or Ethereum to be securities, and does not currently consider Bitcoin to be a security. The SEC staff has also provided informal assurances via no-action letter to a handful of promoters that their digital assets are not securities. On the other hand, the SEC has brought enforcement actions against the issuers and promoters of several other digital assets on the basis that the digital assets in question are securities. More recently, the SEC has also brought enforcement actions against digital asset trading platforms for operating unregistered securities exchanges on the basis that certain of the digital assets traded on their platforms are securities.

As part of determining whether ETH is a security for purposes of the federal securities laws, the Sponsor takes into account a number of factors, including the various definitions of “security” under the federal securities laws and federal court decisions interpreting elements of these definitions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Howey and Reves cases, as well as reports, orders, press releases, public statements and speeches by the SEC, its commissioners and its staff providing guidance on when a digital asset may be a security for purposes of the federal securities laws. Finally, the Sponsor discusses the security status of ETH with external counsel, and has received a memorandum regarding the status of ETH under the federal securities laws from external counsel and has discussed the status of ETH with external counsel and continues to believe that ETH is not a security. The Sponsor has discussed, for example, the security status of ETH with external counsel both before and after the Merge and determined that the Merge has not caused ETH to have become a security for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to, the following:

First, consistent with the holdings in recent Federal court cases involving Ripple and Terraform, the Sponsor believes that whether something is an investment contract under the Howey test is a transaction-specific assessment that does not attach to the underlying object of that transaction as the underlying object of a transaction is not itself “a contract, transaction or scheme.” The Sponsor therefore believes that a digital asset such as ETH cannot itself be an investment contract security. That remains true after the Merge.

Second, the Sponsor also believes that ETH is a consumable commodity that is not a security. ETH was used in making gas fee payments on the Ethereum Network prior to the Merge and continues to be extensively used in this capacity after the Merge. The Merge also introduced a new use for ETH as part of the new consensus mechanism, which provides further evidence that ETH is a consumable commodity and not a security.

Third, the Sponsor believes that any expectations of profit a purchaser of ETH may possess from their purchase depends on the overall market for ETH, not any identifiable “other” or issuer as required in the Howey test. Specifically, the Sponsor believes that ETH’s value derives from the supply and demand for useful applications built on the Ethereum Network. The Sponsor believes this to be the case before the Merge and continues to believe it to be the case after the Merge.

Fourth, the Sponsor believes that even if a holder of ETH expects profits based upon the action of persons directly involved in updating the Ethereum Network’s code, or in publishing new blocks of transactions on the Ethereum Network, the group of persons involved in such activities is sufficiently decentralized such that there is no “other” upon whom a purchaser could rely for Howey purposes. There were thousands of developers working on the Ethereum Network’s code before the Merge, and there continues to be today. There were thousands of miners publishing blocks on the Ethereum Network before the Merge, and there are approximately one million validators performing that role after the Merge. The Sponsor therefore believes that the Ethereum Network remains “sufficiently decentralized” and that ETH is not a security, just as a former Director of Corporation Finance of the Commission stated in June 2018.

Fifth, similar to profits that could be sought from mining under proof of work, any profits realized from validating Ethereum transactions only accrue to those who affirmatively engage in validation efforts, rather than holders of ETH more generally. Any of these profits are also based on the validator’s own efforts to engage in validation, and not the efforts of identifiable “others” more generally.

Sixth, the Sponsor believes ETH is not a security because futures contracts with ETH as the underlying asset continue to be offered by trading platforms regulated only by the CFTC, even after the Merge.

In addition, the Sponsor has considered generally whether the Merge may have caused ETH to be classified as a security under Reves or any other instrument making up the definition of “security” in the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act and concluded that it did not.

Through this process the Sponsor believes that it is applying the proper legal standards in determining that ETH is not a security in light of the uncertainties inherent in the Howeyand Reves tests. In light of these uncertainties and the fact-based nature of the analysis, the Sponsor acknowledges that the SEC may take a contrary position; and the Sponsor’s conclusion, even if reasonable under the circumstances, would not preclude legal or regulatory action based on the presence of a security.

understands that at present counsel is generally not in a position to render a legal “opinion” on the securities law status of ETH or any other particular digital asset.

As such, notwithstanding the Sponsor’s receipt of a memorandum regarding the status of ETH under the federal securities laws from external counsel and the Sponsor’s view that ETH is not a security, the SEC or a federal court may in the future take a different view as to the security status of ETH.

If the Sponsor determines that ETH is a security under the federal securities laws, whether that determination is initially made by the Sponsor itself, or because a federal court upholds an allegation that ETH is a security, the Sponsor does not intend to permit the Trust to continue holding ETH in a way that would violate the federal securities laws (and therefore would either dissolve the Trust or potentially seek to operate the Trust in a manner that complies with the federal securities laws, including the Investment Company Act). Because the legal tests for determining whether a digital asset is or is not a security often leave room for interpretation, for so long as the Sponsor believes there to be good faith grounds to conclude that the Trust’s ETH is not a security, the Sponsor does not intend to dissolve the Trust on the basis that ETH could at some future point be finally determined to be a security.

Any enforcement action by the SEC or a state securities regulator asserting that ETH is a security, or a court decision to that effect, would be expected to have an immediate material adverse impact on the trading value of ETH, as well as the Shares. This is because the business models behind most digital assets are incompatible with regulations applying to transactions in securities. If a digital asset is determined to be a security, it is likely to become difficult or impossible for the digital asset to be traded, cleared or custodied in the United States through the same channels used by non-security digital assets, which in addition to materially and adversely affecting the trading value of the digital asset is likely to significantly impact its liquidity and market participants’ ability to convert the digital asset into U.S. dollars. Any assertion that a digital asset is a security by the SEC or another regulatory authority may have similar effects.

Likewise, in the days following the announcement of the Binance Complaint and Coinbase Complaint, the price of various digital assets, including BTC and ETH, declined significantly and may continue to decline as these cases advance through the federal court system. Subsequently, in July 2023, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that while XRP is not a security, certain sales of XRP to certain buyers amounted to “investment contracts” under the Howey test. The SEC has sought an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s verdict that XRP is not a security, which appeal was denied by the district court in October 2023. Moreover, also in July 2023, another judge in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in litigation between the SEC and the issuer of the UST and LUNA digital assets, suggested that he disagreed with the approach underlying the XRP decision. The Binance Complaint, the Coinbase Complaint, the Kraken Complaint, and the SEC’s actions against XRP’s issuer and the issuer of the UST and LUNA digital assets, as well as seemingly inconsistent views of different district court judges, underscore the continuing uncertainty around which digital assets are securities, and demonstrate that such factors as how long a digital asset has been in existence, how widely held it is, how large its market capitalization is and that it has actual use in commercial transactions, ultimately may have no bearing on whether the SEC or a court will find it to be a security.

Moreover, whether or not the Sponsor or the Trust were subject to additional regulatory requirements as a result of any determination that its assets include securities, the Sponsor may nevertheless decide to terminate the Trust, in order, if possible, to liquidate the Trust’s assets while a liquid market still exists. For example, in response to the SEC’s action against the issuer of XRP, certain significant market participants announced they would no longer support XRP and announced measures, including the delisting of XRP from major digital asset trading platforms, resulting in the Sponsor’s conclusion that it was likely to be increasingly difficult for U.S. investors, including Grayscale XRP Trust (XRP), an affiliate of the Trust, to convert XRP into U.S. dollars. The Sponsor subsequently dissolved Grayscale XRP Trust (XRP) and liquidated its assets. If the SEC or a federal court were to determine that ETH is a security, it is likely that the value of the Shares of the Trust would decline significantly. Furthermore, if a federal court upholds an allegation that ETH is a security, the Trust itself may be terminated and, if practical, its assets liquidated.

Regulatory changes or actions by the U.S. Congress or any U.S. federal or state agencies may affect the value of the Shares or restrict the use of ETH, validating activity or the operation of the Ethereum Network or the Digital Asset Markets in a manner that adversely affects the value of the Shares.

Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, certain privacy-enhancing features have been, or are expected to be, introduced to a number of digital asset networks, including the Ethereum Network. These features, including those adopted by the Ethereum Network or which may be introduced on the Ethereum Network in the future, may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction-level data. Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In August 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. citizens from using Tornado Cash, a digital asset protocol designed to obfuscate blockchain transactions, by adding certain Ethereum wallet addresses associated with the protocol to its Specially Designated Nationals list. A large portion of validators globally, as well as notable industry participants such as Centre, the issuer of the USDC stablecoin, have reportedly complied with the sanctions and blacklisted the sanctioned addresses from interacting with their networks. Although no regulatory action has been taken to treat privacy-enhancing digital assets differently, this may change in the future.

Changes in SEC policy could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

The effect of any future regulatory change on the Trust or the digital assets held by the Trust is impossible to predict, but such change could be substantial and adverse to the Trust and the value of the Shares. In particular, with the exception of funds that hold Bitcoin, the SEC has not yet approved the listing on a national securities exchange of any non-futures based digital-asset focused exchange-traded fund (“ETF”). If the SEC were to approve any such ETF other than ours in the future, such an ETF may be perceived to be a superior investment product offering exposure to digital assets compared to the Trust because the value of the shares issued by such an ETF would be expected to more closely track the ETF’s net asset value than do Shares of the Trust, and investors may therefore favor investments in such ETFs over investments in the Trust. Any weakening in demand for the Shares compared to digital asset ETF shares could cause the value of the Shares to decline.

Regulatory changes or other events in foreign jurisdictions may affect the value of the Shares or restrict the use of one or more digital assets, validating activity or the operation of their networks or the Digital Asset Trading Platform Market in a manner that adversely affects the value of the Shares.

Various foreign jurisdictions have, and may continue to adopt laws, regulations or directives that affect the digital asset network, the Digital Asset Markets, and their users, particularly Digital Asset Trading Platforms and service providers that fall within such jurisdictions’ regulatory scope. For example, if China or other foreign jurisdictions were to ban or otherwise restrict validating activity, including by regulating or limiting manufacturers’ ability to produce or sell semiconductors or hard drives in connection with validating, it would have a material adverse effect on digital asset networks (including the Ethereum Network), the Digital Asset Market, and as a result, impact the value of the Shares.

Foreign laws, regulations or directives may conflict with those of the United States and may negatively impact the acceptance of one or more digital assets by users, merchants and service providers outside the United States and may therefore impede the growth or sustainability of the digital asset economy in the European Union, China, Japan, Russia and the United States and globally, or otherwise negatively affect the value of ETH. Moreover, other events, such as the interruption in telecommunications or internet services, cyber-related terrorist acts, civil disturbances, war or other catastrophes, could also negatively affect the digital asset economy in one or more jurisdictions. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 led to volatility in digital asset prices, with an initial steep decline followed by a sharp rebound in prices. The effect of any future regulatory change or other events on the Trust or ETH is impossible to predict, and such change could be substantial and adverse to the Trust and the value of the Shares.

To the extent that the activities of any Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor cause it to be deemed a “money services business” under the regulations promulgated by FinCEN, such Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor may be required to comply with FinCEN regulations, including those that would mandate the Authorized Participant to implement anti-money laundering programs, make certain reports to FinCEN and maintain certain records. Similarly, the activities of an Authorized Participant, the Trust or the Sponsor may require it to be licensed as a money transmitter or as a digital asset business, such as under the NYDFS’ BitLicense regulation.

Current and future legislation, CFTC and SEC rulemaking and other regulatory developments may impact the manner in which ETH is treated. In particular, ETH may be classified by the CFTC as a “commodity interest” under the CEA or may be classified by the SEC as a “security” under U.S. federal securities laws. The Sponsor and the Trust cannot be certain as to how future regulatory developments will impact the treatment of ETH under the law. In the face of such developments, the required registrations and compliance steps may result in extraordinary, nonrecurring expenses to the Trust. If the Sponsor decides to terminate the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances, the Trust may be dissolved or liquidated at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders.

To the extent that ETH is deemed to fall within the definition of a “commodity interest” under the CEA, the Trust and the Sponsor may be subject to additional regulation under the CEA and CFTC regulations. The Sponsor may be required to register as a commodity pool operator or commodity trading adviser with the CFTC and become a member of the National Futures Association and may be subject to additional regulatory requirements with respect to the Trust, including disclosure and reporting requirements. These additional requirements may result in extraordinary, recurring and/or nonrecurring expenses of the Trust, thereby materially and adversely impacting the Shares. If the Sponsor determines not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, the Sponsor will terminate the Trust. Any such termination could result in the liquidation of the Trust’s ETH at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders.

To the extent that ETH is determined to be a security under U.S. federal securities laws, the Trust and the Sponsor may be subject to additional requirements under the Investment Company Act and the Sponsor may be required to register as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act. Such additional registration may result in extraordinary, recurring and/or non-recurring expenses of the Trust, thereby materially and adversely impacting the Shares. If the Sponsor determines not to comply with such additional regulatory and registration requirements, the Sponsor will terminate the Trust. Any such termination could result in the liquidation of the Trust’s ETH at a time that is disadvantageous to shareholders.

If the IRS were to disagree with, and successfully challenge certain positions the Trust may take, including with respect to Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency, the Trust might not qualify as a grantor trust. In addition, the Sponsor has delivered the Pre-Creation Abandonment Notice to the Custodian stating that the Trust is irrevocably abandoning, effective immediately prior to each Creation Time, all Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency to which it would otherwise be entitled as of such time and with respect to which it has not taken any Affirmative Action at or prior to such time. There can be no complete assurance that these abandonments will be treated as effective for U.S. federal income tax purposes. If the Trust were treated as owning any asset other than ETH as of any date on which it creates Shares, it would likely cease to qualify as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes.

As discussed in the section entitled “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences—Uncertainty Regarding the U.S. Federal Income Tax Treatment of Digital Assets” below, assuming that the Trust is properly treated as a grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes, each beneficial owner of Shares will be treated for U.S. federal income tax purposes as the owner of an undivided interest in the ETH (and, if applicable, any Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency) held in the Trust. Due to the new and evolving nature of digital assets and the absence of comprehensive guidance with respect to digital assets, many significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets are uncertain.

There can be no assurance that the IRS will not alter its position with respect to digital assets in the future or that a court would uphold the treatment set forth in the Notice and the Ruling & FAQs. It is also unclear what additional guidance on the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes may be issued in the future. Any such alteration of the current IRS positions or additional guidance could result in adverse tax consequences for shareholders and could have an adverse effect on the value of ETH. Future developments that may arise with respect to digital assets may increase the uncertainty with respect to the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes. For example, the Notice addresses only digital assets that are “convertible virtual currency,” and it is conceivable that, as a result of a fork, airdrop or similar occurrence, the Trust will hold certain types of digital assets that are not within the scope of the Notice.

As discussed above, many significant aspects of the U.S. federal income tax treatment of digital assets, such as ETH, are uncertain, and it is unclear what guidance on the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal income tax purposes may be issued in the future. It is possible that any such guidance would have an adverse effect on the prices of digital assets, including on the price of ETH in the Digital Asset Markets, and therefore may have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares.

The treatment of digital assets for tax purposes by non-U.S. jurisdictions may differ from the treatment of digital assets for U.S. federal, state or local tax purposes. It is possible, for example, that a non-U.S. jurisdiction would impose sales tax or value-added tax on purchases and sales of digital assets for fiat currency. If a foreign jurisdiction with a significant share of the market of ETH users imposes onerous tax burdens on digital asset users, or imposes sales or value-added tax on purchases and sales of digital assets for fiat currency, such actions could result in decreased demand for ETH in such jurisdiction.

Any future guidance on the treatment of digital assets for state, local or non-U.S. tax purposes could increase the expenses of the Trust and could have an adverse effect on the prices of digital assets, including on the price of ETH in the Digital Asset Markets. As a result, any such future guidance could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares.

Under the guidance provided in the Ruling & FAQs, hard forks, airdrops and similar occurrences with respect to digital assets will under certain circumstances be treated as taxable events giving rise to ordinary income. In the absence of guidance to the contrary, it is possible that any such income recognized by a U.S. tax-exempt shareholder would constitute “unrelated business taxable income” (“UBTI”). A tax-exempt shareholder should consult its tax adviser regarding whether such shareholder may recognize UBTI as a consequence of an investment in Shares. See “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.”

The Ruling & FAQs do not address whether income recognized by a non-U.S. person as a result of a fork, airdrop or similar occurrence could be subject to the 30% withholding tax imposed on U.S.-source “fixed or determinable annual or periodical” income. Non-U.S. Holders (as defined under “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences—Tax Consequences to Non-U.S. Holders” below) should assume that, in the absence of guidance, a withholding agent (including the Sponsor) is likely to withhold 30% of any such income recognized by a non-U.S. Holder in respect of its Shares, including by deducting such withheld amounts from proceeds that such non-U.S. Holder would otherwise be entitled to receive in connection with a distribution of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. See “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences.”

The Sponsor will manage the affairs of the Trust. Conflicts of interest may arise among the Sponsor and its affiliates, including the Authorized Participants, on the one hand, and the Trust and its shareholders, on the other hand. As a result of these conflicts, the Sponsor may favor its own interests and the interests of its affiliates over the Trust and its shareholders. These potential conflicts include, among others, the following:

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Affiliates of the Sponsor have substantial direct investments in ETH that they are permitted to manage taking into account their own interests without regard to the interests of the Trust or its shareholders, and any increases, decreases or other changes in such investments could affect the Index Price and, in turn, the value of the Shares;

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The Sponsor’s parent company, DCG, and certain of its subsidiaries, including Genesis Global Capital, LLC, hold 2.81% of the Shares representing ownership in the Trust, as of February 19, 2024. On March 2, 2022, the board of the Sponsor (the “Board”) approved the purchase by DCG of up to an aggregate total of $200 million worth of Shares of the Trust and shares of any of the following five investment products the Sponsor also acts as the sponsor and manager of, including Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) (NYSE Arca: GBTC), Grayscale Bitcoin Cash Trust (BCH) (OTCQX: BCHG), Grayscale Digital Large Cap Fund LLC (OTCQX: GDLC), Grayscale Stellar Lumens Trust (XLM) (OTCQX: GXLM), and Grayscale Ethereum Classic Trust (ETC) (OTCQX: ETCG). As of the date of this Annual Report, DCG has not purchased any Shares of the Trust under this authorization. However, in the event DCG chooses to purchase Shares of the Trust, such purchase would further increase DCG’s ownership interest in the Trust, which, could ultimately result in DCG holding a majority of the Shares representing ownership in the Trust, and its interests as a shareholder may conflict with the interests of the Trust’s other shareholders;

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DCG is (i) the sole member and parent company of the Sponsor, and parent company of Genesis, a Liquidity Provider to the Authorized Participant from October 3, 2022 through September 12, 2023; (ii) the indirect parent company of Grayscale Securities, the only acting Authorized Participant as of the date of this Annual Report; (iii) formerly the indirect parent company of the Index Provider (prior to its sale to an unaffiliated third party on November 20, 2023); (iv) a minority interest holder in Coinbase, Inc., which operates Coinbase, one of the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index and the Trust’s principal market, and which is the parent company of the Custodian, representing less than 1.0% of its equity; and (v) a minority interest holder in Kraken, one of the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index, representing less than 1.0% of its equity;

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DCG has investments in a large number of digital assets and companies involved in the digital asset ecosystem, including trading platforms and custodians. DCG’s positions on changes that should be adopted in the Ethereum Network could be adverse to positions that would benefit the Trust or its shareholders. Additionally, before or after a hard fork on the Ethereum Network, DCG’s position regarding which fork among a group of incompatible forks of the Ethereum Network should be considered the “true” Ethereum Network could be adverse to positions that would most benefit the Trust;

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DCG has been vocal in the past about its support for digital assets other than ETH. Any investments in, or public positions taken on, digital assets other than ETH by DCG could have an adverse impact on the price of ETH.

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The Sponsor and Grayscale Securities, which acts as Authorized Participant and distributor and marketer for the Shares, are affiliated parties that share a common parent company, DCG;

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The Sponsor and Genesis, which previously served as an Authorized Participant and distributor and marketer for the Shares, are affiliated parties that share a common parent company, DCG;

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The Sponsor may appoint an agent to act on behalf of the shareholders, including in connection with the distribution of any Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency, and such agent may be the Sponsor or an affiliate of the Sponsor; and

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Because the Sponsor and the Trust’s sole Authorized Participant are affiliated with each other, the Trust’s Baskets will not be exchanged for ETH in arm’s-length transactions.

The Sponsor is the parent company of Grayscale Securities, LLC, a registered broker dealer currently acting as the sole Authorized Participant, distributor and marketer for the Shares. The Trust issues Creation Baskets in exchange for deposits of ETH. See “Item 1. Business—Description of Creation of Shares.” As the sole Authorized Participant, Grayscale Securities is currently the only entity that may place orders to create Creation Baskets. As a result, the issuance of Creation Baskets does not occur on an arm’s-length basis.

While additional Authorized Participants may be added at any time, subject to the discretion of the Sponsor, the Sponsor may be disincentivized from replacing affiliated service providers due to its affiliated status. In connection with this conflict of interest, shareholders should understand that affiliated service providers will receive fees for providing services to the Trust. Clients of the affiliated service providers may pay commissions at negotiated rates that are greater or less than the rate paid by the Trust. The Sponsor may have an incentive to resolve questions between Grayscale Securities, on the one hand, and the Trust and shareholders, on the other hand, in favor of Grayscale Securities (including, but not limited to, questions as to the calculation of the Basket Amount).

DCG is a minority interest holder in both Coinbase, Inc. and Kraken, which operate two of the Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index Price.

DCG, the sole member and parent company of the Sponsor, holds a minority interest of less than 1.0% in each of Coinbase, Inc., which operates Coinbase, and Kraken. The Sponsor values its digital assets by reference to the Index Price. The Index Price is the price in U.S. dollars of an ETH derived from the Digital Asset Trading Platforms that are reflected in the Index developed by CoinDesk Indices, Inc. as of 4:00 p.m., New York time on each business day. Coinbase and Kraken are two of such Digital Asset Trading Platforms included in the Index.

Although DCG does not exercise control over Coinbase or Kraken, it is possible that investors could have concerns that DCG could influence market data provided by these Digital Asset Trading Platforms in a way that benefits DCG, for example by artificially inflating the values of ETH in order to increase the Sponsor’s fees. This could make the Trust’s Shares less attractive to investors than the shares of similar vehicles that do not present these concerns, adversely affect investor sentiment about the Trust and negatively affect Share trading prices.

Coinbase, Inc. is also the parent company of the Custodian, Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC. The Custodian serves as a fiduciary and custodian on the Trust’s behalf, and is responsible for safeguarding the ETH and Incidental Rights and/or IR Virtual Currency held by the Trust, and holding the private keys that provide access to the Trust’s digital wallets and vaults. DCG’s minority interest of less than 1.0% in the parent company of the Custodian may present risks to shareholders to the extent DCG causes the Sponsor to favor the Custodian’s interests over the interests of the Trust or its shareholders with respect to, for example, fees charged and the quality of service provided by the Custodian. Similarly, it is possible that investors could have concerns that DCG’s interest in Coinbase, Inc. could cause it to refrain from taking actions that are in the best interests of the Trust but that could harm the Custodian. This could make the Trust’s Shares less attractive to investors than the shares of similar vehicles that do not present these concerns, adversely affect investor sentiment about the Trust and negatively affect Share trading prices.

The Custodian is a fiduciary under § 100 of the New York Banking Law and a qualified custodian for purposes of Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6) under the Investment Advisers Act and is licensed to custody the Trust’s ETH in trust on the Trust’s behalf. However, the SEC has recently released proposed amendments to rule 206(4)-2 that, if enacted as proposed, would amend the definition of a “qualified custodian” under Rule 206(4)-2(d)(6). Executive officers of the Custodian’s parent company have made public statements indicating that the Custodian will remain a qualified custodian under the proposed SEC rule, if enacted as currently proposed. However, there can be no assurance that the Custodian would continue to qualify as a “qualified custodian” under a final rule.

Furthermore, during the initial term, the Custodian may terminate the Custodian Agreement for Cause (as defined in “Description of the Custodian Agreement—Termination”) at any time, and after the initial term, the Custodian can terminate the Agreement for any reason upon the notice period provided under the Custodian Agreement. If the Custodian resigns or is removed by the Sponsor or otherwise, without replacement, the Trust will dissolve in accordance with the terms of the Trust Agreement.